What Stock Market Returns to Expect for the Future?

by Peter A. Diamond*

Summary

In evaluating proposals for reforming Social Security that involve stock investments, the Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) has generally used a 7.0 percent real return for stocks. The 1994-96 Advisory Council specified that OCACT should use that return in making its 75-year projections of investment-based reform proposals. The assumed ultimate real return on Treasury bonds of 3.0 percent implies a long-run equity premium of 4.0 percent. There are two equity-premium concepts: the realized equity premium, which is measured by the actual rates of return; and the required equity premium, which investors expect to receive for being willing to hold available stocks and bonds. Over the past two centuries, the realized premium was 3.5 percent on average, but 5.2 percent for 1926 to 1998.

Some critics argue that the 7.0 percent projected stock returns are too high. They base their arguments on recent developments in the capital market, the current high value of the stock market, and the expectation of slower economic growth.

Increased use of mutual funds and the decline in their costs suggest a lower required premium, as does the rising fraction of the American public investing in stocks. The size of the decrease is limited, however, because the largest cost savings do not apply to the very wealthy and to large institutional investors, who hold a much larger share of the stock market’s total value than do new investors. These trends suggest a lower equity premium for projections than the 5.2 percent of the past 75 years. Also, a declining required premium is likely to imply a temporary increase in the realized premium because a rising willingness to hold stocks tends to increase their price. Therefore, it would be a mistake during a transition period to extrapolate what may be a temporarily high realized return. In the standard (Solow) economic growth model, an assumption of slower long-run growth lowers the marginal product of capital if the savings rate is constant. But lower savings as growth slows should partially or fully offset that effect.

The present high stock prices, together with projected slow economic growth, are not consistent with a 7.0 percent return. With a plausible level of adjusted dividends (dividends plus net share repurchases), the ratio of stock value to gross domestic product (GDP) would rise more than 20-fold over 75 years. Similarly, the steady-state Gordon formula—that stock returns equal the adjusted dividend yield plus the growth rate of stock prices (equal to that of GDP)—suggests a return of roughly 4.0 percent to 4.5 percent. Moreover, when relative stock values have been high, returns over the following decade have tended to be low.

To eliminate the inconsistency posed by the assumed 7.0 percent return, one could assume higher GDP growth, a lower long-run stock return, or a lower short-run stock return with a 7.0 percent return on a lower base thereafter. For example, with an adjusted dividend yield of 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent,
the market would have to decline about 35 percent to 45 percent in real terms over the next decade to reach steady state.

In short, either the stock market is overvalued and requires a correction to justify a 7.0 percent return thereafter, or it is correctly valued and the long-run return is substantially lower than 7.0 percent (or some combination). This article argues that the “overvalued” view is more convincing, since the “correctly valued” hypothesis implies an implausibly small equity premium. Although OCACT could adopt a lower rate for the entire 75-year period, a better approach would be to assume lower returns over the next decade and a 7.0 percent return thereafter.

**Introduction**

All three proposals of the 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security (1997) included investment in equities. For assessing the financial effects of those proposals, the Council members agreed to specify a 7.0 percent long-run real (inflation-adjusted) yield from stocks. They devoted little attention to different short-run returns from stocks. The Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) used this 7.0 percent return, along with a 2.3 percent long-run real yield on Treasury bonds, to project the impact of the Advisory Council’s proposals.

Since then, OCACT has generally used 7.0 percent when assessing other proposals that include equities. In the 1999 Social Security Trustees Report, OCACT used a higher long-term real rate on Treasury bonds of 3.0 percent. In the first 10 years of its projection period, OCACT makes separate assumptions about bond rates for each year and assumes slightly lower real rates in the short run. Since the assumed bond rate has risen, the assumed equity premium, defined as the difference between yields on equities and Treasuries, has declined to 4.0 percent in the long run. Some critics have argued that the assumed return on stocks and the resulting equity premium are still too high.

This article examines the critics’ arguments and, rather than settling on a single recommendation, considers a range of assumptions that seem reasonable. The article:

- Reviews the historical record on rates of return,
- Assesses the critics’ reasons why future returns may be different from those in the historical record and examines the theory about how those rates are determined, and
- Considers two additional issues: the difference between gross and net returns, and investment risk.

Readers should note that in this discussion, a decline in the equity premium need not be associated with a decline in the return on stocks, since the return on bonds could increase. Similarly, a decline in the return on stocks need not be associated with a decline in the equity premium, since the return on bonds could also decline. Both rates of return and the equity premium are relevant to choices about Social Security reform.

**Historical Record**

Realized rates of return on various financial instruments have been much studied and are presented in Table 1. Over the past 200 years, stocks have produced a real return of 7.0 percent per year. Even though annual returns fluctuate enormously, and rates vary significantly over periods of a decade or two, the return on stocks over very long periods has been quite stable (Siegel 1999). Despite that long-run stability, great uncertainty surrounds both a projection for any particular period and the relevance of returns in any short period of time for projecting returns over the long run.

The equity premium is the difference between the rate of return on stocks and on an alternative asset—Treasury bonds, for the purpose of this article. There are two concepts of equity premiums. One is the realized equity premium, which is measured by the actual rates of return. The other is the required equity premium, which equals the premium that investors expect to get in exchange for holding available quantities of assets. The two concepts are closely related but different—significantly different in some circumstances.

