Audit of the Social Security Administration’s Fiscal Year 1999 Financial Statements
November 19, 1999

To Kenneth S. Apfel
Commissioner of Social Security

This letter transmits the PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) report on the audit of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 financial statements of the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the results of the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) review thereon. PwC’s report includes the firm’s opinion on SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements, its report on SSA management’s assertion about the effectiveness of internal control, and its report on SSA’s compliance with laws and regulations.

**Objectives of a Financial Statement Audit**

The objective of a financial statement audit is to determine whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.

PwC’s examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. The audit includes obtaining an understanding of the internal control over financial reporting, and testing and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of the internal control. Due to inherent limitations in any internal control, there is a risk that error or fraud may occur and not be detected.

The risk of fraud is inherent to SSA’s programs and operations, especially within the Supplemental Security Income program. In our opinion, individuals outside of the organization perpetrate the majority of fraud against SSA. A discussion of fraud issues affecting SSA and the activities of the OIG to address fraud is presented in the Inspector General’s Report to Congress, a separate section within this accountability report.

**Audit of Financial Statements, Effectiveness of Internal Control, and Compliance with Laws and Regulations**

The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576), as amended, requires SSA’s Inspector General (IG) or an independent external auditor, as determined by the IG, to audit SSA’s financial statements in accordance with applicable standards. Under a contract monitored by OIG, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, an independent certified public accounting firm, performed the audit of SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements. PwC also audited the FY 1998 financial statements, presented in SSA’s Accountability Report for FY 1999 for comparative purposes.
PwC issued an unqualified opinion on SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements. PwC also reported that SSA’s assertion that its systems of accounting and internal control are in compliance with the internal control objectives in OMB Bulletin No. 98-08. However, the audit identified two reportable conditions in SSA’s internal control. The control weaknesses identified are:

1. SSA Needs to Further Strengthen Controls to Protect Its Information
2. SSA Needs to Complete and Fully Test Its Plan for Maintaining Continuity of Operations

In FY 1998 PwC reported a third reportable condition, “SSA Can Improve Controls Over Separation of Duties”. In FY 1999, SSA made significant progress to correct this weakness and in the opinion of the auditors, it is no longer a reportable condition. We commend SSA on its progress, but encourage the organization to continue its efforts in this area. Strong internal control, including proper separation of duties, are important to mitigate the risk of fraud.

PwC also reported instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations as follows:

1. Section 221(i) of the Social Security Act, which requires periodic continuing disability reviews for title II beneficiaries; and
2. The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) for the cumulative effect of the two internal control weaknesses listed above.

**OIG Evaluation of PwC’s Audit Performance**

To fulfill our responsibilities under the CFO Act and related legislation for ensuring the quality of the audit work performed, we monitored PwC’s audit of SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements by:

- Reviewing PwC’s approach and planning of the audit;
- Evaluating the qualifications and independence of its auditors;
- Monitoring the progress of the audit at key points;
- Examining its working papers related to planning the audit and assessing SSA’s internal control;
- Reviewing PwC’s audit report to ensure compliance with Government Auditing Standards and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended;
- Coordinating the issuance of the audit report; and
- Performing other procedures that we deemed necessary.

Based on the results of our review, we determined that PwC planned, executed, and reported the results of its audit of SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements in accordance with applicable standards. Therefore, it is our opinion that PwC’s work provides a reasonable basis for the firm’s opinion on SSA’s FY 1999 financial statements and SSA management’s assertion on the effectiveness of its internal control and compliance with laws and regulations. Based on our review of the audit, we concur with PwC’s finding of reportable conditions related to internal control weaknesses and instances of noncompliance with section 221(i) of the Social Security Act and the FFMIA.

James G. Huse, Jr.
Inspector General
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

To Kenneth S. Apfel
Commissioner of Social Security

In our audit of the Social Security Administration (SSA) for fiscal year 1999, we found that:

• The principal financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects;

• Management fairly stated that SSA’s systems of accounting and internal control in place as of September 30, 1999 are in compliance with the internal control objectives in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements, requiring that transactions be properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of the principal statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized acquisition, use or disposal; and

• Our testing identified two reportable instances of noncompliance with the laws and regulations we tested.

The following sections outline each of these conclusions in more detail.

