|
|
Volume II. Old Age Security
Final Staff Report
OLD AGE SECURITY STAFF REPORT
January 1935
OLD AGE SECURITY STAFF REPORT
To Mr. Witte
At the time of the last Census (1930) there were six and a half million
people 65 years of age and over in the United States. They constituted
5.4% of the population. As a result of a declining birth rate in this
country, which manifested itself about 1820 and persisted from that time,
the ratio of aged persons has shown a continuous growth from the date.
The increase was very slow for 40 years, more rapid from 1860 on, and
noticeably accelerated between 1920 and 1930. The latter was due to a
rather sharp decline in birth rate which set in about 1920. This decline
is expected to persist, moreover, and will of course produce a correspondingly
sharp increase in the ratio of the aged to the population as a whole.
The recent improvement in mortality rate makes its contribution to this
situation.
As the following table shows, while the ration of the aged to the total
population increased 74% in the 60 year period prior to 1920, it is expected
to increase over 140% in the 60 year period following 1920.
| Ratio
of Aged General Population: 1860 - 1980 (By Decades) |
| 1860 |
2.7 |
1920 |
4.7 |
| 1870 |
3.0 |
1930* |
5.4 |
| 1880 |
3.4 |
1940* |
6.3 |
| 1890 |
3.9 (74%) |
1950* |
7.7 (140% increase) |
| 1900 |
4.1 |
1960* |
9.3 |
| 1910 |
4.3 |
1970* |
10.1 |
| 1920 |
4.7 |
1980* |
11.3 |
*This forecast includes survivors of assumed
net immigration of 100,000 annually in years 1935-1939 inclusive, and
200,000 annually in 1940 and thereafter. There will be more than twice
as many aged in 1960 as there were in 1930.
The mechanization of industry, which has become an increasingly important
factor in our present day economy, has a significant bearing upon the
chances which this growing number of aged persons now have, or in the
future will have of preserving their economic independence. This mechanization
has placed an increasing emphasis upon youth, physical strength and ability
to stand nervous strain. This has resulted in increasing employment difficulties
for middle aged and older workers. The popular impression that the older
worker finds difficulty in either obtaining or keeping employment, and
that his problem is a growing one, is supported by findings of official
investigation, such as that made in New York, California, and Maryland.
Although such graphic phrases as "old at forty" and the "Scrap
heap at forty-five" suggest an exaggeration of the actual facts,
there is undeniably evidence of the progressive use of maximum hiring
age limits.* These limits automatically cut off employment opportunities
of men who find themselves in the labor market in middle life. There seems
to be no proof of a general policy of dismissal of older workers. It is
likely that the statement made in the New York report on the older worker
in industry is a fair statement of the general dismissal and employment
system, to-wit: If the worker has reached middle age with a long service
record, he is likely to be dismissed than the younger worker. This is
because he possesses positive value for his firm. If, however, the older
employee has served only short periods in the employ of any one firm in
his years under forty, he is just as likely to be dismissed as any younger
worker.* In all cases the older man is far less apt than the younger worker
to secure new employment.
----------
*See Maryland, Commissioner of Labor Statistics,
"The Older Worker in Maryland," 1931, pp. 9 and 10; also California
Dept. Of Industrial Relations, Special Bul. 1 and 2, "The Middle
Aged and Older Workers," 1930, pp. 7-14; also, New York, "The
Older Worker in Industry," a report to the Joint Legislative Committee
on Unemployment prepared under the auspices of the Continuation Committee
of the N.Y. State Commission on Economic Security, 1933, Chapters 10 and
11.
----------
Briefly, the above statements mean that in times of normal business activity,
the older worker with a long service record has a fair degree of security
while the man who reaches middle age without a long service record has
no security at all.
Both the Maryland and California surveys of age distribution in their
local industries indicated that beginning with the age groups 40-44 years,
there is a tendency toward lessened employment for wage earners in mechanical
and manufacturing industries, and in retail trade. With each five year
age group after 40 years is passed, the ratio in each employment group
is less than that in the corresponding population age group.** Analysis
of a sampling study of persons working or seeking work who were in receipt
of federal emergency relief in May 1934, reflects this employment difficulty
of the middle-aged and older worker.*** The percentage of persons that
had been unemployed for long periods of time was progressively larger
with each age group beyond the age of 44, as is indicated in the table
below.
--------------------------
*See "The Older Worker in Industry", a study
of New York State Manufacturing Industries, by Solomon Barkin, a report
prepared under the auspices of the Continuation Committee by the N.Y.
State Commission on Old Age Security.
**See "The Older Worker in Maryland", - Commissioner
of Labor and Statistics, 1931, pp. 12 and 13, and pp. 30 and 31. Also
"Middle Aged and Older Workers in California", California Dept.
Of Industrial Relations, Special Bul. 1 and 2, 1930, p. 53; and of, U.S.
Census, Vols. I and IV..
***Tables prepared through the courtesy of the statistical
dept. of FERA.
--------------------------
| Persons with Previous work
experience at Non-Relief Employment Seeking Work. Classified by Length
of Time since last Non-Relief Employment of Four Weeks or More and
by Age |
Time Since Last Non-Relief Employment |
All Ages |
16-24 |
25-44 |
45-54 |
55-64 |
65 and over |
| Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
%
|
Number |
% |
| Total
|
10,058 |
100.0 |
1,854 |
100.0 |
4,958 |
100.0 |
1,934 |
100.0 |
972 |
100.0 |
340 |
100.0 |
| Under 6 months |
1,609 |
16.1 |
467 |
25.4 |
788 |
16.0 |
230 |
12.0 |
98 |
10.1 |
26 |
7.7 |
| 6 to 11 months |
1,611 |
16.1 |
414 |
22.5 |
803 |
16.2 |
252 |
13.1 |
105 |
10.8 |
37 |
10.9 |
| 12 to 23 months |
1,873 |
18.7 |
378 |
20.6 |
943 |
19.1 |
333 |
17.3 |
172 |
17.8 |
47 |
13.9 |
| 24 to 35 months |
1,809 |
18.1 |
269 |
14.6 |
906 |
18.3 |
385 |
20.0 |
182 |
18.8 |
67 |
19.8 |
| 36 to 47 months |
1,364 |
13.6 |
165 |
9.0 |
654 |
13.2 |
320 |
16.6 |
168 |
17.3 |
57 |
16.9 |
| 48 months/over |
1,750 |
17.4 |
146 |
7.9 |
851 |
17.2 |
405 |
21.0 |
244 |
25.2 |
104 |
30.8 |
| Unknown
|
42 |
-
|
15 |
-
|
13 |
-
|
9 |
-
|
3 |
-
|
2 |
-
|
Based on 5 per cent samples of "Survey
of Occupational Characteristics of persons receiving Relief",
May 1934.
Unknowns distributed in computation of percentages.
That this situation is general is indicated by an analysis of census
data which shows that the ratio of the five year groups beginning with
age 40 to 45 to the estimated total number of the wage earners and salaried
employees other than principal officers is progressively smaller than
the corresponding general population ratio.
With the enormous shrinkage in employment brought by the recent severe
depression, large groups of these normally secure, competent older workers
have been discharged. There is, as a result, an aggravated problem of
"the older worker in industry" at the present time.
The small shop and business, moreover, which formerly absorbed a considerable
percentage of older workers who dropped out of more strenuous industrial
pursuits, is becoming less and less the typical establishment. This trend
is cutting off economic opportunities previously open to men and women
who had passed their peak of physical activity and had reached their slowing
down period.
As a result of these industrial trends what may be described as "economic
old age", i.e., permanent inactivity and consequent cessation of
earnings, begins in many cases well down in middle life, often antedating
by a considerable number of years the period of physiological old age.
Obviously, if a lengthened permanent period of non-earning is to be weathered
without economic dependency in old age, there must be increased earnings
during working years. Analysis of wage trends, however, such as that made
by Professor Paul Douglas in his "Real Wages in the United States",
offer little hope of such increase on the basis of our American experience
between 1890 and 1928*. Popular impression of great increased earnings
in this country during the last four decades prove on analysis of real
rather than nominal earnings to be based more upon fiction than upon fact.
The savings account situation also has been popularly misrepresented.
Even were the gain in the size of the average savings deposit attributable
to wage earners' savings account, (which of course is not so) there would
be no basis for a claim that the reserves of workers had increased in
the fifteen years prior to the depression. The average savings account
increased 29% between 1925 and 1928 but the value of the dollar decreased
almost 40% during this same interval.**
The study made by the New York Commission on Old Age Security of deposits
in Mutual Savings banks, (considered the chief depository of the wage
earners) presents a similar picture. Gain made in the size of deposits
in the decades before the 1929 crash was more than counterbalanced by
the drop in the value of money. In result, the average real deposit decreased
rather than increased during this period.***
Accumulations of many working families were lost in the business and
bank failures of 1929. These losses have been added to by the inroads
made upon savings caused by the widespread unemployment since that time.
This situation will be reflected in the figures not only of contemporary
old age dependency, but also in the old age problem for at least the next
thirty or thirty-five years. Those workers who have lost their life savings
at forty will have small prospect of recouping them before their earning
period is over.
----------
*See Paul Howard Douglas, "Real Wages
in the United States," 1890-1926, and Postlude, Pollak Foundation
Publications No. 9.
**See Savings Deposits and Depositors
in Banks and Trust Companies of the United States, compiled and published
by the Savings Bank Division, Amer. Bankers Assn., N.Y. 1930, p. 7; and
see M.L.R., Feb. 1930, p. 241, or cost of living index number, 1913 -
100, 1928 - 170.
***See N.Y. Com. on Old Age Security Report,
1930, p. 177.
----------
How many of the aged persons at present in this country are without sufficient
means of self-support is a question which can be answered only in estimated
figures. Like all other statistics of major social problems, those bearing
on old age dependence must be built up for the country as a whole from
merge samplings. The only reliable data on the whole old age dependency
situation are to be found in the surveys conducted in individual states,
most of them made in the pre-depression period. In their investigation,
these states have accepted as "insufficient subsistence income,"
for self-support, less than $25 a month. Connecticut (1932), New York
(1929) and Wisconsin (1925) found that nearly 50% of their aged population
(65 years of age and over) had less than subsistence income. Moreover,
nearly 34% of the population in Connecticut had no income whatsoever.
Over 1/5 of the Wisconsin aged had less than $8 a month.
Considering both property and income as a test of dependency (on a basis
of less than $5000 property and less than $300 a year income), well over
30% of the aged were dependent in all three of the above mentioned states
as well as in Massachusetts (1925 survey). In the latter survey, and in
the study made by the National Civic Federation, both property and income
owner jointly by old couples were counted at full value for each member
of the couple, thus understating dependency estimates. Two of the studies
made refined analysis of data that show that the ration of dependency
(judges by the combined property and income test) is markedly heavier
for single individuals living alone than for married couples (see Appendix
A to this report, page 4). In several of the states from 30 to nearly
50% of the aged were found to be dependent upon relatives or friends.
As a corollary, a heavy proportion of those receiving public aid were
single or "childless" individuals.
Beyond the fact that about 700,000 old people are members of families
that receive federal emergency relief and 180,000 are in receipt of old
age assistance grants, it is not known how many old people are being supported
from public funds. As no almshouse survey has been made for more than
ten years, the public poorhouse population is not recorded. Records of
the almshouse population in 121 urban areas kept by the U.S. Children's
Bureau, however, indicate a sharp increase in this institutional group
amounting to nearly a 75% gain between 1929 and the end of 1933. Of the
aged in private institutions, endowed and semi-endowed, there is no count.