The realized equity premium for stocks relative to bonds has been 3.5 percent for the two centuries of available data, but it has increased over time (Table 2). That increase has resulted from a significant decline in bond returns over the past

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Stocks</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Bills</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1802-1998</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926-1998</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1998</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
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Source: Siegel (1999).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Equity premium (percent)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802-1998</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1946-1998</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Siegel (1999).
200 years. The decline is not surprising considering investors’ changing perceptions of default risk as the United States went from being a less-developed country (and one with a major civil war) to its current economic and political position, where default risk is seen to be virtually zero.\(^{13}\)

These historical trends can provide a starting point for thinking about what assumptions to use for the future. Given the relative stability of stock returns over time, one might initially choose a 7.0 percent assumption for the return on stocks—the average over the entire 200-year period. In contrast, since bond returns have tended to decline over time, the 200-year number does not seem to be an equally good basis for selecting a long-term bond yield. Instead, one might choose an assumption that approximates the experience of the past 75 years—2.2 percent, which suggests an equity premium of around 5.0 percent. However, other evidence, discussed below, argues for a somewhat lower value.\(^{14}\)

**Why Future Returns May Differ from Past Returns**

**Equilibrium and Long-Run Projected Rates of Return**

The historical data provide one way to think about rates of return. However, thinking about how the future may be different from the past requires an underlying theory about how those returns are determined. This section lists some of the actions by investors, firms, and government that combine to determine equilibrium; it can be skipped without loss of continuity.

In asset markets, the demand by individual and institutional investors reflects a choice among purchasing stocks, purchasing Treasury bonds, and making other investments.\(^{15}\) On the supply side, corporations determine the supplies of stocks and corporate bonds through decisions on dividends, new issues, share repurchases, and borrowing. Firms also choose investment levels. The supplies of Treasury bills and bonds depend on the government’s budget and debt management policies as well as monetary policy. Whatever the supplies of stocks and bonds, their prices will be determined so that the available amounts are purchased and held by investors in the aggregate.

The story becomes more complicated, however, when one recognizes that investors base decisions about portfolios on their projections of both future prices of assets and future dividends.\(^{16}\) In addition, market participants need to pay transactions costs to invest in assets, including administrative charges, brokerage commissions, and the bid-ask spread. The risk premium relevant for investors’ decisions should be calculated net of transactions costs. Thus, the greater cost of investing in equities than in Treasuries must be factored into any discussion of the equity premium.\(^{17}\) Differences in tax treatments of different types of income are also relevant (Gordon 1985; Kaplow 1994).

In addition to determining the supplies of corporate stocks and bonds, corporations also choose a debt/equity mix that affects the risk characteristics of both bonds and stocks. Financing a given level of investment more by debt and less by equity leaves a larger interest cost to be paid from the income of corporations before determining dividends. That makes both the debt and the equity more risky. Thus, changes in the debt/equity mix (possibly in response to prevailing stock market prices) should affect risk and, therefore, the equilibrium equity premium.\(^{18}\)

Since individuals and institutions are generally risk averse when investing, greater expected variation in possible future yields tends to make an asset less valuable. Thus, a sensible expectation about long-run equilibrium is that the expected yield on equities will exceed that on Treasury bonds. The question at hand is how much more stocks should be expected to yield.\(^{19}\) That is, assuming that volatility in the future will be roughly similar to volatility in the past, how much more of a return from stocks would investors need to expect in order to be willing to hold the available supply of stocks. Unless one thought that stock market volatility would collapse, it seems plausible that the premium should be significant. For example, equilibrium with a premium of 70 basis points (as suggested by Baker 1999a) seems improbable, especially since transactions costs are higher for stock than for bond investments. In considering this issue, one needs to recognize that a greater willingness to bear the risk associated with stocks is likely to be accompanied by greater volatility of stock prices if bond rates are unchanged. That is, fluctuations in expected growth in corporate profits will have bigger impacts on expected discounted returns (which approximate prices) when the equity premium, and so the discount rate, is lower.\(^{20}\)

Although stocks should earn a significant premium, economists do not have a fully satisfactory explanation of why stocks have yielded so much more than bonds historically, a fact that has been called the equity-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985; Cochrane 1997). Ongoing research is trying to develop more satisfactory explanations, but the theory still has inadequacies.\(^{21}\) Nevertheless, to explain why the future may be different from the past, one needs to rely on some theoretical explanation of the past in order to have a basis for projecting a different future.

Commentators have put forth three reasons as to why future returns may be different from those in the historical record. First, past and future long-run trends in the capital market may imply a decline in the equity premium. Second, the current valuation of stocks, which is historically high relative to various benchmarks, may signal a lower future rate of return on equities. Third, the projection of slower economic growth may suggest a lower long-run marginal product of capital, which is the source of returns to financial assets. The first two issues are discussed in the context of financial markets; the third, in the context of physical assets. One should distinguish between arguments that suggest a lower equity premium and those that suggest lower returns to financial assets generally.

**Equity Premium and Developments in the Capital Market**

The capital market has experienced two related trends—the decrease in the cost of acquiring a diversified portfolio of
stocks and the spread of stock ownership more widely in the economy. The relevant equity premium for investors is the equity premium net of the costs of investing. Thus, if the cost of investing in some asset decreases, that asset should have a higher price and a lower expected return gross of investment costs. The availability of mutual funds and the decrease in the cost of purchasing them should lower the equity premium in the future relative to long-term historical values. Arguments have also been raised about investors' time horizons and their understanding of financial markets, but the implications of those arguments are less clear.