OPINION ON THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of SSA as of September 30, 1999 and 1998, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, financing, and budgetary resources for the fiscal years then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of SSA’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements audited by us and appearing on pages 29 through 41 of this report present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of SSA at September 30, 1999 and 1998, and its consolidated net cost, changes in net position, budgetary resources and reconciliation of net cost to budgetary resources for the fiscal years then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
REPORT ON MANAGEMENT’S ASSERTION ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNAL CONTROL

We have examined management’s assertion that SSA’s systems of accounting and internal control are in compliance with the internal control objectives in OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, requiring management to establish internal accounting and administrative controls to provide reasonable assurance that transactions are properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of the principal statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized acquisition, use or disposal.

Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended and, accordingly, included obtaining an understanding of the internal control over financial reporting, testing and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of the internal control, and such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination was of the internal control in place as of September 30, 1999.

Because of inherent limitations in any internal control, misstatement due to errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Also, projections of any evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods are subject to the risk that the internal control may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.

In our opinion, management’s assertion that SSA’s systems of accounting and internal control are in compliance with the internal control objectives in OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, requiring that transactions be properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of the principal statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized acquisition, use or disposal, is fairly stated, in all material respects.

In addition, with respect to the internal control related to those performance measures determined by management to be key and reported in the Overview and Supplemental Financial and Management Information, we obtained an understanding of the design of significant internal control relating to the existence and completeness assertions and determined whether it has been placed in operation, as required by OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. Our procedures were not designed to provide assurance on the internal control over reported performance measures, and accordingly, we do not provide an opinion on such control.

However, we noted certain matters involving the internal control and its operation that we consider to be reportable conditions under standards established by the AICPA and by OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. Reportable conditions are matters coming to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control that, in our judgment, could adversely affect the agency’s ability to meet the internal control objectives described above. The reportable conditions we noted were: SSA needs to further strengthen controls to protect its information and SSA needs to complete and fully test its plan for maintaining continuity of operations.

A material weakness, as defined by the AICPA and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, is a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that misstatements in amounts that would be material in relation to the principal financial statements being audited or to a performance measure or aggregation of related performance measures may occur and not be detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of performing their assigned duties. We believe that neither of the two reportable conditions that follow is a material weakness as defined by the AICPA and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. One of the issues raised in our 1998 report, that SSA can improve controls over separation of duties, is no longer a reportable condition.
1. SSA Needs to Further Strengthen Controls to Protect Its Information

SSA has made notable progress in addressing the information protection issues raised in prior years. Specifically, the agency has:

- Developed a System Security Bulletin that provides a security framework for processing in the mainframe and distributed environments;
- Established a mainframe security monitoring process through the development of the Security Management Action Report (SMART) that is used to monitor inappropriate access to SSA systems;
- Improved physical security at the National Computer Center (NCC) by implementing tighter controls over physical access to the facility and increasing security awareness of the guard force; and
- Continued to improve security monitoring procedures and practices in the local area network (LAN) environment at Headquarters, including an ongoing process to identify unauthorized modems and immediately removing unauthorized modem access.

Our audit in 1999 found that SSA’s systems environment remains threatened by weaknesses in several components of its information protection control structure. Because disclosure of detailed information about these weaknesses might further compromise controls, we are providing no further details here. Instead, the specifics are presented in a separate, limited-distribution management letter. The general areas where weaknesses were noted are:

- The entity-wide security program and associated weaknesses in developing, implementing and monitoring LAN and distributed systems security;
- SSA’s mainframe computer security and operating system configuration;
- Physical access controls at non-headquarters locations; and
- Certification and accreditation of certain general support and major application systems.

Until corrected, these weaknesses will continue to increase the risks of unauthorized access to, and modification or disclosure of, sensitive SSA information. In turn, unauthorized access to sensitive data can result in the loss of data, loss of Trust Fund resources, and compromised privacy of information associated with SSA’s enumeration, earnings, retirement, and disability processes and programs.

**Recommendations**

We recommend that SSA accelerate and build on its progress in 1999 to enhance information protection by further strengthening its entity-wide security as it relates to implementation of physical and technical computer security mechanisms and controls throughout the organization. In general, we recommend that SSA:

- Reevaluate its overall organization-wide security architecture;
- Reassess the security roles and responsibilities throughout the organization’s central and regional office components;
- Assure that the appropriate level of trained resources are in place to develop, implement and monitor the SSA security program;
• Enhance and institutionalize an entity-wide security program that facilitates strengthening of LAN and distributed systems’ security;

• Review and certify system access for all users;

• Enhance procedures for removing system access when employees are transferred or leave the agency;

• Decrease vulnerabilities in the mainframe operating system configuration;

• Implement the mainframe monitoring process (SMART Report);

• Finalize accreditation and certification of systems;

• Develop and implement an ongoing entity-wide information security compliance program; and

• Strengthen physical access controls at non-headquarters sites.