No clearing house exists to furnish statistics of either private or public
local charitable assistance to old people not in institutions.
Despite lack of complete statistics, however, it can be said with conviction
that there has been for some years a very substantial economic problem
of old age in the United States, which has been directing public interest
toward old age security legislation as it has developed in other countries.
OLD
AGE SECURITY BOARD
Twenty countries abroad, including all large continental nations and
many small ones, have enacted legislation for the protection of workers
through contributory insurance. In addition to these twenty countries
which have legislated old age insurance for their industrial population,
there are general old age insurance schemes operative in several Swiss
cantons as well as limited systems in five nations in Central and South
America. The latter give protection to selected groups of workers, chiefly
railroad workers, seamen, and employees of public utilities and banks.
Most of these laws, including both those of general and those of restricted
coverage, insure against invalidity as well as old age, and two-thirds
of them also include survivor's insurance, i.e., pensions for the surviving
widow and children in the event of the insured worker's death. In the
British Dominions and a half dozen other countries, by a non-contributory
plan, the state provides a gratuitous pension on proof that the aged person
has insufficient income for self-support and has been guilty of no serious
misconduct.
Both France and Great Britain, in setting up their contributory old age
insurance schemes, recognized that there would always be a small residual
group of needy aged from higher income and other uninsured economic groups
who would not be eligible to insurance benefits. They have therefore retained
their non-contributory plans to provide pensions for these men and women.
The table below lists these countries and indicates coverage and dates
of old age insurance and pension legislation through 1933.
| OLD
AGE INSURANCE AND PENSION LEGISLATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES THROUGH
1933 (1) |
| A.
Compulsory Contributory Old Age Insurance Laws of General Coverage
|
|
Country
|
Year
when Passed
|
Coverage
|
| Austria (I, S) |
1927 |
Workers in industry and commerce,
inc. domestic workers, except casual domestics.
Special schemes for agricultural workers, salaried employees, and
miners. |
| Belgium (S) |
1924 |
All wages earners, inc. agricultural
workers and domestics (except casual domestics); and independent workers
with incomes below 18,000 fr. a year.
Special schemes for salaried employees and miners. |
| Bulgaria (I, S) |
1924 |
Employed persons, inc. agricultural
workers and domestics.
Special schemes for public officials |
| Chile (I) |
1924 |
Wage earners under 65 earning less
than 8000 pesos a year; independent workers with annual incomes below
8000 pesos a year. |
| Czechoslovakia (I, S) |
1924 |
Employed workers over school age
and under 60, inc. agricultural, domestic, and home workers.
Special schemes for salaried employees, miners, state employees, employees
of statutory corporation, such as railways.
Special act for independent workers, passed in 1925, not yet enforced. |
France (I, S)
See also Section C. |
1910 |
All employed persons under 60 whose
earnings do not exceed 18,000 fr, a year in cities with over 200,000
inhabitants or industrial areas, 15,000 fr. elsewhere. (Income limit
raised by 2,000 fr. in respect of each child.)
Persons employed in agriculture subject to insurance against old age
and death only.
Special scheme for miners. |
| Germany (I, S) |
1889 |
All workers, inc. agricultural, domestic,
and home workers.
Special scheme for salaried employees with annual earnings below 8,400
RM.
Special schemes for miners. |
Great Britain (I, S)
See also Section C. |
1925 |
All workers, inc. agricultural workers
and domestics; salaried employees with incomes below 1250 a year. |
| Greece (I, S) |
1932 |
All persons employed in industry
and commerce. |
| Hungary (I, S) |
1928 |
All persons employed in specified
employments. Employments may be added by Minister's order. Salaried
employees with incomes below 6000 pengo a year.
Special scheme for miners. |
| Italy (I) |
1919 |
All employed persons, inc. agricultural
and domestic workers. Salaried employees with incomes below 800 lire
a month. |
| Luxemburg (I, S) |
1911 |
Workers in industry and commerce.
Special scheme for salaried employees in industry and commerce. |
| Netherlands (I,S) |
1913 |
All employed persons, inc. agricultural
and domestic workers, whose annual remuneration does not exceed 2000
florins. Insured persons whose remuneration rises above 2000 florins
remain liable to insurance. If their remuneration has been above 3000
florins for some time, they are exempted at their request.
Special schemes for railway workers and miners. |
| Poland (I, S) |
1933 |
All workers in commerce and industry.
Insurable wage limit. |
| Portugal (I) |
1919 |
All employed persons over 15 years
earning less than 900 escudos annually. |
| Rumania (I) |
1912 |
All persons employed in industry
and commerce, and craftsmen.
Special scheme for miners in Ardeal, which includes survivors' insurance. |
| Spain |
1919 |
All employed persons whose annual
earnings do not exceed 4000 pesetas. Domestic servants excluded. |
| Sweden (I) |
1913 |
All citizens between 16 and 66 years
unless already guaranteed pension under army, navy, etc. |
| U.S.S.R (I, S) |
1922 |
All manual workers; engineers and
skilled technical workers; navigating staff in civil aviation; various
categories of salaried employees. |
| Yugoslavia (I,S) |
1922 1924
1904 |
All wage earners except household
casuals, farm labor, and sea fishermen (Not yet enforced)
All workers and other persons employed under Mining Act.
Salaried employees in Slovenia and Dalmatia who have reached age 18
and whose annual earnings are not less than 150 dinars. |
(1) Compiled from Compulsory Pension Insurance,
International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series M, No. 10, Geneva,
1933; Non-Contributory
Pensions, International Labour Office, Studies
and Reports, Series M, No. 9, Geneva, 1933; Insuring
the Essentials, Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong, 1932.
I - Old Age insurance combined with invalidity insurance.
S - Old Age insurance combined with survivors' insurance.
| B.
Compulsory Contributory Old Age Insurance Laws of Limited Coverage
|
| Country
|
Year
when Passed
|
Coverage
|
| Argentina (I, S) |
1921
1924 |
Public utility employees
Bank staffs |
| Brazil (I, S) |
1923
1926
1931 |
Railway workers.
Dock workers
Staffs of public utility undertakings. |
| Cuba (I, S) |
1927 |
Seamen and harbour workers. |
| Ecuador (I) |
1928 |
Staffs of banks. |
Switzerland
Canton Glarus (I)
Appenzell
Basle Town (S) |
1916
1925
1931 |
Legal residents between ages 17 and 50.
All legal residents between ages 18 and 64.
All persons between ages 20 and 65 who have been resident in the canton
for two years. |
Uruguay (I, S)
See also Section C. |
1919
1925 |
Staffs of public utility undertakings.
Staffs of banks and stock exchange. |
| C.
Non-Contributory Old Age Pension Laws |
| Australia (I) |
1908 |
All citizens with insufficient income,
resident 20 years. |
| Canada |
1927 |
All citizens with insufficient income;
resident in Canada 20 years, in province 5 years. |
| Denmark |
1891 |
Citizens with insufficient means,
resident 5 years. |
France (I)
See also Section A. |
1905 |
All citizens with insufficient means. |
Great Britain
See also Section A. |
1908 |
Citizens with insufficient means;
12 years' residence since age 50 for natural-born citizens; 20 years'
residence in all for naturalized subjects. |
| Greenland |
1926 |
All Greenlanders without subsistence
income. |
| Iceland |
1909 |
Citizens with insufficient means. |
| Irish Free State |
1908 |
Citizens with insufficient means,
resident 30 years. |
| Newfoundland |
1911 |
All citizens with insufficient means. |
| New Zealand |
1898 |
Citizens with insufficient means
and 25 years' continuous residence. |
| Norway (will not go into effect until
announced by Royal Decree) |
1923 |
All citizens with insufficient income. |
| South Africa |
1928 |
All citizens (of 5 years standing)
with 15 years' residence out of preceding 20 years; other persons
with 25 years residence out of preceding 30 years; insufficient income. |
Uruguay (I)
See also Section B |
1919 |
All persons with insufficient means.
(For naturalized subjects or aliens 15 years' residence is required). |
I - Old Age insurance combined with invalidity
insurance.
S - Old Age insurance combined with survivors' insurance.
General interest in old age security manifested itself in Europe about
the middle of the 19th century. The earliest legislative efforts
were made in Belgium, France and Italy. Purely voluntary old age and invalidity
funds were set up and offered to the working population for the purchase
of small old age annuities. Very little, however, was accomplished for
the wage earners by this voluntary insurance. Even the addition of substantial
governmental subsidies did not include many workers to make provision
for themselves.
Subsequent legislation toward old age security followed two patterns.
One was that of non-contributory pensions "for the aged and deserving
poor" on a plan similar to that adopted in 1891 by the pioneering
pension country, Denmark. The other was that of compulsory contributory
old age insurance adopted by Germany in 1889 and patterned after that
of the customary miner's funds that had existed in European mining communities
since the Middle Ages.
By the outbreak of the World War, gratuitous pensions had been established
in Denmark, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland, and Iceland
and nominally in France, while contributory insurance had been instituted
in Luxemburg, Roumania, and Sweden, and legislated for later operation
in the Netherlands.
Since the war, two British dominions, Canada and the Union of South Africa,
one South American state - Uruguay and the island of Greenland have established
gratuitous pensions, while Norway had enacted a pension law but deferred
its operation. In this same period, fifteen countries, including France,
Great Britain, and Italy, have legislated and organized general contributory
old age insurance measures. A half dozen other nations have established
insurance schemes for selected industrial groups.
The shift of interest abroad from gratuitous pensions to contributory
insurance has been prompted mainly by two considerations: (1) the wide-spread
objections to the "means test" basis of the non-contributory
pensions and the desire to make pensions available as of right on arrival
at old age; (2) objection to the financial strain upon the public exchequer
occasioned by the increasing percentage of aged persons who qualified
as in need of help and therefore entitled to pensions.
A tabular summary of the principal provisions of the foreign non-contributory
old age pension laws will be found in Appendix B of this report.
The most significant post-war incident in old age security legislation
abroad was Great Britain's insurance act of 1925. England's pervious choice
of the gratuitous pension approach to the old age security goal had strongly
influenced American thinking. Her acceptance of the contributory insurance
principle after nearly a generation's experience with gratuitous pensions
is of special importance to the United States. It is of major interest,
moreover, that pensions were made payable to the insured workers as of
right, shortly after the institution of the contributory plan. This was
made possible by the government providing the necessary funds for the
older workers. The scheme will ultimately be self-sustaining.
The French old age insurance scheme, which was included in her general
social insurance bill of 1928, also merits special mention on the score
of transitional arrangements, i.e., the provisions made for older workers.
Casual reading of the measure might suggest that little security was afforded
this class of insured persons, as only a benefit proportioned to their
years of insurance is guaranteed them. The clause of minimum
pensions, however, modifies this situation radically and ensures
all pensioners who have been insured at least five years (no pension being
due for a shorter insurable period) annuities which amount to 5/6 of the
normal full pension of the lowest paid workers and nearly ½ of
the normal full pension of the nest stratum of the insured. Thus, at least
a subsistence pensions is guaranteed all annuitants from the year of initial
payments.
All of the insurance systems except those of Sweden and the three Swiss
Cantons which cover the entire population, restrict their coverage almost
exclusively to employed workers. From the standpoint of needed protection
an old age insurance scheme of course should include all persons of low
earnings whether self-employed persons or wage earners. The practical
difficulty of collecting from the independent workers, however, has stood
in the way of their inclusion on a compulsory basis. All of the administrative
problems of a poll tax are involved. It is on practical and not theoretical
grounds that the usual coverage of old age insurance laws is confined
to persons who can be reached through their employers.