**Mutual Funds.** In the absence of mutual funds, small investors would need to make many small purchases in different companies in order to acquire a widely diversified portfolio. Mutual funds provide an opportunity to acquire a diversified portfolio at a lower cost by taking advantage of the economies of scale in investing. At the same time, these funds add another layer of intermediation, with its costs, including the costs of marketing the funds.

Nevertheless, as the large growth of mutual funds indicates, many investors find them a valuable way to invest. That suggests that the equity premium should be lower in the future than in the past, since greater diversification means less risk for investors. However, the significance of the growth of mutual funds depends on the importance in total equity demand of "small" investors who purchase them, since this argument is much less important for large investors, particularly large institutional investors. According to recent data, mutual funds own less than 20 percent of U.S. equity outstanding (Investment Company Institute 1999).

A second development is that the average cost of investing in mutual funds has decreased. Rea and Reid (1998) report a drop of 76 basis points (from 225 to 149) in the average annual charge of equity mutual funds from 1980 to 1997. They attribute the bulk of the decline to a decrease in the importance of front-loaded funds (funds that charge an initial fee when making a deposit in addition to annual charges). The development and growth of index funds should also reduce costs, since index funds charge investors considerably less on average than do managed funds while doing roughly as well in gross rates of return. In a separate analysis, Rea and Reid (1999) also report a decline of 38 basis points (from 154 to 116) in the cost of bond mutual funds over the same period, a smaller drop than with equity mutual funds. Thus, since the cost of stock funds has fallen more than the cost of bond funds, it is plausible to expect a decrease in the equity premium relative to historical values. The importance of that decline is limited, however, by the fact that the largest cost savings do not apply to large institutional investors, who have always faced considerably lower charges.

A period with a declining required equity premium is likely to have a temporary increase in the realized equity premium. Assuming no anticipation of an ongoing trend, the divergence occurs because a greater willingness to hold stocks, relative to bonds, tends to increase the price of stocks. Such a price rise may yield a realized return that is higher than the required return. The high realized equity premium since World War II may be partially caused by a decline in the required equity premium over that period. During such a transition period, therefore, it would be a mistake to extrapolate what may be a temporarily high realized return.

**Spread of Stock Ownership.** Another trend that would tend to decrease the equity premium is the rising fraction of the American public investing in stocks either directly or indirectly through mutual funds and retirement accounts (such as 401(k) plans). Developments in tax law, pension provision, and the capital markets have expanded the base of the population who are sharing in the risks associated with the return to corporate stock. The share of households investing in stocks in any form increased from 32 percent in 1989 to 41 percent in 1995 (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sundén 1997). Numerous studies have concluded that widening the pool of investors sharing in stock market risk should lower the equilibrium risk premium (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991; Brav and Geczy 1996; Vissing-Jorgensen 1997; Diamond and Geanakoplos 1999; Heaton and Lucas 2000). The importance of that trend must be weighted by the low size of investment by such new investors.

**Investors' Time Horizons.** A further issue relevant to the future of the equity premium is whether the time horizons of investors, on average, have changed or will change. Although the question of how time horizons should affect demands for assets raises subtle theoretical issues (Samuelson 1989), longer horizons and sufficient risk aversion should lead to greater willingness to hold stocks given the tendency for stock prices to revert toward their long-term trend (Campbell and Viceira 1999).

The evidence on trends in investors' time horizons is mixed. For example, the growth of explicit individual retirement savings vehicles, such as individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)s, suggests that the average time horizons of individual investors may have lengthened. However, some of that growth is at the expense of defined benefit plans, which may have longer horizons. Another factor that might suggest a longer investment horizon is the increase in equities held by institutional investors, particularly through defined benefit pension plans. However, the relevant time horizon for such holdings may not be the open-ended life of the plan but rather the horizon of the plans' asset managers, who may have career concerns that shorten the relevant horizon.

Other developments may tend to lower the average horizon. Although the retirement savings of baby boomers may currently add to the horizon, their aging and the aging of the population generally will tend to shorten horizons. Finally, individual stock ownership has become less concentrated (Poterba and Samwick 1995), which suggests a shorter time horizon because less wealthy investors might be less concerned about passing assets on to younger generations. Overall, without detailed calculations that would go beyond the scope of this article, it is not clear how changing time horizons should affect projections.
Investors’ Understanding. Another factor that may affect the equity premium is investors’ understanding of the properties of stock and bond investments. The demand for stocks might be affected by the popular presentation of material, such as Siegel (1998), explaining to the general public the difference between short- and long-run risks. In particular, Siegel highlights the risks, in real terms, of holding nominal bonds. While the creation of inflation-indexed Treasury bonds might affect behavior, the lack of wide interest in those bonds (in both the United States and the United Kingdom) and the failure to fully adjust future amounts for inflation generally (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky 1997) suggest that nominal bonds will continue to be a major part of portfolios. Perceptions that those bonds are riskier than previously believed would then tend to decrease the required equity premium.

Popular perceptions may, however, be excessively influenced by recent events—both the high returns on equity and the low rates of inflation. Some evidence suggests that a segment of the public generally expects recent rates of increase in the prices of assets to continue, even when those rates seem highly implausible for a longer term (Case and Shiller 1988). The possibility of such extrapolative expectations is also connected with the historical link between stock prices and inflation. Historically, real stock prices have been adversely affected by inflation in the short run. Thus, the decline in inflation expectations over the past two decades would be associated with a rise in real stock prices if the historical pattern held. If investors and analysts fail to consider such a connection, they might expect robust growth in stock prices to continue without recognizing that further declines in inflation are unlikely. Sharpe (1999) reports evidence that stock analysts’ forecasts of real growth in corporate earnings include extrapolations that may be implausibly high. If so, expectations of continuing rapid growth in stock prices suggest that the required equity premium may not have declined.

