in part on the level at which the two variables employed in the crosstabulation are measured. The $\tau b$ and $\tau c$ measures require at least ordinal-level measurement. They use the information about the ordering of categories of variables by considering every possible pair of cases in the table. Each pair is checked to see if its relative ordering on the first variable is the same (concordant) as its relative ordering on the second variable, or if the ordering is reversed (discordant).

The number of concordant pairs ($P$) and the number of discordant pairs ($Q$) is then computed. If $P$ is larger than $Q$—that is, if there is a preponderance of pairs ordered in the same direction on both variables—then the final statistic will be positive. If $Q$ is larger than $P$, there will be a negative association (sometimes referred to as correlation) between the variables. If there are only two categories of either variable, the sign of the association is arbitrary. $\tau b$ is most appropriate for use with square tables, where the number of rows and columns are equal. $\tau c$ is appropriate for use with rectangular tables, where the number of rows differs from the number of columns.

---

### Social Security Abroad

#### Impact of Recession on Swiss Pension Program*

Numerous discussions in the United States have highlighted the increased financial demands placed on the social security program by the worldwide recession that began in 1974 and the continuing inflation of the 1970's. In light of these concerns, attention has shifted to ways in which foreign countries have dealt with similar economic conditions. This study focuses on the measures taken to cope with the effects of recession and inflation on the Swiss national pension program.

#### BACKGROUND

The 1974 recession and continuing high rates of inflation have placed considerable strain on social security financing in industrialized countries. Sharp rises in unemployment have reduced revenues from payroll contributions and, at the same time, created a need for greater expenditures in the areas of unemployment benefits, job training, and, in several countries, early pensions claimed because employment opportunities were limited. Inflation has also added to social security program costs as benefits have been adjusted upwards to keep pace with rising prices. The combined effects of inflation and recession have aggravated existing long-term financial problems already facing the programs in industrialized countries where demographic changes have meant a steadily declining number of contributors in relation to beneficiaries.

In the period 1975–77, the Swiss government took legislative action to restructure the financing of the social security system and to meet the income-maintenance needs of the growing number of unemployed. First, in January 1975, temporary “emergency measures” were enacted that reduced the government’s contribution to the social security program and substantially raised payroll taxes to offset that cutback. Amendments drafted in 1976 to change the social security law have been passed by the legislature and await voter approval in a referendum.*

*Prepared by Frank B. McArdle, Comparative Studies Staff, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics.


*On February 26, 1978, 66 percent of the Swiss voters approved the new social security amendments and rejected by a vote of 80 percent a proposal to lower retirement age to 60 for men, 58 for women. All the proposed changes discussed in this article have thus become law.
The proposed legislation (1) schedules gradual increases in the national government's contribution during 1978-82, (2) makes the emergency payroll tax increase permanent and further raises contribution rates for self-employed and non-employed persons, (3) restricts entitlement to supplemental benefits for a spouse, and (4) introduces a mechanism to automatically adjust the pensions as wages and prices fluctuate. Finally, in 1977, another step was taken when compulsory unemployment insurance took effect.

The Swiss government anticipated that these measures would produce a social security system that was financially sound for the next 20 years. To achieve this goal, the government sought additional sources of revenue to finance its share of the program. As part of its solution, the government proposed the use of a value-added tax to increase Federal revenues and thereby help meet its obligation. Swiss voters, however, rejected the proposal in June 1977. As a result, even if the amendments receive voter approval, the financial outlook of the system remains uncertain. The government will lack this anticipated additional revenue to finance scheduled increases in its contribution over the next 4 years.

**PROGRAM PROFILE**

Switzerland is a Federal state composed of 22 sovereign Cantons that are altogether autonomous except in matters where their rights have been specifically ceded to the central authority—the Confederation. The relationship between the Cantons and the Confederation is regulated by the Federal Constitution. All amendments to the Constitution must be approved by the citizens in a compulsory referendum.

The social security pension program in Switzerland provides old-age, survivor, and disability protection, health insurance, employment injury compensation, unemployment insurance, and family allowances.

The old-age and survivor program was established in 1948 and is compulsory for residents. It is financed primarily through a payroll tax and government contribution.

Most persons in Switzerland are required to pay contributions from the time they begin working or the year after they reach age 20 through retirement at age 65 for men or age 62 for women, whether or not they are actually working. Married women who are not employed, or who work in a family business without salary, are exempted from making social security contributions.