It is worth noting that a Czechoslovakia measure enacted in 1925 calling
for a separately organized insurance scheme for independent workers has
not yet been put in operation. It should also be mentioned that Sweden's
experience has resulted in contribution delinquencies in industrial centers
running well over 40%, which suggests that her broader coverage is more
nominal that factual. Chile's system includes independent artisans and
several of the European laws cover certain selected classes of self-employment.
Contribution from both employers and the insured workers are required
in all these systems except that of Soviet Russia, Spain, and the Netherlands.
In all of the countries except Russia, the government contributes either
by paying part of the premium or, more commonly, by adding to the annuities
which contributions will yield.
In Russia the entire cost of the insurance is assessed to the employer
which is in most cases the state itself. In Spain and in the Netherlands
the insurance cost of small basic pensions is shared by employers and
the Public Exchequer. Employees contribute if they desire ti do so in
order to secure annuities more adequate than the basic pensions. The British
old age insurance scheme, like the other parts of her social insurance
program, is based upon uniform contributions and uniform pensions, while
the continental systems relate both their contributions and their pensions
to the wages of the insured person. The British scheme has the great advantage
of simplicity. It could be effective, however, only in a country without
substantial variations in the cost of living.
The pension amounts, stated in terms of foreign currency, mean little
if anything to most Americans. For purposes of illustration a comparative
table which states the old age pension amounts as a percentage of the
engineering laborers wage in each of the countries is included in the
Appendix C to this report.
To turn from the imposing picture of old age security provision in the
rest of the western world to the situation in the United States, is to
turn to a picture dominantly characterized, by utter neglect. This is
true despite the fact that a series of state commissions began almost
30 years ago to investigate the plight of the aged, and that shortly thereafter
the American Association for Labor Legislation and the fraternal Orders
led by the Eagles, began to push for legislation in aid of the needy aged.
Until ten years ago the only permanent provision made by almost all of
the states for the needy aged was through the medium of the so-called
"almshouse" or "poor farm". The indecent conditions
existing in the majority of these institutions were made known in a book
by Harry Carroll Evans published in 1926 by a group of fraternal organizations.
This book summarized the findings of the surveys of American Almshouses
conducted by these organizations, with the aid of special examiners from
the United States Bureau of Labor. Insufficient and unfit food, filth,
and unhealthful discomfort characterized most of them. Even in the sanitary
and physically suitable buildings, feebleminded, diseased, and defective
inmates were customarily thrown in with the dependent aged.
The cost of maintaining old people in these institutions, as was revealed
by a financial survey of almshouses made by the Federal Bureau of Labor
in 1925, was high and most of it went for inefficient "overhead".
Stimulated by the facts disclosed in these two reports, the drive for
regular non-institutional aid for needy old people made more progress.
A series of measures variously described as "old age pension,"
old age assistance", "old age relief", and "old age
security" acts were enacted by state after state, totaling 18 by
the middle of 1931 and 8 with two additional territorial laws by the middle
of 1934. They offered to citizens of long residence who had small assets
and no financially competent relatives, monthly grants to enable them
to maintain themselves outside of institutions. The maximum monthly sums
available ranged from $10 to $30, (the latter being the commonest figure).
New York and Massachusetts put no maximum on their possible grants.
The early measures made the county the fiscal unit. More than a third
now call for state aid to the counties and seven make the state the responsible
unit.
The most important legislative achievement for old age security in the
United States is the Railroad Retirement Act passed by the last Congress.
This established contributory old age annuities for employees of steam
railroads, sleeping car companies, and express companies. Credit toward
annuities is guaranteed the older workers so that the system may function
for them as well as for the young men just commencing their services.
The scheme is fully contractual in that the worker who leaves railway
employment before reaching the age of sixty-five is entitled to the annuity
due him on the basis of the number of his years of railway service.
Annuities vary with the wage and the number of years of service. A higher
percentage of the first $50 of wages is used in computations so
that the annuity drawn by the lower paid worker constitutes a
higher percentage of his average wage than the annuity of the better-paid
man. This is not only sound public policy, as the low-paid worker needs
a higher ratio of his wage for subsistence, but it is also based on insurance
principles. The low-paid worker receives the highest wages of his life
during the years prior to fifty or fifty-five, after which his wages rapidly
diminish. He has, therefore, paid contributions on the higher wage during
the earlier years of his life and these contributions have been long at
interest. The reverse situation is typical of the worker in the higher
wage groups.
The "old age pension" statutes previously discussed mark the
first step away from complete and shameful neglect of the old age problem
in the United States. Even with their limited functioning they have enabled
180,000 destitute old people who have no family able to support them,
to escape the miserable almshouse existence to which all needy aged persons
previously were doomed. One of the serious limitations of these measures
is the long residence qualifications, 15 years or more, which most of
them provide. In this regard a sampling survey made by the F.E.R.A. in
six cities is pertinent. A table presenting the results of this survey
is shown in Appendix D to this report. While a very great variation in
the influence of the residence requirement exists in the various states,
it seems, from this sampling investigation, that a reduction of the residence
requirement to five years in the last ten before applying for assistance,
would include most of the old people and yet not fasten upon the states
the burden of providing special assistance for mere transients.
It must be conceded, however, that the maximum possible grants in some
of the acts are inadequate for comfortable existence, and that actual
grants, as information recently gathered indicates, have fallen in some
states even below general relief standards.
In only sixteen of the states were the measures functioning at all by
the end of 1933, and only six more have commenced activity since that
time. Moreover, the grants were given throughout the whole state in only
eleven states and one territory. Even in the "functioning" states,
the grants have not provided what the law required. To quote from the
recent report made by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "sharply
curtailed benefits and refusal to take on new pensioners, even the discontinuance
of the system altogether until times improve, are some of the measures
to which the pension officials have been forced. In certain other jurisdictions,
the result has been to crystallize the plan and to build up a waiting
list as large or larger than the number of actual beneficiaries."
Recent data obtained by the Committee from the various states are shown
in Appendix E of this report.
PROPOSED
OLD AGE SECURITY PROGRAM FOR THE UNITED STATES
In entering upon an exposition of practical proposals for old age security,
it should be repeated that the "poorhouse" and "almshouse"
method of providing for all aged dependents has been rejected by thinking
opinion as both wasteful and inhumane. Non-institutional assistance for
those who are not in need of institutional care has become an accepted
standard of decent provision for the dependent aged.
In popular debating of proper plans for the aged in an economic security
program, there has been much discussion of choosing between non-contributory
old age pensions and contributory old age insurance. It seems apparent,
however, that an old age security program involves not a choice between
gratuitous pensions and contributory insurance, but a combination of the
two. It seems equally apparent that only gratuitous pensions can serve
to meet the problem of the millions of persons who are already superannuated
or shortly will be so and are without sufficient income for a decent subsistence.
Contributory insurance financed exclusively by workers and their employers
obviously offers no solution of the problems of the near future. It can,
on the other hand, enable younger workers with the aid of their employer
gradually to build up their right to annuities in their old age. Insurance
annuities are unquestionably to be preferred to non-contributory pensions.
They come to the workers as a right, whereas the gratuitous pension must
be conditioned upon a "means" test. The gratuitous pension,
moreover, in fairness to the legitimate demands of other needy groups,
must hold all grantee down to a minimum standard. Insurance
annuities, on the other hand can be ample for a comfortable existence,
bearing some relation to customary wage standards.
Contributory insurance could be expected in time to carry the major,
but never the entire load. Administrative problems stand in the way of
insuring all workers who need old age protection. Moreover, it may always
be expected that some persons from higher income groups will come to financial
grief and dependence in old age. Non-contributory pensions, even in the
long--time old age security planning, have a definite place.
The old age security program here proposed comprises three separate schemes:
(1) A federal system of grants-in-aid to the state old age assistance
laws.
(2) A national, compulsory, old age insurance system covering such employed
persons of small earning capacity as can be reached practically by such
an insurance scheme (supplemented by certain voluntary provisions).
(3) A system of individual old age annuities for persons of low and moderate
incomes not covered by the social insurance scheme.
No provision for any type of institutional maintenance is proposed. Yet
there are, of course, aged persons who, while not needing hospitalization,
do require constant custodial care. The almshouse or poorhouse of most
of the states is, of course, a most unsuitable answer to their needs.
The staff is aware of this situation, but feels that lack of factual data
bearing on these county institutions and their inmates prevents intelligent
planning for this problem now. It therefore recommends that the United
States Department of Labor undertake at once a special survey of such
institutions with a view to working out a constructive program for the
improvement of institutional maintenance of the aged.
Non-Contributory Old Age Pensions.
As has been stated previously in this report, there are now twenty-eight
states and two territories with old age assistance laws, which professedly
offer varying standards of aid to aged persons, granted upon differing
conditions. Six of these laws are practically non-functioning. Four are
just getting under way. Many of the others, through financial pressure,
have cut benefits below a proper minimum, and have long waiting lists
of needy persons. It would seem quite clear that due to the financial
limitations of many of the states and the indifference of others, state
action alone cannot be relied upon to provide either adequate or universal
old age assistance.
It is recommended
(1) That the federal government enter this situation by offering grants-in-aid
the states and territories which provide old age assistance for their
needy aged under plans that are approved by the federal authority, such
plans to include proposed administrative arrangements, estimated administrative
costs, and the method of selecting personnel;
(2) That the grants-in-aid constitute one-half of the expenditures, including
administrative expenses, for non-institutional old age assistance made
by any state or territory under a plan approved by this federal authority,
provided that in computing the amount of said grants-in-aid, not more
than $15.00 per month shall be paid in federal subsidy on account of assistance
Provided for any aged persons in such state or territory, nor more than
5% of the total expenditures for assistance on account of administration;
(3) A state or territory, on account of administration, shall be permitted
to impose qualifications upon the granting of assistance to needy aged
persons, but it should be stipulated in the Congressional statute providing
for the grants-in-aid that no plan shall be approved by the federal administrative
agency unless it
(a) is State-wide or territory--wide, and if administered by subdivisions
of the State or territory, is mandatory upon such subdivisions; and
(b) establishes or designates a state welfare authority which shall be
responsible to the federal government for the administration of the plan
in the State; and which shall administer the plan locally through local
welfare authorities; and
(c) grants to any claimant the right of appeal to such State authority;
and
(d) provides that such State authority shall make full and complete reports
to the Federal administrative agency in accordance with rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the Federal Administrative agency; and
(e) provides a minimum assistance grant which will provide a reasonable
subsistence compatible with decency and, health, provided that in the
event that the claimant possesses income, this minimum grant may be reduced
by the amount of such income, and
(f) provides that whether or not assistance shall be denied to certain
needy aged persons, it shall be granted at least to any person who
(1) is a United States citizen; and
(2) has resided in the State or territory for five years or more, within
the ten years immediate preceding application for assistance; and
(3) is not an inmate of an institution; and
(4) has an income inadequate to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible
with decency and health; and
(5) possesses no real or personal property, or possesses real or personal
property of a market value of not more than $5,000; and
(6) is 70 years of age or older; provided that after January 1, 1940,
assistance shall not be denied to an otherwise qualified person after
he is 65 years of age or older; and
(g) provides that at least so much of the sum paid as assistance to any
aged recipient as represents the share of the United States government
in such assistance, shall be a lien on the estate of the aged recipient
which, upon his death, shall, be enforced by the State or territory, and
the amount collected reported to the Federal administrative agency.