More specific recommendations are included in a separate, limited-distribution management letter.

2. SSA Needs to Complete and Fully Test Its Plan for Maintaining Continuity of Operations

SSA has made notable progress since 1998 in implementing improvements to its disaster recovery plan for computer operations. For example, SSA has scheduled testing for all of its 13 originally identified critical workloads for fiscal year 2000. In addition, SSA established a special workgroup that validated the original critical workloads and identified potential additional critical workloads. SSA further developed its draft plan for moving computer operations from its designated “hot-site” (a facility that already has computer equipment and an acceptable computing environment in place to provide processing capabilities on short notice) to a “cold-site” in the event of a longer-term disruption of processing operations. In an effort to eliminate the need for a hot-site to cold-site transition plan and provide for long term outages of up to 12 months, SSA has negotiated with the hot-site vendor via the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide maximum EDP operational capability after disaster declaration. Furthermore, an Interagency Agreement between SSA and GSA has been established so funds and resources will be available in a time of disaster. Finally, SSA initiated efforts to establish a continuity of operations planning workgroup to bring an agency-wide focus to its efforts in this area.

While SSA has many components of a contingency plan in place, we identified a number of deficiencies that, in our opinion, would impair SSA’s ability to respond effectively to a disruption in business operations as a result of a disaster or other long-term crisis. Although SSA has performed a Business Impact Analysis, its list of critical workloads is still being finalized and recovery time objectives (RTOs) have not yet been established for each of the critical workloads. Consequently, SSA has not established recovery priorities for all of its systems in the mainframe and distributed environments. Furthermore, the plan for recovering the critical workloads still needs to be fully tested. In addition, SSA has not fully updated the contingency plans for the headquarters site or finalized and tested contingency plans for non-headquarters sites.

SSA also needs to take additional actions to ensure its approach for obtaining alternate processing facilities will be successful. As with other agreements for continuity services, availability of SSA’s designated hot-site is dependent upon whether other customers of the hot-site vendor have already declared a disaster, since use of the hot-site is on a “first come, first served” basis. Under the current hot-site arrangement, SSA will be provided with the choice of two Mainframe/Midrange Recovery Centers (MRCs) and two Workarea Recovery Centers (WRCs) for recovering EDP operations. Vendor facilities in North Bergen, NJ and Columbia, MD, respectively, have been identified for SSA use. SSA needs to have the hot-site vendor
identify the secondary MRC and WRC in the event that SSA is not the first customer to declare a disaster and therefore cannot be serviced by the North Bergen and/or Columbia facilities. Once the secondary facilities have been identified, SSA needs to perform recovery tests at these locations to ensure that the resources are adequate to enable recovery of EDP operations.

While we are encouraged by the attention and level of effort SSA has directed to this issue thus far, and senior level agency management is committed to completing and fully testing a comprehensive plan, SSA remains focused on the systems aspect of continuity planning. SSA needs to ensure it includes contingency planning for operations as well as for systems in its overall plan.

Recommendations

We recommend that SSA:

• Finalize the list of critical SSA workloads and fully test the plans for recovering each workload;

• Establish RTOs for each critical workload;

• Establish recovery priorities for all systems and applications (mainframe and distributed);

• Update contingency plans for headquarters;

• Finalize and test contingency plans for non-headquarters sites;

• Have its hot-site vendor identify secondary facilities (MRC and WRC) for recovering EDP operations; and

• Finalize and test SSA’s ultimate strategy for implementing and maintaining alternate processing facilities.

REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS

We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended.

The management of SSA is responsible for complying with laws and regulations applicable to the agency. As part of obtaining reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, we performed tests of SSA’s compliance with certain provisions of applicable laws and regulations, noncompliance with which could have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts and certain other laws and regulations specified in OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, including the requirements referred to in the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996. However, the objective of our audit of the financial statements was not to provide an opinion on overall compliance with such provisions and, accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

The results of our tests of compliance with the laws and regulations described in the preceding paragraph disclosed instances of noncompliance with the following laws and regulations that are required to be reported under Government Auditing Standards and OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended.