On balance, the continued growth and development of mutual funds and the broader participation in the stock market should contribute to a drop in future equity premiums relative to the historical premium, but the drop is limited. Other factors, such as investors’ time horizons and understanding, have less clear-cut implications for the equity premium.

Equity Premium and Current Market Values

At present, stock prices are very high relative to a number of different indicators, such as earnings, dividends, book values, and gross domestic product (GDP) (Charts 1 and 2). Some
Projecting Future Adjusted Dividends

This article uses the concept of adjusted dividends to estimate the dividend yield. The adjustment begins by adding the value of net share repurchases to actual dividends, since that also represents a cash flow to stockholders in aggregate. A further adjustment is then made to reflect the extent to which the current situation might not be typical of the relationship between dividends and gross domestic product (GDP) in the future. Three pieces of evidence suggest that the current ratio of dividends to GDP is abnormally low and therefore not appropriate to use for projection purposes.

First, dividends are currently very low relative to corporate earnings—roughly 40 percent of earnings compared with a historical average of 60 percent. Because dividends tend to be much more stable over time than earnings, the dividend-earnings ratio declines in a period of high growth of corporate earnings. If future earnings grow at the same rate as GDP, dividends will probably grow faster than GDP to move toward the historical ratio. On the other hand, earnings, which are high relative to GDP, might grow more slowly than GDP. But then, corporate earnings, which have a sizable international component, might grow faster than GDP.

Second, corporations are repurchasing their outstanding shares at a high rate. Liang and Sharpe (1999) report on share repurchases by the 144 largest (nonbank) firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500. From 1994 to 1998, approximately 2 percent of share value was repurchased, although Liang and Sharpe anticipate a lower value in the future. At the same time, those firms were issuing shares because employees were exercising stock options at prices below the share values, thus offsetting much of the increase in the number of shares outstanding. Such transfers of net wealth to employees presumably reflect past services. In addition, initial public offerings (IPOs) represent a negative cash flow from stockholders as a whole. Not only the amount paid for stocks but also the value of the shares held by insiders represents a dilution relative to a base for long-run returns on all stocks. As a result, some value needs to be added to the current dividend ratio to adjust for net share repurchases, but the exact amount is unclear. However, in part, the high rate of share repurchase may be just another reflection of the low level of dividends, making it inappropriate to both project much higher dividends in the near term and assume that all of the higher share repurchases will continue. Exactly how to project current numbers into the next decade is not clear.

Finally, projected slow GDP growth, which will plausibly lower investment levels, could be a reason for lower retained earnings in the future. A stable level of earnings relative to GDP and lower retained earnings would increase the ratio of adjusted dividends to GDP.

In summary, the evidence suggests using an “adjusted” dividend yield that is larger than the current level. Therefore, the illustrative calculations in this article use adjusted dividend yields of 2.0 percent, 2.5 percent, 3.0 percent, and 3.5 percent. (The current level of dividends without adjustment for share repurchases is between 1.0 percent and 2.0 percent.)

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1 For example, Baker and Weisbrot (1999) appear to make no adjustment for share repurchases or for current dividends being low. However, they use a dividend payout of 2.0 percent, while Dudley and others (1999) report a current dividend yield on the Wilshire 5000 of 1.3 percent.

2 Firms might change their overall financing package by changing the fraction of net earnings they retain. The implications of such a change would depend on why they were making it. A long-run decrease in retained earnings might merely be increases in dividends and borrowing, with investment held constant. That case, to a first approximation, is another application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and the total stock value would be expected to fall by the decrease in retained earnings. Alternatively, a change in retained earnings might signal a change in investment. Again, there is ambiguity. Firms might be retaining a smaller fraction of earnings because investment opportunities were less attractive or because investment had become more productive. These issues tie together two parts of the analysis in this article. If slower growth is associated with lower investment that leaves the return on capital relatively unchanged, then what financial behavior of corporations is required for consistency? Baker (1999b) makes such a calculation; it is not examined here.
the growth rate of prices can be assumed to equal that of GDP. Assuming an adjusted dividend yield of roughly 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent and projected GDP growth of 1.5 percent, the Gordon equation implies a stock return of roughly 4.0 percent to 4.5 percent, not 7.0 percent. Those lower values would imply an equity premium of 1.0 percent to 1.5 percent, given OCACT’s assumption of a 3.0 percent yield on Treasury bonds. Making the equation work with a 7.0 percent stock return, assuming no change in projected GDP growth, would require an adjusted dividend yield of roughly 5.5 percent—about double today’s level.  

For such a large jump in the dividend yield to occur, one of two things would have to happen—adjusted dividends would have to grow much more rapidly than the economy, or stock prices would have to grow much less rapidly than the economy (or even decline). But a consistent projection would take a very large jump in adjusted dividends, assuming that stock prices grew along with GDP starting at today’s value. Estimates of recent values of the adjusted dividend yield range from 2.10 percent to 2.55 percent (Dudley and others 1999; Wadhwani 1998).  

Even with reasons for additional growth in the dividend yield, which are discussed in the box on projecting future dividends, an implausible growth of adjusted dividends is needed if the short- and long-term returns on stocks are to be 7.0 percent. Moreover, historically, very low values of the dividend yield and earnings-price ratio have been followed primarily by adjustments in stock prices, not in dividends and earnings (Campbell and Shiller 1998).  