Estimates of future subsidy costs like all forecasts must of course be
offered as probabilities rather than certainties. The staff has predicated
the estimate which they present on an assumption which they feel is liable
to error on the side of understatement of the problem. The data that were
studied as a basis for the estimate include material collected and analyzed
by the several state commissions on old age dependency, statistics of
the functioning of state old age assistance laws, and. the history of
the functioning of gratuitous pension laws elsewhere in operation, particularly
those of Denmark, Australia, and Canada. The average pension amount used,
$20, is undoubtedly too low for the period covered. This is felt to be
counter-balanced by the fact that the increase in the ratio of dependency
may well be less rapid than that which is counted upon in this estimate.
The staff is convinced that, however the actual figures may vary from
those presented, i.e., whether they will, be more or less in any one year
projected, the trend indicated in the following table will be inescapable.
There are several reasons for this conviction. The assurance of the old
age pension in case of need, a pension which is sponsored by the federal
government, tends to produce in the minds of the population a feeling
that the pension is available in old age as of right. This reflects itself
in the attitude of children toward supporting their parents and puts pressure
upon the administrators of the pension laws, which sends the pension ratio
up. Moreover, the very principle of the gratuitous pension, that is, that
the less income the applicant has, the more pension he receives, and vice
versa, has an effect which is the inverse of inducement to thrift. The
number of aged persons who arrive at old age without any income is actually
increased.
The following estimates of the cost of the federal subsidies under the
proposed plan on the assumptions suggested by the staff and indicated
in the heading, has been prepared by the staff actuary. These estimates
were not concurred to by the staff actuaries nor by the actuarial advisory
board. These actuaries present estimates showing substantially larger
projected costs, which are found in Appendix G of this report.
| I. AMOUNT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY (OLD AGE ASSISTANCE)
Assuming: (1) dependency ratio of 15% in 1936, increasing thereafter
to maximum of 40% in 1961 and subsequent years; (2) average grant
of $20 per month; (3) federal subsidy of one-half payments, and
one-half administrative costs.
Year |
Number receiving old age
grants
(1,000) |
Amount of
federal subsidy
(1,000,000) |
| 1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 |
897
1046
1200
1372
1580
2293
3153
4140
5304
5735
6026
6405
6800 |
72.2*
131.8
151.2
172.8
199.1
289.0
397.3
521.6
668.3
722.7
759.3
807.0
856.7 |
* Full year cost reduced for administration lag.
Note: This table is based on the assumption that
there will be no contributory system in effect. Estimates of the
amount of federal subsidy assuming the existence of a contributory
system are found in Appendix F.
The estimate offered by the Actuarial staff assume
considerably large costs. They are found in Appendix G.
APPENDUM:
It has been suggested that the federal government might as a matter
of fiscal policy desire to finance the old age assistance grants
for a temporary period by borrowing. Should such a temporary expedient
be deemed necessary, it may be pointed out that for a number of
years the income paid in to the old age insurance fund by employees
and their employers will exceed the benefits payable from the fund;
and that such excess would presumably in any event be invested in
government securities. Under normal circumstances the fund would
purchase these government obligations in the open market, thus reducing
the outstanding indebtedness to the general public. For periods
when the government debt is increasing, the Treasury might borrow
directly from the insurance fund. It would seem unwise ordinarily
to create a special class of indebtedness for the insurance fund,
even to the extent of the subsidy for the old age assistance laws,
unless no other government securities are appropriate, particularly
as regards yield.
Contributory Old
Age Insurance
In supplement to the foregoing old age assistance program, it is
recommended. That a contributory old age insurance system be legislated
at once to go into operation in 1936. A straight national old age
insurance system is proposed. In fact, there could be no sound actuarial
basis for a scheme based upon the state as an insurance unit. It
must be borne in mind that old age insurance is based upon a long
contributory period running up to a maximum of 45 or 50 years. The
ratio of the insured who will reach 65 years of age and over each
year to the general insured population can be projected for the
United States as a whole, and it is thus possible to compute the
rates of contribution necessary to produce certain stipulated pensions.
This forecast cannot be made for individual states, as there is
no way of estimating the above ratio on a state basis. This is due
to the fact that the migration of workers from one state to another,
following the unpredictable shift in the areas of economic activity,
causes a movement of population of working ages that is not accompanied
by a proportionate movement of superannuated groups. Because of
industrial development, younger workers may be drained out of certain
states into others, leaving the population of the former heavily
weighted with older age groups.
The plan proposed involves in the early years the use of funds
contributed by younger and middle-aged workers to pay a part of
the pensions to superannuated workers. This requires that the proportions
of persons of various age groups be determined in advance for the
proper computation of contributions and benefits. Rapidly changing
proportions, such as might occur in a single state, would involve
serious financial risks were the insurance unit the state rather
than the federal government.
Even were this not the case, there would be major difficulties
in the way of old age insurance on a state basis due to the shift
in population from state to state, since continuous insurance is
essential to a proper functioning of the scheme. Gaps in contribution
years caused by the states not adopting insurance and by states
deferring the adoption of insurance would make impossible the assurance
of any definite pension. Only a straight, national, old age insurance
scheme could rest upon a sound actuarial basis, and only a scheme
resting upon such a basis could perform the function
which insurance is expected to perform.
Old age insurance is not complicated with the necessity of reports
on cause of terminating employment, merit rating, contracting out,
etc., which are involved in projected unemployment insurance plans,
and it is therefore less difficult to adjust to the constitutional
requirements of federal legislation. The old age security staff
is convinced that the proposed national scheme is entirely feasible
from a constitutional stand-point. They have reached this conclusion
in reliance upon the argument of Mr. Holtzoff of the Technical Board
and upon the opinions of Professor Thomas Reed Powell, Professor
of Constitutional Law in the Harvard Law School; Professor Dudley
O. McGovney, Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of
California Law School (author of a leading case book on Constitutional
Law); Professor Corwin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University;
and Professor Douglas Maggs, Professor of Constitutional
Law at Duke University. These academic men are well known nationally
through many published articles in the field of constitutional law.
The plan projected in this report evolved from the schemes included
in the preliminary report presented in September. The latter included
Scheme A, which provided full pensions for older workers as though
the insurance system had been functioning all their working lives;
Scheme B, which provided pensions for older workers that made no
special provision whatsoever for workers who were middle aged and
over at the time that the insurance system went into effect.
Both these schemes were academically possible old age insurance
programs. The evolution of the plan now proposed has taken place
through the following process:
The plans have been subjected to critical detailed analysis by
the staff -
They have been subjected to criticism by the Sub-committee on Old
Age Security of the Technical Board -
They have been subjected to criticism by the Executive Committee
of the Technical Board-
They have been subjected to criticism by the Executive Director
appointed by the Committee on Economic Security itself -
These criticisms produced the following main objections:
(1) That Scheme A, proposed in the preliminary report, (involving
full accrued liability) (a) put a too heavy, sudden tax burden on
industry, (b) called for indefensibly large annual contributions
from the government - far in excess of practical possibilities and
unjustifiably large from any point of view, (c)
that funding of the ultimate necessary federal subsidy and even
distribution of it over the years, would build up reserves ultimately
totaling 90 to 100 billion dollars, which would involve the government
in investment problems considered impossible by financial advisers
of the Committee, (Treasury Department representatives), (d) that
the projected pensions themselves were unnecessarily large from
the standpoint of a reasonable security program.
Scheme A was abandoned altogether.
The chief objections to Scheme B (no accrued liability) were that
it was, from a practical point of view, out of the question for
two reasons; (a) that it would produce for many years such small
pensions as to subject it to general disapproval, (4 per cent contributions
would pay $2.58 per month after five years, $5.95 after ten years,
and $10.19 after 15 years).
| For 4% contributions |
after 5 years contributions--
$2.58 per month
after 10 years contributions-- $5.95 per month
after 15 years contributions-- $10.19 per month |
The great majority of people do not realize how slowly annuities
grow, and it was deemed that the pensioners would believe that they
were not receiving a fair return for their contributions. From the
point of view of social results, moreover, the scheme would be condemned
as not providing a substantial reduction of old age dependency for
more than a generation. Such a delay in effectiveness was deemed
highly undesirable in view of what a reasonably planned old age
insurance scheme could achieve.
(b) It would, as in the case of Scheme A above, pile up such large
reserves (in this case 50 to 60 billion dollars) that the fiscal
authorities would be unable to find suitable investment outlet for
them. It was suggested that the investment market of both the government
and private business would be undermined by an attempt to place
such reserves at interest.
Scheme B was abandoned altogether.
After the abandoning of the two extremes involved in A and B, a
series of compromise plans were projected in the attempt to meet
objections registered, to the extent that they could be met without
departing altogether from the social insurance pattern.
In the course of discussion on this series of projected compromise
plans, a maximum reserve of ten billion dollars was suggested by
advisers from the Treasury Department, with the injunction that
it be kept within five billion if possible.
One other point was quite generally emphasized: that any special
provision for the worker who was middle-aged, or over at the time
of the launching of the scheme, should commence at a relatively
low amount and increase with each succeeding year of his contribution
to the insurance system. The plan ultimately adopted
and, here presented predominantly but not entirely a pay-as-you-go
scheme, which builds up and maintains a contingency reserve equivalent
to about one-fifth of the full reserve.
The proposed contributory insurance plan follows.
The old age insurance scheme should cover (a) all manual wage earners,
and (b) non-manual wage earners employed at a rate of not more than
$50 a week, with the exception of those workers who are in the employ
of the federal, state, or municipal or of municipal or quasi-municipal
corporations or who are subject to the U.S. Railroad Retirement
Act, and with the further exception, for practical
administrative reasons, of domestic and, agricultural employees
during the initial period of the operation of the scheme. Legislation
should include two separate measures, one a taxing measure, and
the other a permanent appropriation measure. Congress should levy:
(1) a payroll tax upon eligible payroll, defined payroll of all
manual wage earners and eligible non-manual wage earners payroll
to be assumed for taxation purposes not to exceed $50 for any employed
person; (2) a tax upon wages of all persons involved in the payroll
taxes in (1) -- the wage of each taxable employee for taxation purposes
to be deemed not to exceed $50 per week -- such wage tax to be collected
for the government through the agency of the employer who will be
authorized and directed to withhold the wage tax due from each employee
from the wages payable to each employee; the taxes levied on the
employee shall be represented by coupon stamps, provided, however,
that under regulations to be proregulated by the Internal Revenue
Division, employers may, on filing proper bonds, be authorized to
substitute a mechanical stamping device for imprinting coupon stamps
in the passbooks of taxable employees; the provisions of laws governing
the engraving, issue, sale, accountability, effacement, and destruction
of stamps relating to tobacco, snuff, and oleomargarine, as far
as applicable shall apply to the stamps provided, for the payment
of the taxes.
It is proposed: that there be a qualifying contributory period
of five years before payments of any pensions; that an insurance
book shall be provided for each worker, in which stamps recorded
will evidence tax payments on his account; that the insured worker
shall, on becoming subject to the insurance tax, file this insurance
book with his employer, and on changing employment, shall file this
insurance book with each successive employer; that the employer
shall be responsible to the government for collecting the tax due
from his employee by placing the proper stamps in the insurance
book; that these books shall be periodically (every six months)
checked by the administrative authorities and pension credit permanently
recorded; that used books shall be mailed to the proper office through
franking arrangements or personally delivered at local administrative
offices for checking; that new books shall be franked to the employers
or made available for collection by employers at local administrative
offices; that arrangements shall be made for permitting employers
with stable payrolls who desire to do so, to pay their payroll tax
quarterly in advance, with adjustments at the end of each annual
period.