• SSA is not in full compliance with Section 221(i) of the Social Security Act which requires periodic Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) for Title II beneficiaries. If CDRs are not performed timely, beneficiaries who are no longer eligible for disability may inappropriately continue to receive benefits,
including Medicare benefits. Prior to our report date, SSA was unable to provide an estimate of the total backlog of Title II cases yet to be reviewed for continuing eligibility as of September 30, 1999.

- Under FFMIA, we are required to report whether the agency’s financial management systems substantially comply with Federal financial management systems requirements, Federal accounting standards, and the United States Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. To meet this requirement we performed tests of compliance using the implementation guidance for FFMIA included in Appendix D of OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. We found weaknesses in information protection and business continuity planning, as described above. We believe these weaknesses are significant departures from certain of the requirements of OMB Circulars A-127, Financial Management Systems, and A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, and are therefore instances of substantial noncompliance with the Federal financial management systems requirements under FFMIA. SSA should assign a high priority to the corrective actions consistent with the requirements of OMB Circular No. A-50 Revised, on audit follow-up.

Except as noted in the previous paragraph, the results of our tests of compliance disclosed no instances of noncompliance with other laws and regulations that are required to be reported under Government Auditing Standards or OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

SSA management is responsible for:

- Preparing the annual financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles;

- Establishing, maintaining, and assessing internal control that provides reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the broad control objectives of OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended are met; and

- Complying with applicable laws and regulations.

Our responsibilities are to:

- Express an opinion on SSA’s principal financial statements;

- Obtain reasonable assurance about whether management’s assertion about the effectiveness of the internal control is fairly stated, in all material respects, based upon the internal control objectives in OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements, requiring that transactions be properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of the principal statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized acquisition, use or disposal; and

- Test SSA’s compliance with selected provisions of laws and regulations that could materially affect the principal financial statements.

In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we:

- Examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the principal financial statements;

- Assessed the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management;

- Evaluated the overall presentation of the principal financial statements;
• Obtained an understanding of the internal control related to safeguarding assets, compliance with laws and regulations including the execution of transactions in accordance with budget authority, financial reporting, and certain performance measures determined by management to be key and reported in the Overview of SSA and Supplemental Financial and Management Information;

• Tested relevant internal control over safeguarding, compliance, and financial reporting and evaluated management’s assertion about the effectiveness of the internal control; and

• Tested compliance with selected provisions of laws and regulations.

We did not evaluate all the internal controls relevant to operating objectives as broadly defined by the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act, such as those controls relevant to preparing statistical reports and ensuring efficient operations. We limited our internal control testing to those controls necessary to achieve the objectives outlined in our report on management’s assertion about the effectiveness of the internal control.

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We noted other matters involving the internal control and its operation that we will communicate in a separate letter.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of the management and Inspector General of SSA, OMB and Congress and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties.

Arlington, Virginia
November 18, 1999
Appendix
Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have reviewed the 1999 draft report on management's assertion about the effectiveness of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations. We agree with all the findings and recommendations contained in the report and our comments and responses are enclosed.

We are pleased that the report indicates that SSA has improved controls over separation of duties to the extent that this area is no longer a reportable condition. We are also pleased that you acknowledged our notable progress in addressing the remaining two reportable conditions addressed in the report. SSA is committed to continue making improvements in these areas until all planned actions are completed. Please direct any questions on our comments to Thomas G. Staples, Associate Commissioner for Financial Policy and Operations, at (410) 965-3839.

Sincerely,

John R. Dyer
Principal Deputy Commissioner of Social Security

Enclosure
General Comments

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report on the effectiveness of SSA's internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations. We welcome your opinion that management's assertion that SSA's systems of accounting and internal control are in compliance with the internal control objectives in Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended, is fairly stated, in all material respects.

We are pleased that there were no new reportable conditions identified since last year's report and that the report found that SSA has improved controls over separation of duties to the extent that this area is no longer a reportable condition. We will continue to make improvements to strengthen our controls in this area.

We are also pleased that you acknowledged notable progress in addressing the remaining two reportable conditions addressed in the report; i.e., protection of information and continuity of operations. SSA is committed to continue making improvements in these areas until all planned actions are completed.

Report on Management's Assertion About the Effectiveness of Internal Controls

Finding 1, SSA Needs to Further Strengthen Controls to Protect Its Information

Recommendations:

We recommend that SSA accelerate and build on its progress in 1999 to enhance information protection by further strengthening its entity-wide security as it relates to implementation of physical and technical computer security mechanisms and controls throughout the organization. In general, we recommend that SSA:
• **Reevaluate its overall organization-wide security architecture;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and is initiating a full reassessment of its organization-wide security architecture to ensure that vulnerabilities, especially those introduced by new technology, are being addressed. This strategic reassessment will allow SSA to identify any additional initiatives needed to upgrade its programs. Enhancements to the existing architecture resulting from this activity will be implemented and communicated to all SSA components.