If the ratio of aggregate adjusted dividends to GDP is unlikely to change substantially, there are three ways out of the internal inconsistency between the market’s current value and OCACT’s assumptions for economic growth and stock returns. One can:  

• Assume higher GDP growth, which would decrease the implausibility of the calculations described above for either the ratio of market value to GDP or the steady state under the Gordon equation. (The possibility of more rapid GDP growth is not explored further in this article.)  

• Adopt a long-run stock return that is considerably less than 7.0 percent.  

• Lower the rate of return during an intermediate period so that a 7.0 percent return could be applied to a lower market value base thereafter.  

A combination of the latter two alternatives is also possible.  

In considering the prospect of a near-term market decline, the Gordon equation can be used to compute the magnitude of the drop required over, for example, the next 10 years in order for stock returns to average 7.0 percent over the remaining 65 years of OCACT’s projection period (see Appendix B). A long-run return of 7.0 percent would require a drop in real prices of between 21 percent and 55 percent, depending on the assumed value of adjusted dividends (Table 3). That calculation is relatively sensitive to the assumed rate of return—for example, with a long-run return of 6.5 percent, the required drop in the market falls to a range of 13 percent to 51 percent.  

The two different ways of restoring consistency—a lower stock return in all years or a near-term decline followed by a return to the historical yield—have different implications for Social Security finances. To illustrate the difference, consider the contrast between a scenario with a steady yield of 4.25 percent derived by using current values for the Gordon equation as described above (the steady-state scenario) and a scenario in which stock prices drop by half immediately and the yield on stocks is 7.0 percent thereafter (the market-correction scenario). First, dollars newly invested in the future (that is, after any drop in share prices) earn only 4.25 percent per year under the steady-state scenario, compared with 7.0 percent per year under the market-correction scenario. Second, even for dollars currently in the market, the long-run yield differs under the two scenarios when the returns on stocks are being reinvested. Under the steady-state scenario, the yield on dollars currently in the market is 4.25 percent per year over any projected time period; under the market-correction scenario, the annual rate of return depends on the time horizon used for the calculation. After one year, the latter scenario has a rate of return of –46 percent. By the end of 10 years, the annual rate of return with the latter scenario is –0.2 percent; by the end of 35 years, 4.9 percent; and by the end of 75 years, 6.0 percent. Proposals for Social Security generally envision a gradual buildup of stock investments, which suggests that those investments would fare better under the market-correction scenario. The importance of the difference between scenarios depends also on the choice of additional changes to Social Security, which affect how long the money can stay invested until it is needed to pay benefits.  

Given the different impacts of these scenarios, which one is more likely to occur? The key issue is whether the current stock

<table>
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<th>Adjusted dividend yield</th>
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Table 3. Required percentage decline in real stock prices over the next 10 years to justify a return of 7.0, 6.5, and 6.0 percent thereafter

Source: Author’s calculations.

Note: Derived from the Gordon formula. Dividends are assumed to grow in line with gross domestic product (GDP), which the Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) assumes is 2.0 percent over the next 10 years. For long-run GDP growth, OCACT assumes 1.5 percent.
market is overvalued in the sense that rates of return are likely
to be lower in the intermediate term than in the long run.
Economists have divergent views on this issue.

One possible conclusion is that current stock prices signal a
significant drop in the long-run required equity premium. For
example, Glassman and Hassett (1999) have argued that the
equity premium will be dramatically lower in the future than it
has been in the past, so that the current market is not overval-
ued in the sense of signaling lower returns in the near term than
in the long run. 36 Indeed, they even raise the possibility that
the market is "undervalued" in the sense that the rate of return
in the intermediate period will be higher than in the long run,
reflecting a possible continuing decline in the required equity
premium. If their view is right, then a 7.0 percent long-run
return, together with a 4.0 percent equity premium, would be too
high.

Others argue that the current stock market values include a
significant price component that will disappear at some point,
although no one can predict when or whether it will happen
abruptly or slowly. Indeed, Campbell and Shiller (1998) and
Cochrane (1997) have shown that when stock prices (normal-
ized by earnings, dividends, or book values) have been far
above historical ratios, the rate of return over the following
decade has tended to be low, and the low return is associated
primarily with the price of stocks, not the growth of dividends
or earnings. 37 Thus, to project a steady rate of return in the
future, one needs to argue that this historical pattern will not
repeat itself. The values in Table 3 are in the range suggested
by the historical relationship between future stock prices and
current price-earnings and price-dividend ratios (see, for
eexample, Campbell and Shiller 1998).

Therefore, either the stock market is overvalued and requires
a correction to justify a 7.0 percent return thereafter, or it is
correctly valued and the long-run return is substantially lower
than 7.0 percent. (Some combination of the two is also pos-
sible.) Under either scenario, stock returns would be lower than
7.0 percent for at least a portion of the next 75 years. Some
evidence suggests, however, that investors have not ade-
quately considered that possibility.38 The former view is more
convincing, since accepting the "correctly valued" hypothesis
implies an implausibly small long-run equity premium. More-
over, when stock values (compared with earnings or dividends)
have been far above historical ratios, returns over the following
decade have tended to be low. Since this discussion has no
direct bearing on bond returns, assuming a lower return for
stocks over the near or long term also means assuming a lower
equity premium.