The tax recommended is in the following amounts: 1% in the first
five years the system is in effect; 2% in the second five years;
3% in the third five years; 4% in the fourth five years; and 5%
thereafter. It is recommended that employers and employees each
pay one-half of the above percentages, with the employer responsible
for the payment of the employee's tax but entitled to deduct the
same amount from the wages due the employee.
Federal Contributions.
Federal subsidy shall become payable when the reserves have reached
$12 billion and shall be an amount sufficient to prevent reserve
from falling below this total. (This figure represents a substantial
contingency reserve, constituting approximately one-fifth of the
full reserve needed to support the pension scheme.)
Benefits. It is
proposed to provide a larger relative annuity for lower paid workers
by weighting more heavily the first $15 of weekly wage. In the following
description of benefits, however, the average percentage paid to
all wage groups is used in indicating the annuities payable in each
year. The following plan of benefits applies only to persons entering
the insurance system during the first five years of its operation,
and is organized to cover the situation of workers who are middle-aged
and over at the time that the system goes into operation.
No annuities are to be paid until five years after the system has
been in operation nor to any worker who has not been insured for
five years and made at least 200 weekly tax payments before reaching
the age of 65 years. Thereafter the following benefits are to be
paid on retirement at age 65 or over to a worker who has been insured
five years and has made at least 200 weekly tax payments:
(1) An annuity equal to 15% of the average weekly contributions
wage (not counting that portion of average weekly contribution wage
in excess of $35 weekly.)
(2) This annuity is to be increased as follows: In the next five
years, l% of the average weekly wage (such average not to be in
excess of $35 weekly) in which tax payments are
made shall be added for each 40 weekly tax payments, provided that
the increase shall be not more than 1% per year of insurance; thereafter
2% shall be added for each 40 weekly tax payments, not to exceed
2% per year of insurance, until a maximum pension of 40% of the
average weekly wage upon which tax payments have been made has been
reached, provided, however, that the maximum pension payment shall
never be less than the actuarial equivalent of the workers own contributions
made before reaching the age of 65 years.
(3) A death benefit to legal or actual dependents of insured workers
who die, in the amount of the worker's own contributions, less the
aggregate amount paid to the worker as an annuity.
Any worker who, while having made tax payments, is not entitled
to a pension on reaching age 65, shall be entitled to the amount
of his own tax payments with 3% compound interest.
As has been stated, the foregoing plan of benefits applies to persons
entering the insurance during the first five years after the system
goes into operation, and takes care of the workers who are middle-aged
or over when the insurance goes into operation. The permanent
plan of benefits which follows does not need to plan for such workers.
The full pension is therefore adjusted to the contributory period
of a "normal" working life.
Permanent Plan
of Benefits.
In the permanent plan of benefits a person (1) who has been insured
5 years and has made at least 200 weekly tax payments
shall be entitled to a pension of 10% of the average weekly wage,
such average not to be in excess of $55 weekly upon which weekly
tax payments have been made. Thereafter there shall be added to
his pension 1% for each 40 weekly tax payments, this added amount
not to exceed 1% for each year of insurance after the qualifying
period, except that the annuity shall never be less than the actuarial
equivalent of the worker's own contributions made before reaching
the age of 65 years; (2) a death benefit to legal or actual dependents
of insured workers who die, in the amount of the worker's own contributions,
less the aggregate amount paid to the worker as an annuity.
Any insured worker who, on reaching age 65 is not entitled to a
pension will be entitled to the amount of his own tax payments with
3% compound interest.
Under both the transitional and the permanent plans of benefit,
the annuitant with a dependent spouse will have the privilege of
choosing a joint survivorship annuity with the proviso that the
reduced amount payable during their joint lives shall be not less
than 60 per cent of the individual annuity to which the worker would
have been entitled. Under both the transitional and the permanent
plans of benefit, the worker who leaves insurable employment after
having been insured five years and paid not less than 200 weekly
tax payments, shall be entitled to continue his insurance voluntarily.
The following table shows the progress of the contributions, annuity
payments and reserves projected for the first 45 years of the operation
of the insurance plan proposed.
| PROGRESS OF RESERVE
UNDER PROPOSED OLD AGE INSURANCE PLAN
(All estimates in millions of dollars) |
| Year |
Net Contributions |
Interest
on
Reserve |
Federal Subsidy |
Benefits Payments |
Reserve
End of
Year |
| 1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 |
227.2
229.5
231.7
234.0
236.2
485.8
504.2
805.0
1140.0
1484.4
1543.7
1603.1
1662.5
1662.5 |
0.0
6.8
13.8
21.1
28.7
36.5
91.8
172.7
259.0
328.4
343.5
343.5
343.5
343.5 |
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
124.3
474.6
775.7
1109.0 |
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.6
4.7
36.4
201.0
512.7
989.2
1575.3
2011.5
2421.2
2781.7
3115.0 |
226.7
461.5
704.5
956.0
1216.2
1702.1
3454.8
6220.4
9043.5
11184.3
11450.0
11450.0
11450.0
11450.0 |
*Joint contributions less administration expenses as follows:
|
Years
|
Joint Contributions
as % of Payroll
|
Expenses
as % of
Contributions
|
| 1936-40
1941-45
1946-50
1951-55
1956-80 |
1%
2
3
4
5 |
10%
8-1/3
6-2/3
5
5 |
Special attention should be called, to the proviso that there be
payment of the worker's "contributions" to his dependents
when he dies either before arriving at pensionable age or before
receiving in pension payments the amount of his own contributions.
This is, of course, a beginning of protection for survivors. Survivors'
insurance, i.e., provision through insurance for the dependent wife
and children of the worker in the event of his death, is in the
opinion both of the staff and of the Technical Board's sub-committee
on old age security an inevitable future development of social insurance
in this country. Seventeen of the twenty-six old age insurance schemes
abroad are combination old age, invalidity, and survivors' insurance.
These types of insurance have one feature in common that makes them
akin from an actuarial standpoint, i.e., they call for continuing
payments or pensions rather than for temporary benefits. The combination
of old age insurance and survivors insurance, moreover, is a happy
one from the psychological standpoint, as the young worker who makes
his social insurance contributions knows that he is purchasing protection
that will materialize whether or not he lives to old age.
The return of the tax payments made by the worker to his dependents
in the event of his death, while not of course, real survivors'
insurance, at least assures the worker that he is not purchasing
his own old age security at the expense of protection to his family.
It is fully recognized in recommending full coverage there will
be a real likelihood of many small employers evading their obligations,
especially at the outset. It is believed, however, that the extent
of non-compliance will, with proper educational effort on the part
of the government end with a policy of severe penalties for deliberate
non-compliance on tho part of the employer, steadily diminish. Since
there is a constant flow of workers from large to small establishments
it is believed by both actuarial staff and the advisory actuarial
board that limited coverage would eat at the actuarial foundation
of the scheme. Moreover, administrative difficulties of ascertaining
coverage under a scheme limited to establishments with a certain
number of employees which would necessitate constant repeated check
of all small establishments to determine whether the limit set was
reached, at any time, might well be quite as formidable as those
which must be faced in straight universal coverage.
Compared with the administrative problems involved in unemployment
insurance with its necessity of determining the cause of severing
employment, the existence of re-employment, the suitability of available
work and similar allied questions, the administrative requirements
of old age insurance are not complicated. The very number of individual
tax records that must be kept, however, makes the question of administration
a new one in point of magnitude for this country.
The staff recommends that a staff of specialists in administrative
detail be called together at once for the working out of suitable
enforcement machinery for the projected insurance program. It is
their belief that the collection of the insurance tax necessitates
some sort of stamp system such as is operative in several of the
old age insurance schemes abroad, and that experienced administrators
from both Great Britain and Germany should be included in any group
of experts who may be assembled.
The staff further recommends that there be undertaken at once a
special industrial census designed to furnish data relating occupied
person and their ages, wages, income, etc., to their specific employment.
This census should furnish important information needed for both
unemployment and old age insurance programs which at present is
lacking, including: (1) the number of employees in the various occupations,
as distinguished from self-employed persons; (2) wage rates and
earnings of such employees; (3) the relating of such employees and.
their ages, their wage rates, earnings, etc. to the size of establishment,
and similar allied data. It is suggested that the actuarial staff
and advisory board of this committee participate in the planning
of this census.
It is believed that effective administration of the old age insurance
system demands that an independent board be established which would
be directly responsible for its administration. Such a board should
be set apart from any executive department of government in the
same manner as the Federal Reserve Board, The Railroad Retirement
Board, The Interstate Commerce Commission, and The Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. However, such a board would necessarily have
close contacts with both the Department of Labor and the Treasury.
It would cooperate with the former in all relations with wage earners
and employers, with particular reference to the employment agencies,
and with the latter in the collection, investment, and disbursement
of funds. Moreover, it will of course be desirable to utilize local
agencies of the states which are handling state unemployment insurance
schemes by deputizing whenever possible in the operation of the
old age insurance scheme.
The advantages of an independent board are numerous and important.
The membership of the board should include outstanding persons in
the field of social insurance administration who could be secured
with difficulty if offered positions as lesser officials in any
department. The safeguarding of the interests of the insured population,
both in the formulation of regulations, and in the development cf
new policies and practices, demands that the Board be a non-political
organization and that it be protected as far as possible from political
influences even such as may arise from an executive department under
a politically minded administration. While the actual handling and
investment of funds would be carried on by the Treasury Department,
accounting responsibility, and the control of disbursements should
be centered in the Board, which might also have a voice in the formulation
of investment policy. The smooth functioning of a program of this
magnitude will necessitate a highly competent technical staff; it
is probably easier to secure good and proper classifications for
such employees under the Classification Act under the set-up of
a new independent Board, than in a new bureau in an established
department. This is both because of crystallized practice which,
even though departmental, would be influential with the Civil Service
Commission and because, under departmental organizations, bureau
chiefs are themselves several grades from the top. In inaugurating
an insurance system, the government is assuming a new type of financial
responsibility to its citizens which should be focused in a body
whose full time and interest is directed toward meeting that responsibility.
Voluntary Old
Age Insurance
In addition to the compulsory old age insurance plan, it is proposed
that there be established, as a related but separate undertaking,
voluntary system of government old age annuities. Under such a plan,
the government would sell to individuals, on a cost basis, deferred
life annuities similar to those issued by commercial insurance companies;
that is, in consideration of premiums paid at specified ages, the
government would guarantee the individual concerned a definite amount
of income starting at, say, sixty-five and continuing throughout
the lifetime of annuitant.
The primary purpose of a plan of this character would be to offer
persons not included within the compulsory insurance arrangement
a systematic and safe method of providing for their old age. The
plan could also be used, however, by insured persons as a means
of supplementing the limited old age income provided under the compulsory
plan.
Without attempting to outline in detail the terms under which government
annuities should be sold, it is believed that a satisfactory and
workable plan, based on the following principles, could be developed
without great difficulty:
1. The plan should be self-supporting, and premiums and benefits
should be kept in actuarial balance by any necessary revision of
the rates indicated by periodical examinations of the experience.
2. The terms of the plan should be kept as simple as practicable
in interest of the economic administration and to minimize misunderstanding
on the part of individuals utilizing these arrangements. This could
be accomplished by limiting the types of annuity offered to two
or three of the most important standard forms.
3. In recognition of the fact that the plan would be intended primarily
for the lower and middle wage classes, provision should be made
for the acceptance of relatively small premiums, such as one dollar
per month, and for the limiting of the maximum pension payable to
any individual under these arrangements to, some such sum as one
hundred dollars per month.