• **Reassess the security roles and responsibilities throughout the organization’s central and regional office components;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and is currently reassessing security roles and responsibilities. Recently, SSA elevated the organizational structure of the entity for information systems security within the Office of Finance, Assessment and Management. Also, within the Office of Operations, a higher level security oversight group was formed and there was a reassessment of regional security officer roles to emphasize the increased importance of their roles.

• **Assure that the appropriate level of trained resources are in place to develop, implement and monitor the SSA security program;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and has enhanced security training by directing additional funds toward new security training courses for both Headquarters and regional security staffs. In addition, the Office of Systems is taking steps to improve its security program by obtaining additional expertise via contractor services.

The additional training and the organizational refocusing discussed above will ensure the appropriate level of trained resources are in place to develop, implement and monitor the SSA security program.
• **Enhance and institutionalize an entity-wide security program that facilitates strengthening of Local Area Network (LAN) and distributed systems’ security;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with the recommendation and has been working diligently on improvements in this area. SSA will continue to enhance and institutionalize the entity-wide security program through a series of enhancements to the mainframe, LAN and distributive systems. The enhancements will include: improved monitoring of access controls, particularly in field activities; full implementation of the Enterprise Security Interface; administrative monitoring and penetration testing.

• **Review and certify system access for all users;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and continues to make progress in this area. The Office of Systems continues to work aggressively to adjust access rights under its Standardized System Profile Project.

• **Enhance procedures for removing system access when employees are transferred or leave the agency;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and will continue to improve our procedures and the comprehensive processes already in place for removing system access when employees are transferred or leave the Agency.

• **Decrease vulnerabilities in the mainframe operating system configuration;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and will continue to evaluate our mainframe operating system configuration and initiate changes to protect against threats, both deliberate and nonintentional.
• **Implement the mainframe monitoring process (Security Management Action Report (SMART Report));**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation. As acknowledged earlier in the report, SSA has established the SMART Report, which is distributed to the security officers responsible for the groups using the systems. While most users are in non-Headquarters offices, all users, including those in central office, are tracked and monitored. Procedures have been distributed which focus the reviews on specific types of transaction scenarios, thereby making the SMART system a more useful security management and enforcement tool. We agree that additional enhancements for increased use of the report can be made both in the field and in central office. We will continue to improve the use of the report to monitor inappropriate access to SSA’s systems.

• **Finalize accreditation and certification of systems;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and either certified or recertified all of SSA’s sensitive systems in July 1999.

• **Develop and implement an ongoing entity-wide information security compliance program; and**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and has a number of existing and planned programs to monitor compliance with security policies and procedures. In addition to automated controls, SSA also monitors compliance through programmatic and systems audits, financial systems reviews, and other internal studies and reviews.

SSA has made progress in developing the Comprehensive Integrity Review Process (CIRP) system that will consolidate integrity review functions into a single automated facility where transactions will be screened against specific criteria. The criteria include cross-application criteria and can be changed to concentrate on emerging trends. SSA remains committed to ongoing enhancement and implementation of the CIRP system.
• **Strengthen physical access controls at non-Headquarters sites.**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and is committed to strengthening security at non-Headquarters sites. We are in the process of enhancing the badging procedures and policy enforcement in the regions and other major non-Headquarters facilities. In addition, the Agency, through its security tactical plan, has been working to increase physical security at the National Computer Center (NCC) and SSA facilities around the country.

**Finding 2, SSA Needs to Complete and Fully Test Its Plan for Maintaining Continuity of Operations**

**Recommendations:**

We recommend that SSA:

• **Finalize the list of critical SSA workloads and fully test the plans for recovering each workload;**

  **SSA Comment**

  SSA agrees with this recommendation. SSA recently reevaluated and confirmed its critical workloads. Testing that will determine recoverability of all identified critical workloads is scheduled for July 2000.

• **Establish recovery time objectives (RTO) for each critical workload;**

  **SSA Comment**

  SSA agrees with this recommendation. It is SSA’s goal to provide users with a fully integrated set of software to process each critical workload as rapidly as possible. As part of our July 2000 test, we plan to assess and determine realistic timeframes and sequences for restoring critical workloads. These objectives will be incorporated into the next iteration of the Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). Subsequent DRP iterations will include timeframes and other supporting information.
- **Establish recovery priorities for all systems and applications (mainframe and distributed);**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and continues to work to establish recovery priorities for all mainframe and distributed systems and applications. DRP identifies the recovery sequence of all mainframe workloads. We plan to determine realistic timeframes for reestablishing access to these workloads. In addition, SSA will work to further define the recovery of the distributed workloads.