The social security system was founded on the basic premise that there should be three "pillars" of economic security: (1) compulsory social insurance, (2) employee-benefit plans, and (3) private savings and insurance. Since the program was not intended to be the sole source of income, it was set up with a relatively low benefit that replaced only a small portion of a worker's final earnings.

In practice, however, social security benefits became the main source of income for a large part of the retired population. In 1964, more than 20 percent of the beneficiaries were also receiving a means-tested payment because their pensions were inadequate. As a result, in January 1966 a national minimum income standard was established and a new system of supplementary payments was added to the regular earnings-related pension to bring the incomes of pensioners up to the national minimum.

So many pensioners rely on social security benefits as their sole source of income that the Swiss decided to modify their original philosophy of keeping such benefits relatively low. Social security amendments passed in 1972 inaugurated a program of steadily increasing pensions at a rate faster than wages and prices. Pension increases scheduled for 1973 and 1975 were designed to raise old-age and survivor pensions to a level that would guarantee a minimum standard of living. A constitutional amendment passed in 1972 also reinforced the second "pillar" concept of the Swiss program. This amendment made it mandatory for employers to provide a private pension system covering all wage and salary workers with earnings above the maximum for social security benefit purposes. The bill implementing compulsory private pensions is still pending, however.

---


When the recession began in 1974, the contribution rates were as follows: Wage earners and their employers each paid 3.9 percent of payroll for old-age and survivor coverage and 0.4 percent for disability coverage. Self-employed persons contributed 3.9–0.8 percent on earnings from 2,000 to 20,000 francs per year* for the old-age and survivor program, and an added 0.46–0.80 percent for disability insurance. Self-employed persons earning less than 2,000 francs paid the minimum fixed contribution of 78 francs per year. Non-employed persons were assessed amounts based on their income and assets, ranging from a minimum of 78 francs to a maximum of 7,800 francs annually.

The public subsidy to the social security program is a designated percentage of expenditures. In 1974, total government contributions amounted to 20 percent of expenditures for the old-age and survivor pension program and 50 percent for the disability program. The national government contributed 75 percent of the total government contribution, the Cantons contributed the other 25 percent. Annual surpluses accumulate in a central equalization fund and are tapped to help finance the social security program. The fund’s real purpose is to prepare for an unfavorable demographic pattern later in the century.

The Swiss social security program has a minimum and a maximum pension that were 400 francs and 800 francs per month, respectively, in 1974. A retired worker with a spouse aged 45 or older was entitled to a dependent’s supplement equal to 35 percent of the insured individual’s pension, and a worker with a spouse aged 60 or older was entitled to a couple’s pension equal to 150 percent of the insured person’s benefit. Pension review occurred every 3 years or whenever the consumer price index rose 5 percentage points. Increases were initiated by a government commission and legislated by Parliament.

**PROBLEMS OF FINANCING**

The recession adversely affected contributions from both payroll and general revenues—the sources of revenue for the social security program.

*As of January 1, 1977, 1 Swiss franc equaled 408 US cents*

**Deficit in 1975**

The inflation rate in Switzerland was 11.9 percent in 1973 and 12.3 percent in 1974—among the
highest in Europe. The national government, as a result, experienced growing budget deficits. A 1974 fiscal program designed to contain the growth of government expenditures and to raise sales and income taxes was rejected by Swiss voters. Thus, on the eve of a 25-percent increase in pensions scheduled for 1975, the government found itself without additional sources of revenue. As a result, in early 1975 the national government cut back its contribution for 1975-77 from 15 percent to 9 percent of expenditures.

The size of the central equalization fund is especially important because Switzerland, like most industrialized countries, has experienced a declining ratio of contributors to pensioners. For every pensioner in 1975, down from 4.4 in 1960, a further decline to 3.0 contributors is projected for the year 2000 and possibly as few as 1.8 contributors per beneficiary in the era beyond 2020. The government believes that the fund will have to be used to offset the unfavorable demographic ratio in the future.

In 1975, when the fund dropped in absolute size for the first time in order to compensate for the social security annual deficit, special measures became necessary. In that year, for the first time since it was established in 1948, the Swiss old-age and survivor pension program had a deficit in its annual operations. This decline resulted from the changes indicated in the accompanying table. Payroll contributions failed to grow as quickly as they had in the past and the government contribution declined. Therefore, total receipts for 1975 increased only 4 percent while expenditures rose 19 percent.