4. The plan should be aimed primarily at the provision of old age
income, and this objective should be recognized by eliminating from
the annuity contract, cash (surrender value) and loan values and,
possibly, also, return of premiums in the event of death prior to
retirement.
5. The plan should be managed by the insurance authority along
with the compulsory old age insurance system.
No estimates have been made as to the amount of annuity reserves
that would be accumulated under a plan such as that proposed above.
It is believed, however, that the fiscal problems presented by such
reserves would not be serious.
In conclusion, the staff wish to state that they feel it to be
a serious error to assume that government contribution to a social
insurance scheme is a "gratuity". They believe that analysis
shows it to be an investment of major importance.
Social insurance is an institution designed to prevent destitution
and dependency. Destitution and dependency are enormously expensive,
not only in the initial cost of necessary assistance, but in the
disastrous psychological effect of relief upon the recipients, which
in turn breeds more dependency.
The quality of self-respect which perhaps more than any other helps
to build and maintain a sturdy community has an important dollar
and cent value to society. Government contribution to social insurance
is based upon a recognition of this situation. It amounts to a dedication
to the policy of putting public funds into keeping people out of
a state of destitution in substitution for the policy of charitable
assistance for them after dependency has become a fact.
Experience abroad has demonstrated that the health, morale and
standard of living of the worker have definitely improved under
social insurance. This points to the fact that from the standpoint
of sound economic policy, social insurance would be justified even
were the net cost of government participation in excess of the primary
cost of the relief it replaces. In view of the fact that the reverse
is actually the case, and that even a generous governmental share
in social insurance costs brings a direct as well as indirect economic
saving in the long run, the great development of social insurance
institutions in the civilized world today is readily understood.
More than a score of countries have adopted old age insurance plans
for their working population. In most of these plans the government
shares in the cost--either by paying a part of the premium, or more
commonly, by adding to the pension when it falls due.
The compulsory insurance plan proposed in this report asks that
the government share in the cost of pensions only for middle aged
and older workers, leaving the pensions for younger insured persons
to be financed exclusively by contributions of workers and their
employers. It should be emphasized, however, as the fact is one
that might well be overlooked, that pensions through the insurance
scheme for these older workers mean not only an improvement in the
lot of the aged who receive the pensions, but also a lift in the
standard of living of the millions of wage earning families represented
by their children, who would otherwise be burdened with their support.
The staff have realized that it is dubious policy to plan an old
age insurance scheme which does not include a permanent government
contribution to all pensions paid. It is debatable whether industry
and workers in the present economic organization of society (from
which of us, whether immediately concerned in industry or not, profit)
should be asked to furnish, even through insurance, sufficient contributions
to provide ample retirement annuities for superannuated workers.
It is with the hope that both wage standards and business profits
will over the course of years be able to so do, and the realization
that the government can and will step in if this hope is unfounded,
that the payment plan of compulsory old age insurance is put forward--as
furnishing at least a suitable foundation on which to build.
Appendix A
EXTENT
OF OLD AGE DEPENDENCY IN THE UNITED STATES
It must be pointed out from the very beginning that there are no
figures available indicating the extent of old age dependency for
the United States as a whole. A number of surveys of the number
of old people have been made in individual states. Very often these
state commissions making the surveys limited themselves to estimating
the number of people that would become eligible under a state law,
which, in addition to requiring a means test to be passed by the
old person, made children and relatives responsible for the support.
These estimates give no true picture of the economic status of the
old people. There are some surveys, however, which classify old
people according to property and income, without taking into account
the economic status of children and relatives. These surveys give
a more accurate picture of the extent of old age dependency than
do the reports which estimate the number of old people who will
be eligible to old age assistance under state laws.
The simplest method of measuring the economic status of the aged
is to ascertain their income. It has been customary to place a person
with an annual income below $300 in the dependent class. In comparing
the estimates of old people who have an income of less than $300
a year (without taking into account any property they might possess),
there is a surprising amount of agreement among the various surveys.
As will be seen by the following table, they all place this number
at below 50% of the aged.
| Percentage
of Aged People with Incomes of Less than $300 Annual Income
|
| Connecticut |
1932 |
(persons over 65) (1) |
49.2%
51.3% urban/42.7% rural) |
| New York |
1929 |
(persons over 65) (2) |
48.2% |
| Wisconsin |
1915 |
(persons over 60) (3) |
47.1% |
The Connecticut survey of 1932 brought out the fact that 33.5%
of the people over 65 in that state had no income whatsoever. The
Wisconsin report of 1915 has stated that 21% of the old people over
60 had incomes below $100. Only 29% of these old people in Wisconsin
had incomes above $500.(5)
A less satisfactory classification is one made according to the
property which the old person possesses. It is obvious that it is
difficult to estimate the true value of a home, and even if this
could be done without difficulty, the ownership of a home does not
keep an old person from becoming dependent. This is undoubtedly
the reason why only the Connecticut and Wisconsin commissions classified
old people according to the amount of property.
| Aged
Persons Classified by Property |
| |
No
property |
Below
$1000 |
Below
$1500 |
Below
$3000 |
Connecticut (65 yrs. &
over) (6)
Wisconsin (60 yrs.
& over) (7) |
34.9% |
47.6%
41.5% |
50.2% |
58.7% |
---------------------------------
(1) Connecticut Report, 1932, tables 13 and 14.
(2) New York Report, 1930.
(3) Wisconsin Report, 1915.
(4) Connecticut Report, 1932, Tables 13 and 14.
(5) Wisconsin Report, 1915.
(6) Connecticut Report, 1932, Table 14.
(7) Wisconsin Report, 1915.
---------------------------------
As in the income classification, the Connecticut survey indicates
that old people living in cities are considerably worse off than
those in rural areas. The percent-age of old. people owning less
than $3000 worth of property is 61.1% for urban areas, while it
is 54.1% for rural areas.
More important for the purposes of this report than the above classifications
by income or property separately are the attempts on the port of
a number of commissions to combine income and property of the old
people, and then place persons with property and income below a
specified amount in the dependent group. It is quite arbitrary where
this "danger line" is drawn, and different commissions
have drawn it at different points. The New York Commission of 1930
was anxious to make a comparison of its findings with those of the
Massachusetts survey 1925 and the National Civic Federation Study
of 1926-27, and so it put the danger line at property below $5000
and income below $300 a year. In order to furnish a comparison,
the Connecticut figures were placed on the same basis. It will be
seen that the figures of the Massachusetts Commission and of the
National Civic Federation study are much lower than they are for
the other two surveys. This is, at least in part, due to the fact
that the Massachusetts and National Civic Federation surveys counted
the amount of property and income, owned jointly by an old couple,
at the full value for each member of the couple. It is felt that
because of this procedure, they do not give a true picture. The
Connecticut Commission tried to solve this difficulty by separating
altogether the old persons living by themselves from those living
with others. Their samples were large enough to enable the Commission
to make generalizations for the entire state. The New York samples,
on the other hand, were extremely limited, and for this reason no
generalization was attempted.
| Percentage
of Persons 65 and Over Having Property Less than $5000 And Income
less than $300 Annually |
| |
Individuals
|
Households
|
Combined
|
| Connecticut, 1932
(1) |
46.0
(Urban 50%/Rural 39%) |
24.8%
(Urban 26.5%/Rural 21.9%) |
|
| New York, 1930
(2) |
| Canton Village |
36.9
|
10.0
|
25.0
|
| Selected
Cities |
46.5 |
28.2 |
33.5 |
| Ostego County |
69.2 |
31.8 |
50.2 |
| New York
City |
74.5 |
48.4 |
65.1 |
| Massachusetts
(3) |
|
|
32.8 |
| National
Civic Federation, 1926-27(2) |
|
|
22.7 |
These dependency figures show a very great divergency. They range
from 10% for old couples in Canton Village, New York, to 74.5% for
single individuals in New York City. The Connecticut report would
indicate that rural Communities are better off than urban communities.
The New York survey does not bear out this conclusion, though it
must be remembered that its sample was extremely limited. Otsego
County, a strictly rural county, has a very high percentage of poor
old people.
It becomes clear from the above figures that old married couples
or people living together with other families are in a better economic
situation than single individuals. In some localities the percentages
for single individuals are two to three times as high as for households
with old people.
It might be interesting to investigate what percentage of old people
own absolutely nothing and have not a cent of income. The National
Civic Foundation study had estimated that 17% of the old people
were without income or property, while the Connecticut Commission
puts this figure at 25% for single individuals and at 7% for households
with persons over 65.
---------------------------
(1) Connecticut Report, 1932, Tables 11 and 12.
(2) New York Report, 1930.
(3) Care of the Aged, Monthly Labor Review, April 1930, p. 9.
---------------------------
A somewhat different classification of old age dependency was made
in New York. An estimate was made by the commission of the number
of old people who are self-supporting and those that are dependent
on relatives, friends, and charity. The following table gives these
figures.
| Old
Age Dependency in the State of New York
July 1, 1929 |
| |
Persons 65 and
over |
Persons 70 and
over |
Self-Dependent
Public Pensioners
Private pensioners
Self-support on current earnings
Self-support on income |
8.3%
1.8%) 43.6%
28.5%
5.0% |
11.0%
3.0%) 36.0%
17.0%
5.0% |
Dependent
On private homes
On relatives and friends
On public and private and charity
Confined by government |
1.0%
49.4%) 56.4%
3.5%
2.5% |
1.5%
55.6%) 64.0%
4.5%
2.4% |
The outstanding fact disclosed in this table is the very high percentage
of old people who are dependent upon relatives and friends. This
figure increases considerably between ages 65 and 70. There is a
proportionate decline in the number of people who earn their own
living. It must be borne in mind that these are pre-depression figure,
and that at the present time the situation is probably less favorable.
--------------------------
(1) New York Report, 1930, p. 39.
--------------------------
A similar study has recently been made in the District of Columbia.
The following table is interesting because it breaks down the old
people into white and colored. The dependency of old Negroes at
age 65 runs as high as 67.5%, while that for the white people is
only 33%, which is considerably lower, it will be noticed, than
the pre-depression figures of the State of New York. The District
of Columbia, however, is not a typical example.
| Economic
Status of Aged Studied in the (1)
District of Columbia
1934 |
| |
White |
Negro |
Combined |
| Independent |
63% |
30% |
52% |
| Supported by Relatives |
30 |
50 |
37 |
| Other Means of
Support (friends, public or private relief) |
2 |
15 |
6 |
| Dependent, but
source of support not reported |
1 |
2.5 |
1 |
| Status not reported |
4 |
2.5 |
4 |
The chief support of old people is furnished by their children
or by relatives. The Massachusetts investigation of 1925 had estimated
that of the dependent aged, 74% were supported by their children,
while another 14% as supported by relatives or friends. (2).
_______________________
(1) Study of Aged in the D. C.,
Monthly Labor Review, August 1934.
(2) Care of the Aged, Monthly Labor Review,
April, 1930, p. 9.
_______________________
This is the reason why the estimates for eligibility to old age
assistance are much lower than the dependency figures would indicate.
It is assumed that most old people will continue to be supported
by their children. The following is a tabulation of the estimates
of eligibility to old age assistance. It must be remembered that
a certain number of people are excluded under the old age assistance
laws due to the fact that they do not fulfill citizenship or residence
requirements.
| Eligibility
to Old Age Assistance under State Laws. |
| |
Persons over
65 |
Persons over
70 |
| New Jersey (1) |
9.9% |
11.4% |
| New York (2) |
12.7% |
14.5 |
| New York - projected by Connecticut
Commission (3) |
|
15.9 |
| Connecticut (4) |
13.7 |
13.2 |
-----------------------------------
(1) New Jersey Survey, Feb. 1931
(2) New York Report, pp. 16,22,77.
