20 CFR 404.1101(d)(3)(i)
R, a fully insured worker, died in August 1966. Shortly thereafter, W, the mother of C, filed an application on behalf of C for child's insurance benefits alleging that C is the natural child of R. The mother stated that she was never married to R, that R had never acknowledged paternity of C in writing, that he had never lived with C, and that his only contribution toward C's support was food and milk for several months in 1962. In support of her application, however, W submitted a copy of a court judgment which indicated that R was not required to support "his child" because of terminal illness which made him unable to work and support "his child."
Section 216(e) of the Social Security Act, in pertinent part, defines the term "child" as the worker's child, legally adopted child, or under certain conditions, a stepchild. Section 216(h)(2)(A) provides that in determining whether an applicant is the child of a deceased insured worker, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which the worker was domiciled at the time of his death. An applicant who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child of the worker shall be deemed such. Under section 216(h)(2)(B), a child who does not qualify under the provision above may nevertheless be deemed to be the worker's child where the mother and the worker went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a kind of legal defect described in section 216(h)(1)(B) of the statute, would have been a valid marriage. A child who does not meet the requirements of section 216(h)(2)(A) or (B), may qualify under section 216(h)(3) if he meets certain other requirements.
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Since there is no evidence in this case that C was ever legitimated in accordance with State law, nor under State law acquired the status of R's child for inheritance purposes, C cannot be deemed R's child under section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act. Moreover, since C's parents failed to go through a marriage ceremony, he cannot be deemed R's child under section 216(h)(2)(B) of the Act.
The question, therefore, is whether C, who meets all other requirements for entitlement to child's benefits, is R's child within the meaning of section 216(h)(3)(C) of the Act.
The evidence showed that prior to his death R had been charged with "nonsupport of minor child [C]" and that in October 1965 the following judgment had been issued:
It is obvious this is not a court order to contribute to the support of C as no such obligation was imposed. (See SSR 67-59, C.B. 1967, p. 73, in which there was a court order to contribute.) The judgment may, however, be considered a court decree that R is C's father since it twice refers to C as "his child." Thus C meets the requirements of section 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(II) of the Act.
Accordingly, it is held that C has the status of R's child within the meaning of section 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(II) of the Act, and thus may qualify for child's insurance benefits on R's earnings record, having met all other entitlement requirements.