The Swiss policy of steadily increasing pensions had placed a financial strain on the central equalization fund. The minimum annual pension for a single person, for example, increased to more than four times its original size during 1964-77 from 1,500 francs to 6,300 francs. Higher benefits and the rising number of beneficiaries between the end of 1963 and the end of 1975 caused total receipts to the old-age and survivor program to increase by 5.7 times, while total expenditures rose by 8.3 times what they had been. Expenditures have risen faster than the revenue going into the central equalization fund. The fund, which had sufficient resources to cover 53 months of pension expenditures in 1966, was only able to finance 18 months of expenditures by the end of 1974.

The decline in the rate of increase of payroll contributions would have been even greater if the Swiss government had not enacted an 8-percent increase (from 7.8 percent to 8.4 percent) in payroll taxes for old-age and survivor insurance effective July 1, 1975. The decline in government contributions reflects the previously mentioned government-ordered cutback in January 1975. Total receipts nevertheless managed to grow slightly from 1974 to 1975 but not nearly so much as the increase in expenditures, which reflects the 25-percent benefit increase effective January 1, 1975. As a result, the old-age and survivor pension program in 1975 registered a deficit of 168.8 million francs.

**CHANGES IN SOCIAL SECURITY**

As noted earlier, to compensate for the reduction in the Swiss government subsidy (from 15 percent to 9 percent of total social security expenditures), payroll taxes were increased (effective July 1, 1975) from 7.8 percent to 8.4 percent for the old-age and survivor insurance program and from 0.8 percent to 1.0 percent for disability insurance. In addition, the scale of contributions for the self-employed was raised from 3.9-6.8 percent to 4.2-7.3 percent for the old-age and survivor insurance program and from 0.46-0.80 percent to 0.575-1.000 percent for disability insurance. The minimum contribution for self-employed persons was increased from 78 francs to 84 francs annually, and the range of contributions for nonemployed persons was also raised—from 78-7,800 francs to 84-8,400 francs per year.

Both the government contribution cutback and the payroll-tax increase were enacted under temporary legislation. In 1975, therefore, the Swiss government began drafting a permanent set of amendments to the social security law. The goal of the proposed new legislation is to restore the financial equilibrium of the system by increasing revenue into the system and cutting back on expenditures.

**Increased Revenue**

A proposal was made to raise the national government's contribution to the old-age and sur-
The government would have the authority to regulate multiple entitlement among the several branches of social insurance to curtail duplication of benefits and to overhaul the system of partial pensions with the same end in mind.

The new legislation is intended to curb future growth of social security expenditures by consciously omitting any provisions for a lower or flexible retirement age. The government deliberately rejected popular demands for early or flexible retirement because of cost considerations. The government argued that it was inappropriate to lower retirement age while life expectancy was rising and that early retirement would not resolve the problem of unemployment. The government estimated that early retirement measures would have required an immediate 3-percent increase in payroll contributions or a 25-percent cut in pensions.

Automatic Adjustment of Pensions

The new legislation aims at establishing a mechanism for automatic adjustment of pensions. Under the old law, pensions were reviewed every 3 years, or whenever the consumer price index rose 8 percentage points. During the review process, the government would ask the Federal Commission on Old-Age, Survivors, and Invalidity Insurance to weigh the need for adjusting pensions against the financial condition of the social security system and, on that basis, propose an appropriate benefit increase. The proposal then had to be presented to Parliament for approval, a procedure that was regarded as time-consuming and cumbersome.

The proposed new law gives the government...
some discretion in adjusting pensions. Pensions would follow a “pension index” equal to the mean of the Swiss consumer price index and the wage index of the Federal Office for Industry, Handicrafts, and Labor. The government would automatically adjust pensions every 2 years but would have the option of making adjustments at shorter intervals if the consumer price index rises more than 8 percent in a single year, or at longer intervals if the rise in the consumer price index is less than 5 percent in the span of 2 years.

To avoid the problem of overindexing, the proposed law provides that new pensions awarded in the year before the benefit increase would be raised only by half as much as those pensions in force over the full 2-year adjustment period. Otherwise, the beneficiary would derive a double advantage, once for the year he worked and received higher wages and once for the benefit adjustment that reflects the change in wages during the work year before retiring.

COMPULSORY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

The recession underscored the fact that the existing system of unemployment insurance was inadequate. When the recession began, unemployment compensation in Switzerland was a mixture of compulsory and voluntary systems. The national government had passed legislation establishing minimum standards for unemployment insurance, but it was barred by the Constitution from establishing a national unemployment fund. Instead, unemployment funds were administered by Cantons and local districts, trade unions, and private companies. In most Cantons, unemployment insurance was only compulsory for low-income workers, and many other occupational groups were excluded—among them public officials, agricultural workers, and nursing staffs.