(3) Connecticut Report, p. 41.
(4) Connecticut Report.
-----------------------------------
(FOLD-OUT CHART OMITTED)
|
WEEKLY
OLD AGE PENSIONS FOR VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN RELATIONS TO WEEKLY WAGES
IN THOSE COUNTRIES (a)
(From Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong's "Insuring the Essentials,
" 1932, p. 417 |
| Country |
Unit |
Old
Age Pension
(Weekly) (b) |
Weekly
Wages Unskilled Labor
in Engineering Trades |
Old
Age Pension as a Per Cent of wages |
| Austria |
schillings |
15.23 |
38.89 |
39.2% |
| Belgium |
francs |
61.5 |
145.80 |
42.1 |
| Czechoslovakia |
crowns |
87.50 |
170.26 |
51.4 |
| France |
francs |
72.00 |
153.21 |
47.0 |
| Germany |
marks |
12.15 |
34.89 |
34.8 |
| Great Britain |
shillings & pence |
20/0 |
44/2 |
45.3 |
| Hungary |
pengos |
13.16 |
23.52 |
56.2 |
| Italy |
lire |
58.14 |
121.88 |
47.7 |
The pensions have been calculated for a worker whose
average wage during the whole period involved is equal to or falls within
the same wage class as the average weekly wage paid to unskilled laborers
in the engineering trades.
Calculated for a worker and his wife at the age at which
benefits begin.
Appendix D.
| YEARS
OF RESIDENCE IN STATE OF PERSONS 65 YEARS AND OVER ON RELIEF* |
Years of Residence |
Boston,
Massachusetts
|
Dallas, Texas |
Rockford, Illinois |
Salt
Lake City, Utah |
Newark,
New Jersey |
Los
Angeles, California |
| |
No. |
Percent |
No. |
Percent |
No. |
Percent |
No. |
Percent |
No. |
Percent |
No. |
Percent |
| |
886
0
0
1
1
2
11
21
19
823
8 |
100.0
-
-
.1
.2
.2
1.3
2.4
2.2
93.7
- |
587
0
1
0
0
6
10
15
19
536 |
100.0
-
.2
-
-
1.0
1.7
2.6
3.2
91.3 |
827
0
1
0
3
2
41
42
52
685
1 |
100.0
-
.1
-
.4
.2
5.0
5.1
6.3
82.9 |
1,076
0
2
3
0
4
31
56
50
930 |
100.0
-
.2
.3
-
.4
2.9
5.2
4.6
86.4 |
443
0
1
0
.1
3
22
33
39
341
3 |
100.0
-
.2
-
.2
.7
5.0
7.5
8.9
77.5 |
738
3
2
7
13
25
106
207
94
264
17 |
100.0
.4
.3
1.0
1.8
3.5
14.7
28.7
13.0
36.6 |
From a sample study made through courtesy of the F.E.R.A.
HISTORY
OF THE OLD AGE PENSION MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Beginnings
(1)
The American states have been very reluctant in enacting legislation
giving assistance to the destitute aged. Long before they took action,
European countries, industrial as well as non-industrial, had recognized
the problem of old age dependency by making provisions for old people.
In Australia state old age relief systems had become well established
before the World War. In the United States, on the other hand, movement
for old age relief did not get under way until after the depression of
1920-21.
This indifference to the problem of the aged can be explained only in
part by the lack of confidence in state action on the part of the American
public. The fact is that a large part of the American people were convinced
that people who had been hard working and thrifty all of their lives would
not become destitute in their old age; only shiftless lazy people were
faced with dependency in their later years. This meant that to give state
old age relief was tantamount to rewarding the one who had not done his
duty toward society.
In addition to this philosophy of thrift and self-reliance, there was
- and there still is - extant in the United States a conviction that it
is the duty of the children, and not that of the state, to take care of
the old. It is assumed that if the state relieves the children of the
responsibility, family ties are loosened, and since the family is one
of our most highly valued institutions, this danger is to be avoided at
all costs.
___________________
(1) Base on Ch. III of Report
on Old Age Relief, by Connecticut Commission
to Investigate the Subject of Old Age Pensions, 1932.
__________________
Investigations on the extent of old age dependency made by a number of
state commissions in the 20's and early 30's disrupted once and for all
the comfortable belief that "deserving" citizens do not become
dependent in their old age. But the laws which were passed following the
recommendations of the commissions made it clear that even though the
states instituted a system of old age relief, children and relatives were
not to be relieved of the responsibility to provide for their aged parents.
All laws, with the exception of those of Arizona and Hawaii, exclude from
State assistance all those who have financially competent children or
relatives.
The movement for state old age relief began in Massachusetts, where in
1903 the Bureau of Statistics of Labor made an investigation in which
it attempted to calculate the cost of a system of old age pensions. The
next step in the history of the movement was again taken by Massachusetts.
In 1907 the legislature there appointed a commission, which was instructed
to investigate old age dependency. The report of this commission did not
come out until 1910. From that time on, a number of old age survey commissions
investigated the problem. (1)
There are to be distinguished in these investigations two periods, one
period before the depression of 1920-21 and the other since then. In the
first period the commissions held very divergent views on the reasons
for old age dependency. A number of them recommended health insurance
as a solution to the problem of old age; others were opposed to state
action in the field, while only two were sympathetic toward old age assistance
grants. The "New Era" begins with the Pennsylvania report of
1919-21. In it the attitude that poverty and pauperism were the direct
consequences of laziness and deliberate transgressions was abandoned for
the first time, and the state was urged to enter the field. From that
time on the many commissions which were appointed to study the question
all reached the conclusion that it is the responsibility of the state
to provide for its dependent aged if they have no children or relatives
who were able to do so.
____________________
(1) The following is a list of these commissions
1910 Massachusetts 1919--21 Pennsylvania 1929 Maine
1914 Massachusetts 1922 Montana 1930 New York
1915 Wisconsin 1925 Massachusetts 1932 Connecticut
1917 New Jersey 1925 Nevada
1917 New Jersey 1925 Indiana
1917 California 1926 Virginia
1917 Massachusetts 1928 California
1919 Ohio 1929 New Jersey
1919 Connecticut 1929 Minnesota
____________________
History
of Legislation (1)
The first state law was passed in Arizona in 1915 by an initiative act,
which abolished almshouses and established old age and mothers' pensions
in their stead. However, it was worded so loosely that it was declared
unconstitutional on account of its vagueness. In the same year Alaska
passes a law, providing assistance to its aged pioneers. This law, though
it has been amended on different occasions, is still in effect at the
present time.
No action was taken by any state until 8 years later, in 1923. In that
year three states, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Nevada, passed old age assistance
laws, but only one of them, that of Montana, has remained in the statute
books. In 1925 the Nevada state legislature passed a bill repealing the
1923 law, and putting another one in its place. The Pennsylvania law was
declared unconstitutional in 1924 on the basis of the state constitution,
which prohibited the legislature from making appropriations for charitable,
benevolent and educational purposes. Pennsylvania proceeded immediately
to take steps to amend its constitution, but it was not until 1931 that
the amendment passed the legislature. Since this amendment had to be repassed
in 1933 and then submitted to a referendum vote for approval, it was not
until 1934 that Pennsylvania secured action. Thus the decision of the
court deferred legislation for ten years in Pennsylvania.
_______________________
(1) Based on Bulletin
No. 561 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Public Old-Age Pensions
and Insurance in the United States and in Foreign Countries."
_______________________
Ohio, too, took some first steps in the year 1923. The question of old
age pensions was submitted to a referendum vote, but it was decided adversely
by a vote of almost 2 to 1.
By 1925 the movement had gained considerable impetus. Although only Wisconsin
passed a law which has remained effective since that time; there was much
activity in a number of the states. California passed a law, which, however,
was vetoed by the Governor. Bills were introduced in the legislative sessions
of Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Texas. In Indiana and Illinois the bills passed the lower house,
but were not acted upon by the upper chamber. In four states, Colorado,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Utah, commissions were appointed.
In 1926 one law was added, that of Kentucky. In the same year, the Washington
Legislature approved a bill, which was vetoed by the Governor.
In 1927 Maryland and Colorado passed bills.
At the end of 1928, after six years of agitation, there were only six
states and one territory which had made provision for their aged. They
were Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, Wisconsin and Alaska.
All the state laws were of the optional type, i.e., they left the adoption
or rejection of an old age assistance system to the discretion of the
counties. For this reason these laws had very limited effect only. In
these six states, there were slightly above 1000 pensioners, and these
were found almost exclusively in Montana and Wisconsin, the former having
884, the latter 295 old people on their pension rolls. The total amount
spent by the six states in 1928 was, in round numbers, $200,000.(1)
From 1929 on, the trend in the pension legislation has been toward making
the adoption of the old age assistance systems mandatory upon the counties.
This type of legislation proved much more effective, especially when it
was accompanied by a provision by which the state shared in the expense
of the county. Of this latter type was the California law which was passed
in 1929. In the same year, Minnesota, Utah and Wyoming passed laws, which
did not provide such state assistance, although those of Utah and Wyoming
made the adoption of the system mandatory upon the counties.
In 1930 the Massachusetts and New York laws were passed, which not only
were of the mandatory type but also provided for the state sharing in
the expense of the locality.
In 1931 and 1933 the state legislatures were very active in the field
of old age pensions. It is estimated that 100 bills were introduced in
the legislatures of 38 states in 1931. In that year five new laws were
enacted in Delaware, Idaho, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and West Virginia.
Of these all except the West Virginia law were of the mandatory type,
but only Delaware and New Jersey provided for state funds. Colorado and
Wisconsin amended their laws making them mandatory upon the counties as
well as making state funds available for the purpose of old age assistance.
Ten more laws were added in 1933, in Arizona, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
(1) Monthly Labor Review, June, 1932, "Operation
of Old Age Pension Systems in the United States in 1931."
Washington, and Hawaii. With the exception of Hawaii, they were all mandatory
upon the counties, and in Oregon and Washington the state does not share
in the expenses of the locality. Arkansas passed a law in 1933, but it
was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court.
Iowa and Pennsylvania passed mandatory laws in 1934, the state sharing
the entire cost.
By the end of 1934, twenty-eight states and two territories had passes
old age assistance laws.
Comparison
of Laws
Exhibit A summarizes in table form the provisions of the various laws
of the United States. As incidental in the discussion above, the effectiveness
of these laws depend to a large extent on the degree to which the state
shares in the responsibilities of administration and cost. The state has
entire supervision only in those states where it bears the whole cost.
This is the case in Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. In other states, where the state bears part of the cost
of old age assistance, there is a considerable amount of state supervision.
This is true in Arizona, California, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York. Colorado and Wisconsin are the only states which
give money to the counties and leave them the administration of the funds,
requiring only an annual report to the state office. Such an annual report
is required in a number other states from the counties administering the
laws. This provides a certain amount of guarantee that the laws are actually
enforced. A number of states leave the entire responsibility to the counties,
requiring not even an annual report. They are Kentucky, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Utah, and Washington.
It is safe to make the general statement that the purpose of these old
age pension laws has been carried out more effectively in the states which
leave little discretion to the localities than in those which make the
counties entirely responsible. The percentage of pensioners to the number
of people of eligible age is highest in the states where there is complete
state supervision.