In short, given current stock values, a constant 7.0 percent
return is not consistent with OCACT's projected GDP growth. 39
However, OCACT could assume lower returns for a decade,
followed by a return equal to or about 7.0 percent. 40 In that
case, OCACT could treat equity returns as it does Treasury
rates, using different projection methods for the first 10 years
and for the following 65. This conclusion is not meant to
suggest that anyone is capable of predicting the timing of
annual stock returns, but rather that this is an approach to
financially consistent assumptions. Alternatively, OCACT
could adopt a lower rate of return for the entire 75-year period.

Marginal Product of Capital and Slow Growth

In its long-term projections, OCACT assumes a slower rate
of economic growth than the U.S. economy has experienced
over an extended period. That projection reflects both the
slowdown in labor force growth expected over the next few
decades and the slowdown in productivity growth since 1973.41
Some critics have suggested that slower growth implies lower
projected rates of return on both stocks and bonds, since the
returns to financial assets must reflect the returns on capital
investment over the long run. That issue can be addressed by
considering either the return to stocks directly, as discussed
above, or the marginal product of capital in the context of a
model of economic growth. 42

For the long run, the returns to financial assets must reflect
the returns on the physical assets that support the financial
assets. Thus, the question is whether projecting slower
economic growth is a reason to expect a lower marginal product
of capital. As noted above, this argument speaks to rates of
return generally, not necessarily to the equity premium.

The standard (Solow) model of economic growth implies that
slower long-run economic growth with a constant savings rate
will yield a lower marginal product of capital, and the relation-
ship may be roughly point-for-point (see Appendix C). How-
ever, the evidence suggests that savings rates are not affec-
ted by growth rates. Indeed, growth may be more important
for savings rates than savings are for growth rates. Bosworth
and Burtless (1998) have observed that savings rates and long-
term rates of income growth have a persistent positive associ-
ation, both across countries and over time. That observation
suggests that if future economic growth is slower than in the
past, savings will also be lower. In the Solow model, low
savings raise the marginal product of capital, with each
percentage-point decrease in the savings rate increasing the
marginal product by roughly one-half of a percentage point in
the long run. Since growth has fluctuated in the past, the
stability in real rates of return to stocks, as shown in Table 1,
suggests an offsetting savings effect, preserving the stability in
the rate of return. 43

Focusing directly on demographic structure and the rate of
return rather than on labor force growth and savings rates,
Poterba (1998) does not find a robust relationship between
demographic structure and asset returns. He does recognize the
limited power of statistical tests based on the few "effective
degrees of freedom" in the historical record. Poterba suggests
that the connection between demography and returns is not
simple and direct, although such a connection has been raised
as a possible reason for high current stock values, as baby
boomers save for retirement, and for projecting low future stock
values, as they finance retirement consumption. Goyal (1999)
estimates equity premium regressions and finds that changes in
population age structure add significant explanatory power.
Nevertheless, using a vector autoregression approach, his
analysis predicts no significant increase in average outflows
over the next 52 years. That occurs despite the retirement of baby boomers. Thus, both papers reach the same conclusion—that demography is not likely to effect large changes in the long-run rate of return.

Another factor to consider in assessing the connection between growth and rates of return is the increasing openness of the world economy. Currently, U.S. corporations earn income from production and trade abroad, and individual investors, while primarily investing at home, also invest abroad. It is not clear that putting the growth issue in a global context makes much difference. On the one hand, since other advanced economies are also aging, increased economic connections with other advanced countries do not alter the basic analysis. On the other hand, although investment in the less-developed countries may preserve higher rates, it is not clear either how much investment opportunities will increase or how to adjust for political risk. Increasing openness further weakens the argument for a significant drop in the marginal product of capital, but the opportunities abroad may or may not be realized as a better rate of return.

On balance, slower projected growth may reduce the return on capital, but the effect is probably considerably less than one-for-one. Moreover, this argument relates to the overall return to capital in an economy, not just stock returns. Any impact would therefore tend to affect returns on both stocks and bonds similarly, with no directly implied change in the equity premium.44

**Other Issues**

This paper has considered the gross rate of return to equities and the equity premium generally. Two additional issues arise in considering the prospect of equity investment for Social Security: how gross returns depend on investment strategy and how they differ from net returns; and the degree of risk associated with adding stock investments to a current all-bond portfolio.

**Gross and Net Returns**

A gross rate of return differs from a net return because it includes transactions costs such as brokerage charges, bid-ask spreads, and fees for asset management.45

If the Social Security trust fund invests directly in equities, the investment is likely to be in an index fund representing almost all of the equities outstanding in the United States. Thus, the analysis above holds for that type of investment. Although some critics have expressed concern that political influence might cause deviations from a broad-based indexing strategy, the evidence suggests that such considerations would have little impact on the expected rate of return (Munnell and Sundén 1999).

If the investment in stocks is made through individual accounts, then individuals may be given some choice either about the makeup of stock investment or about varying the mix of stocks and bonds over time. In order to consider the rate of return on stocks held in such individual accounts, one must consider the kind of portfolio choices individuals might make, both in the composition of the stock portfolio and in the timing of purchases and sales. Given the opportunity, many individuals would engage in numerous transactions, both among stocks and between stocks and other assets (attempts to time the market).

The evidence suggests that such transactions reduce gross returns relative to risks, even before factoring in transactions costs (Odean 1998). Therefore, both the presence of individual accounts with choice and the details of their regulation are likely to affect gross returns. On average, individual accounts with choice are likely to have lower gross returns from stocks than would direct trust fund investment.