Consequently, a relatively low level of coverage existed in 1974 when the recession struck. Only 1 out of 5 workers was covered by an unemployment insurance plan.

Some improvements were introduced in 1975. The terms of coverage were liberalized, benefits were increased, and the duration of benefits was prolonged. The recession prompted more workers to enroll voluntarily, the Cantons extended their obligatory systems, and the national government tried to encourage enrollment. Still, as of June 1976, only 1 out of 3 workers had unemployment insurance coverage.

The Swiss government consequently drafted a constitutional amendment authorizing a system of compulsory national unemployment insurance. It was approved by voter referendum on June 13, 1976. Interim provisions went into effect April 1, 1977.

Under this legislation, employers and employees each contribute 0.4 percent of earnings up to a ceiling of 46,800 francs per year, which is a little more than twice the average earnings of a Swiss worker in manufacturing in 1975 (23,228 francs). The law also provides for contribution rates to be lowered when sufficient reserves have accumulated in the unemployment fund.

The interim program left benefits virtually the same as they were under the old system. Those without dependents receive 65 percent of the latest covered monthly salary. Employees with dependents receive 70 percent of salary, plus supplements for dependents, up to a maximum unemployment benefit of 85 percent of last salary. Benefits cannot exceed 150 days (180 days for handicapped workers and workers over age 55) and are subject to suspension if several job offers are declined.

A worker must have paid contributions for 150 days of work out of the 365 days preceding his unemployment to qualify for benefits. Benefits were not paid during the first 6 months of the program's operation, unless the employee was covered under a preexisting unemployment insurance plan.

The new law on unemployment compensation thus complements the other changes in the Swiss pension system. It further increases the capabilities of social insurance programs to cope with the impact of recession.

SUMMARY

Legislation drafted in Switzerland in 1975-77 aims at countering the effects of inflation and...
recession by bringing increased revenues into the system, reducing expenditures, devising a mechanism to adjust pensions automatically, and improving income maintenance for the unemployed. The proposed legislation to place the social security system on a sound financial basis now needs voter approval in a referendum. Swiss voters meanwhile rejected (in mid-1977) a government-proposed value-added tax designed to finance increasing government contributions during 1978–82. Still to be resolved, therefore, is the problem of how the government will finance higher contributions and still achieve its stated goal of a balanced budget.

**PROGRAM OPERATIONS**

(Continued from page 2)

10 percent in the ratable reduction percentage used in the computation of grants. The increase of $49.95 in average payments in Nebraska reflected a legislative change in the maximum—from $294 for a family of four to $370, or $250 for the first child and $60 for each additional child. West Virginia's lower average was the result of the large payment in the preceding month to include a one-time back-to-school allowance. In Rhode Island a three-pay-period adjustment affected average payments in both the regular and the unemployed-parent programs.

**Medicare Benefits**

Withdrawals from the hospital insurance (HI) trust fund for payments to hospitals, skilled-nursing facilities, and home health agencies providing services to beneficiaries totaled nearly $1.6 billion in December 1977. Supplementary medical insurance (SMI) benefits amounted to $510 million. Cumulative withdrawals from the hospital and medical insurance trust funds for fiscal year 1978 were $4.4 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively.

As of December 31, 1977, Social Security Administration records indicate that 9.6 million bills were approved and $11.9 billion was reimbursed under HI from January through December 1977. The average amount reimbursed for all ages was $1,457 per inpatient hospital bill (all hospitals), $158 per home health bill, and $328 per skilled-nursing facility bill. Approximately 80 percent of the total amount reimbursed during this 12-month period was for the population aged 65 and over, and 11 percent was for the disabled.

Short-stay hospital bills accounted for 81 percent of all bills approved and 95 percent of total reimbursements. Hospital charges were $199 per day for the aged and $215 per day for disabled beneficiaries. Fewer covered days of care were recorded for the disabled, however (94, compared with 100 for all ages).

As of December 31, 1977, 111 million bills were recorded and $6.2 billion was reimbursed under SMI since January 1, 1977. Approximately 15 percent of the total amount reimbursed was for the disabled. The average amounts reimbursed per bill for disabled beneficiaries were $50 for physicians' services, $117 for outpatient care, $18 for independent laboratory services, $114 for home care, and $223 for all other services.