In other respects the various laws are quite similar. With the exception
of Arizona and Hawaii, they all specify that pensions must not be paid
to old people who have children or relatives able to support them. New
York and Massachusetts are the only laws which do not set a maximum amount
of the pensions; this maximum is as low as $15 in some states, but most
of the laws set it at $30 a month. The age limit is 65 years of age in
a majority of the states; but in quite a few of them it is 70. One of
the most serious restrictions to receiving assistance from the states
are the citizenship and very long residence requirements. Under most of
the laws, in order to receive an old age pension, a person must have been
a citizen and a resident in the state for 15 years; in few states the
residence requirement is even higher. The great majority of the states
have income and property qualifications. The property limit is $3000 in
most of the laws, while the income limit is $300 to $365 a year. A few
of the newer laws omit altogether these property and income qualifications
and leave the decision of whether or not a person is in need to the administrator.
A good many of the laws include the provision that the transfer to the
pension authority of any property the applicant may possess, may be demanded
before a pension is paid. In most laws there is a provision that a pension
must be denied to persons who have deprived themselves of property in
order to qualify for assistance. Almost all of the laws provide that the
amount of pensions paid shall be a lien on the estate of the pensioner
and shall be collected upon his death or the death of the last survivor
of a married couple. The majority of the laws provide for a small funeral
allowance.
In addition to these qualifications, the old age assistance laws make
sure that the recipients of relief are "deserving" citizens.
People who have deserted their husbands or wives, who have failed to support
their families, who have been convicted of a crime, who have been tramps
or beggars, who have failed to work according to their ability, are ineligible
to assistance in most of the states. Inmates of jails, prisons, infirmaries,
and insane asylums are also barred from receiving pensions. A few states
permit the payment of the assistance grant to a benevolent fraternal institution
after a pensioner becomes an inmate, but they make such payment subject
to the proviso that the institution may be inspected by the pension authority.
Operation
of the Laws
After this survey of the many restrictions in the old age pension laws,
it is not surprising to find that their operation has been much more limited
than in other countries which have adopted old age pension legislation.
The percentage of old people on pension rolls is far below that of European
countries, Canada, and Australia. Exhibit B gives a summary of the number
of pensioners in the individual states, the number of eligible age, the
percentage of pensioners to the number of eligible age, the average pensions
paid, and the yearly cost. In five of the states
which have laws no pensions are being paid because of the unfavorable
financial condition of the state. They are Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and West Virginia. In other states lack of funds has made
it necessary to reduce the grants to a very low figure. Thus it will be
seen that in one state the average monthly pension is as low as $6.13,
and in no state is it above $30. The number of pensioners is very low
in states which have financial difficulties. That many more people are
in need of assistance becomes clear from a survey of Exhibit C, which
shows the number of applications received in some of the states since
the passage of the law. In all the states for which this information is
available, the applications far exceed the number of pensions actually
granted.
The last column of the table in Exhibit B gives the yearly cost pension
systems at the present time. For some of the states that have recently
begun paying pensions these figures are only estimated from the account
of monthly expenditures at this time. It may well be that these estimates
are below what will actually be spent for the entire year.
Conclusion
To one familiar with the results of the various surveys of old age dependency
in the United States, it appears that the number of people who are new
in receipt of old age assistance grants is very small indeed. As a matter
of fact, because of lack of funds in the states and counties, many of
the aged who are eligible to old age assistance grants, do not receive
them. It is safe to assume, therefore, that the old age security movement
in the United States is merely in its initial stage and that, as the demand
for more adequate provisions grows, it will expand considerably.
(FOLD-OUT CHART
OMITTED)
Exhibit B
| OPERATION
OF OLD AGE ASSISTANCE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1934
|
| State |
Type
of
Law |
Number
of
Pensioners
1 |
Number
of
Eligible
Age
2 |
Percentage
of
Pensioners to
Number of
Eligible
Age |
Average Pension1/ |
Yearly
Cost
3 |
| Alaska |
M |
446 (c) |
3,437 |
11.1% |
$20.82 |
$95,705 |
| Arizona |
M |
1,974 (a) |
9,118 |
21.6 |
9.01 |
200,927 |
| California |
M |
19,300 (a) |
210,379 |
9.2 |
21.16 |
3,502,000 |
| Colorado |
M |
8,705 |
61,787 |
14.1 |
8.59 |
172,481 |
| Delaware |
M |
1,610 (a) |
16,678 |
9.7 |
9.79 |
188,740 |
| Hawaii |
O |
No information available |
| Idaho |
M |
1,275 |
22,310 |
5.7 |
8.85 |
114,521 |
| Indiana |
M |
23,418 (b) |
138,426 |
16.9 |
6.13(b) |
1,254,169 h |
| Iowa |
M |
3,000 (C) |
184,239 |
1.6 |
13.50(c) |
475,500(d |
| Kentucky |
O |
No pensions being paid |
| Maine |
M |
Not yet in effect |
| Maryland |
O |
141 (e) |
92,972 |
0.2 |
29.90 |
50,217 |
| Massachusetts |
M |
20,023 (e) |
156,590 |
12.8 |
24.35 |
5,411,723 |
| Michigan |
M |
2,660 (e) |
148,853 |
1.8 |
9.59(e) |
306,096 f |
| Minnesota |
O |
2,655 |
94,401 |
2.8 |
13.20 |
420,536 |
| Montana |
O |
1,781 |
14,377 |
12.4 |
7.28 |
155,525 |
| Nebraska |
M |
Not much being done
due to lack of funds |
| Nevada |
O |
23 |
4,814 |
0.5 |
15.00 |
3,320 |
| New Hampshire |
M |
1,423 (c) |
25,714 |
5.5 |
19.06(g) |
298,722(f |
| New Jersey |
M |
10,560 (g) |
112,594 |
9.4 |
12.72 |
1,375,693 |
| New York |
M |
51,228 |
373,878 |
13.7 |
22.16 |
13,592,080 |
| North Dakota |
M |
No pensions being paid |
| Ohio |
M |
24,000 (e) |
414,836 |
5.8 |
13.99(a) |
3,000,000(f |
| Oregon |
M |
Administered by counties;
no info available for state |
| Pennsylvania |
M |
Law just being put into
effect |
| Utah |
M |
930 |
22,665 |
4.1 |
8.56 |
95,599 |
| Washington |
M |
2,239 (b) |
101,503 |
2.2 |
No information available |
| West Virginia |
O |
No pensions being paid |
| Wisconsin |
O |
1,969 |
112,112 |
1.8 |
16.75 |
395,707 |
| Wyoming |
M |
643 |
8,707 |
7.4 |
10.79 |
83,231 |
| Total |
|
180,003
|
|
|
|
$31,192,492 |
M - Mandatory
O- Optional
1 - Where no special reference is given, the figures are as of December
31, 1933
2 - 1930 Census figures
3 - Where no special reference is given, the figures represent actual
cost for the year 1933 |
(a) As of October 1,
1934
(b) As of August 1934
(c) As of December 1934
(d) Estimated from expenditures of April through November 1934 -
$317,000
(e) As of November 1934
(f) Estimated from monthly figures
(g) As of September 1934
(h) Appropriation for 1934 |
Exhibit C
| NUMBER
OF APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY PENSION AUTHORITIES (1)
(November, 1934) |
|
State
|
Number
of Persons Receiving Grants |
Number
of Applications Received |
Number of People on
Waiting List |
| Arizona |
1974 |
2,098 from 7/1/33 to
6/30/34 |
10 |
| Delaware |
1,610 |
5,685 since 1931 |
1,700 applications not yet investigated;
of these about 1,200 will qualify |
| Idaho |
1275 |
3,525 since 1931 |
200 at close of 1933 |
| Indiana |
23,418 |
39,304 from Jan.-Aug.
1934 |
3,059 applications not investigated
August, 1934 |
| Iowa |
3,000 |
60,000 since April |
Estimated that 28,000 will qualify |
Maryland
(Baltimore only) |
141 |
2,168 since 1931 |
Applications are investigated only
when there is a vacancy |
| Michigan |
2,660 |
42,358 since Oct., 1933 |
6,575 applications approved; 27,032
applications not yet investigated |
| Louisiana |
1,781 |
4,444 since 1926 |
|
| New Jersey |
10,560 |
26,269 since July, 1932 |
3,080 pending applications not yet
investigated |
| New York |
51,228 |
136,482 since Sept.,
1930 |
5,123 pending applications not yet
investigated |
| North Dakota |
None |
4,201 |
3,761 |
| Maine |
24,000 |
105,000 since May, 1934 |
|
| Wisconsin |
1,969 |
4,912 since 1930 |
234 |
| (1) The information presented in this
table was secured through correspondence with state officials. |
Appendix F
I. AMOUNT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY (OLD AGE ASSISTANCE)
Assuming: (1) contributory plan in effect; (2) dependency ration of 15%
in 1936, increasing thereafter to maximum of 40% in 1961 and subsequent
years; (3) average yearly grant of $20 per month; (4) federal subsidy
of one-half total payments, and one-half of administrative costs.
| Year |
Number receiving
old age grants
(1000) |
Amount of federal
subsidy
(1,000,000) |
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 |
897
1046
1200
1372
1580
1716
1880
2114
2650
2586
2497
2446
2392 |
72.2*
131.8
151.2
172.8
199.1
216.2
236.9
266.4
333.9
325.8
314.6
308.2
301.4 |
| * Full year cost reduced for administration lag. |
| Note: The estimates offered by the Actuarial staff
assumes considerably larger costs. It is found in Appendix G, page
2. |
AMOUNT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY TO STATE OLD AGE PENSION PLANS
Assuming: (1) Dependency ratio of 15% in 1936, increasing to 20% in 1937,
25% in 1938, 30% in 1939, 33% in 1940, and thereafter, by 1% increments,
to maximum of 50% in 1957 and subsequent years; (2) average total grant
of $25 per month from state and federal governments combined; (3) federal
subsidy of one-half of total costs, excluding that portion of individual
grants in excess of $30 per month and that portion of administration expenses
in excess of 10% of total payments.
| Year |
Number
receiving Old
Age Grants
(1000) |
Amount
of Federal
Subsidy
(1,000,000) |
| 1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 |
897
1307
1765
2287
2746
2835
3631
4675
5844
6801
7169
7533
8007
8501 |
136.6
199.0
268.7
348.2
418.1
440.8
552.8
711.8
889.7
1035.5
1091.5
1146.9
1219.0
1294.3 |
| Note: This table is based on the assumption
that there will be no contributory system in effect. Estimate of
the amount of federal subsidy assuming the existence of a contributory
system are found on page 3 of this Appendix. |
Appendix G - 2
AMOUNT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY TO STATE OLD AGE PENSION PLANS
Assuming: (1) contributory old age insurance plan in effect; (2) dependency
ratio of 15% in 1936, increasing to 20% in 1937, 25% in 1938, 30% in 1939,
33% in 1940, and thereafter, by 1% increments, to maximum of 50% in 1957
and subsequent years; (3) average total grant of $25 per month from state
and federal governments combined; (4) federal subsidy of one-half of total
costs, excluding that portion of individual grants in excess of $30 per
month and that portion of administration expenses in excess of 10% of
total pension payments.
| Year |
Number
receiving Old Age Grants
(1000) |
Amount of Federal
Subsidy
($1,000,000) |
| 1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 |
897
1,307
1,765
2,287
2,746
2,835
3,311
3,813
4,275
4,533
4,414
4,416
4,510
4,606 |
136.6
199.0
268.7
348.2
418.1
431.6
504.1
580.5
650.9
690.1
672.0
672.3
686.6
701.3 |
Back to Volume
Two Table of Contents
|