Similarly, the cost of administration as a percentage of managed assets varies depending on whether there are individual accounts and how they are organized and regulated (National Academy of Social Insurance 1998; Diamond 2000). Estimates of that cost vary from 0.5 basis points for direct trust fund investment to 100 to 150 basis points for individually organized individual accounts, with government-organized individual accounts somewhere in between.

**Investment Risk of Stocks**

The Office of the Chief Actuary’s projections are projections of plausible long-run scenarios (ignoring fluctuations). As such, they are useful for identifying a sizable probability of future financial needs for Social Security. However, they do not address different probabilities for the trust fund’s financial condition under different policies.46 Nor are they sufficient for normative evaluation of policies that have different distributional or risk characteristics.

Although investment in stocks entails riskiness in the rate of return, investment in Treasury bonds also entails risk. Therefore, a comparison of those risks should consider the distribution of outcomes—concern about risk should not be separated from the compensation for bearing risk. That is, one needs to consider the probabilities of both doing better and doing worse as a result of holding some stocks. Merely observing that stocks are risky is an inadequate basis for policy evaluations. Indeed, studies of the historical pattern of returns show that portfolio risk decreases when some stocks are added to a portfolio consisting only of nominal bonds (Siegel 1998). Furthermore, many risks affect the financial future of Social Security, and investing a small portion of the trust fund in stocks is a small risk for the system as a whole relative to economic and demographic risks (Thompson 1998).

As long as the differences in risk and expected return are being determined in a market and reflect the risk aversion of market participants, the suitability of the trust fund’s portfolio can be considered in terms of whether Social Security has more or less risk aversion than current investors. Of course, the “risk aversion” of Social Security is a derived concept, based on the risks to be borne by future beneficiaries and taxpayers, who will incur some risk whatever portfolio Social Security holds. Thus, the question is whether the balance of risks and returns looks better with one portfolio than with another. The answer is
somewhat complex, since it depends on how policy changes in taxes and benefits respond to economic and demographic outcomes. Nevertheless, since individuals are normally advised to hold at least some stocks in their own portfolios, it seems appropriate for Social Security to also hold some stocks when investing on their behalf, at least in the long run, regardless of the rates of return used for projection purposes (Diamond and Geanakoplos 1999). 4

Conclusion

Of the three main bases for criticizing OCACT’s assumptions, by far the most important one is the argument that a constant 7.0 percent stock return is not consistent with the value of today’s stock market and projected slow economic growth. The other two arguments—pertaining to developments in financial markets and the marginal product of capital—have merit, but neither suggests a dramatic change in the equity premium.

Given the high value of today’s stock market and an expectation of slower economic growth in the future, OCACT could adjust its stock return projections in one of two ways. It could assume a decline in the stock market sometime over the next decade, followed by a 7.0 percent return for the remainder of the projection period. That approach would treat equity returns like Treasury rates, using different short- and long-run projection methods for the first 10 years and the following 65 years. Alternatively, OCACT could adopt a lower rate of return for the entire 75-year period. That approach may be more acceptable politically, but it obscures the expected pattern of returns and may produce misleading assessments of alternative financing proposals, since the appropriate uniform rate to use for projection purposes depends on the investment policy being evaluated.

Notes

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1 This 7.0 percent real rate of return is gross of administrative charges.

2 To generate short-run returns on stocks, the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) multiplied the ratio of one plus the ultimate yield on stocks to one plus the ultimate yield on bonds by the annual bond assumptions in the short run.

3 An exception was the use of 6.75 percent for the President’s proposal evaluated in a memorandum on January 26, 1999.

4 This report is formally called the 1999 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds.

5 For OCACT’s short-run bond projections, see Table II.D.1 in the 1999 Social Security Trustees Report.

6 This article was written in the summer of 1999 and uses numbers appropriate at the time. The 2000 Trustees Report uses the same assumptions of 6.3 percent for the nominal interest rate and 3.3 percent for the annual percentage change in the consumer price index. The real wage is assumed to grow at 1.0 percent, as opposed to 0.9 percent in the 1999 report.

7 See, for example, Baker (1999a) and Baker and Weisbrod (1999). This article only considers return assumptions given economic growth assumptions and does not consider growth assumptions.

8 This article does not analyze the policy issues related to stock market investment either by the trust fund or through individual accounts. Such an analysis needs to recognize that higher expected returns in the U.S. capital market come with higher risk. For the issues relevant for such a policy analysis, see National Academy of Social Insurance (1998).

9 Ideally, one would want the yield on the special Treasury bonds held by Social Security. However, this article simply refers to published long-run bond rates.

10 Because annual rates of return on stocks fluctuate so much, a wide band of uncertainty surrounds the best statistical estimate of the average rate of return. For example, Cochrane (1997) notes that over the 50 years from 1947 to 1996, the excess return of stocks over Treasury bills was 8 percent, but, assuming that annual returns are statistically independent, the standard statistical confidence interval extends from 3 percent to 13 percent. Using a data set covering a longer period lowers the size of the confidence interval, provided one is willing to assume that the stochastic process describing rates of return is stable for the longer period. This article is not concerned with that uncertainty, only with the appropriate rate of return to use for a central (or intermediate) projection. For policy purposes, one must also look at stochastic projections (see, for example, Copeland, VanDerhei, and Salisbury 1999; and Lee and Tuljapurkar 1998). Despite the value of stochastic projections, OCACT’s central projection plays an important role in thinking about policy and in the political process. Nevertheless, when making a long-run projection, one must realize that great uncertainty surrounds any single projection and the relevance of returns in any short period of time.