- **Update contingency plans for Headquarters;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation. In compliance with Presidential Decision Directive Number 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Operations Plan, SSA has convened an agencywide workgroup to develop an infrastructure for contingency planning. This includes defining organizational roles and responsibilities, essential operations and staffing, training, maintenance, etc. The actions recommended by the workgroup and approved by SSA management will be incorporated into the Agency contingency plan.

- **Finalize and test contingency plans for non-Headquarters sites;**

**SSA Comment**

SSA agrees with this recommendation and is in the process of reviewing and updating all of the Security Action Plans (SAP) that are in place in its non-Headquarters facilities. The Area Directors will review and test the SAPs as they visit each site during the course of the year. The Agency also conducts field site visits to assess the security that is in place in our offices. In the course of these visits, staff will analyze the plans for effectiveness and verify that employees are familiar with their content and application.
• Have its hot-site vendor identify secondary facilities (Mainframe/Midrange Recovery Centers (MRCs) and Workarea Recovery Centers (WRCs)) for recovering EDP operations; and

SSA Comment

SSA agrees that secondary facilities be identified and a listing currently exists in the Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA) with the General Services Administration (GSA).

• Finalize and test SSA’s ultimate strategy for implementing and maintaining alternate processing facilities.

SSA Comment

SSA agrees with this recommendation. Our current IAA with GSA provides SSA with a long-term, alternate facility supplied through a GSA contract. These provisions will be implemented and provide SSA access to the site for 1 year should a catastrophic event leave the NCC uninhabitable for longer than 6 weeks. SSA annually tests the use of alternate facilities when conducting its disaster recovery test of NCC operations. The extent of these tests is limited by test time constraints, the smaller configuration used for testing, availability of personnel and other such factors.

Over the years, SSA has gained significant experience in installing and running its systems on a wide variety of hardware during disaster recovery tests and benchmarking new computing platforms. We believe this experience has resulted in the development of reliable procedures that allow SSA to bring up its systems at any site. This, of course, does not remove SSA’s burden of verifying that secondary sites are stocked, as indicated, by the vendor. We will evaluate the benefits of establishing orientation visits at the secondary sites.

Report on Compliance with Laws and Regulations

Findings:

SSA is not in full compliance with section 221(i) of the Social Security Act which requires periodic Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) for Title II beneficiaries. If CDRs are not performed timely, beneficiaries who are no longer eligible for disability may inappropriately continue to receive benefits, including Medicare benefits. Prior to our report date, SSA was
unable to provide an estimate of the total backlog of Title II cases yet to be reviewed for continuing eligibility as of September 30, 1999.

SSA Comment

We believe SSA has made significant progress towards becoming compliant with section 221 (i) by the end of next year. We recommend that this be recognized by adding the following at the end of the above finding: “Recognizing its responsibility to meet the requirements of the law, SSA has a plan to eliminate the backlog of title II CDRs and is on target to eliminate the backlog by FY 2000.”

Under FFMIA, we are required to report whether the agency’s financial management systems substantially comply with Federal financial management systems requirements, Federal accounting standards, and the United States Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. To meet this requirement we performed tests of compliance using the implementation guidance for FFMIA included in Appendix D of OMB Bulletin No. 98-08, as amended. We found weaknesses in information protection and business continuity planning, as described above. We believe these weaknesses are significant departures from certain of the requirements of OMB Circulars A-127, Financial Management Systems, and A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, and are therefore instances of substantial noncompliance with the Federal financial management systems requirements under FFMIA. SSA should assign a high priority to the corrective actions consistent with the requirements of OMB Circular No. A-50 Revised, on audit follow-up.

SSA Comment

SSA partially agrees with this finding. As discussed earlier in the report and in these comments, SSA agrees with the findings and recommendations pertaining to protection of information and continuity of operations and we are committed to continue making improvements in these areas until all planned actions are completed. However, we do not agree that these are instances of substantial noncompliance. Furthermore, due to the fact that there were no new reportable conditions identified since last year’s report and that SSA has improved controls over separation of duties to the extent that the area is no longer a reportable condition, we believe that SSA is, overall, in substantial compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act.