11 Table 2 also shows the equity premiums relative to Treasury bills. Those numbers are included only because they arise in other discussions; they are not referred to in this article.

12 For determining the equity premium shown in Table 2, the rate of return is calculated assuming that a dollar is invested at the start of a period and the returns are reinvested until the end of the period. In contrast to that geometric average, an arithmetic average is the average of the annual rates of return for each of the years in a period. The arithmetic average is larger than the geometric average. Assume, for example, that a dollar doubles in value in year 1 and then halves in value from year 1 to year 2. The geometric average over the 2-year period is zero; the arithmetic average of +100 percent and –50 percent annual rates of return is +25 percent. For projection purposes, one looks for an estimated rate of return that is suitable for investment over a long period. Presumably the best approach would be to take the arithmetic average of the rates of return that were each the geometric average for different historical periods of the same length as...
the average investment period within the projection period. That calculation would be close to the geometric average, since the variation in 35- or 40-year geometric rates of return, which is the source of the difference between arithmetic and geometric averages, would not be so large.

In considering recent data, some adjustment should be made for bond rates being artificially low in the 1940s as a consequence of war and postwar policies.

Also relevant is the fact that the real rate on 30-year Treasury bonds is currently above 3.0 percent.

Finance theory relates the willingness to hold alternative assets to the expected risks and returns (in real terms) of the different assets, recognizing that expectations about risk and return are likely to vary with the time horizon of the investor. Indeed, time horizon is an oversimplification, since people are also uncertain about when they will want to have access to the proceeds of those investments. Thus, finance theory is primarily about the difference in returns to different assets (the equity premium) and needs to be supplemented by other analyses to consider the expected return to stocks.

With Treasury bonds, investors can easily project future nominal returns (since default risk is taken to be virtually zero), although expected real returns depend on projected inflation outcomes given nominal yields. With inflation-protected Treasury bonds, investors can purchase bonds with a known real interest rate. Since those bonds were introduced only recently, they do not play a role in interpreting the historical record for projection purposes. Moreover, their importance in future portfolio choices is unclear.

In theory, for determining asset prices at which markets clear, one wants to consider marginal investments. Those investments are made up of a mix of marginal portfolio allocations by all investors and by marginal investors who become participants (or nonparticipants) in the stock and/or bond markets.

This conclusion does not contradict the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Different firms with the same total return distributions but different amounts of debt outstanding will have the same total value (stock plus bond) and so the same total expected return. A firm with more debt outstanding will have a higher expected return on its stock in order to preserve the total expected return.

Consideration of equilibrium suggests an alternative approach to analyzing the historical record. Rather than looking at realized rates of return, one could construct estimates of expected rates of return and see how they have varied in the past. That approach has been taken by Blanchard (1993). He concluded that the equity premium (measured by expectations) was unusually high in the late 1930s and 1940s and, since the 1950s, has experienced a long decline from that unusually high level. The high realized rates of return over this period are, in part, a consequence of a decline in the equity premium needed for people to be willing to hold stocks. In addition, the real expected returns on bonds have risen since the 1950s, which should have moderated the impact of a declining equity premium on expected stock returns. Blanchard examines the importance of inflation expectations and attributes some of the recent trend to a decline in expected inflation. He concluded that the premium in 1993 appeared to be around 2 percent to 3 percent and would probably not move much if inflation expectations remain low. He also concluded that decreases in the equity premium were likely to involve both increases in expected bond rates and decreases in expected rates of return on stocks.

If current cash returns to stockholders are expected to grow at rate \( g \), with projected returns discounted at rate \( r \), this fundamental value is the current return divided by \( (r - g) \). If \( r \) is smaller, fluctuations in long-run projections of \( g \) result in larger fluctuations in the fundamental value.

Several explanations have been put forth, including: (1) the United States has been lucky, compared with stock investment in other countries, and realized returns include a premium for the possibility that the U.S. experience might have been different; (2) returns to actual investors are considerably less than the returns on indexes that have been used in analyses; and (3) individual preferences are different from the simple models that have been used in examining the puzzle.

The timing of realized returns that are higher than required returns is somewhat more complicated, since recognizing and projecting such a trend will tend to boost the price of equities when the trend is recognized, not when it is realized.

Nonprofit institutions, such as universities, and defined benefit plans for public employees now hold more stock than in the past. Attributing the risk associated with that portfolio to the beneficiaries of those institutions would further expand the pool sharing in the risk.

More generally, the equity premium depends on the investment strategies being followed by investors.

This tendency, known as mean reversion, implies that a short period of above-average stock returns is likely to be followed by a period of below-average returns.

To quantify the importance of these developments, one would want to model corporate behavior as well as investor behavior. A decline in the equity premium reflects a drop to corporations in the “cost of risk” in the process of acquiring funds for risky investment. If the “price per unit of risk” goes down, corporations might respond by selecting riskier investments (those with a higher expected return), thereby somewhat restoring the equity premium associated with investing in corporations.

In considering the return to an individual from investing in stocks, the return is made up of dividends and a (possible) capital gain from a rise in the value of the shares purchased. When considering the return to all investment in stocks, one needs to consider the entire cash flow to stockholders, including dividends and net share repurchases by the firms. That suggests two methods of examining the consistency of any assumed rate of return on stocks. One is to consider the value of all stocks outstanding. If one assumes that the value of all stocks outstanding grows at the same rate as the economy (in the long run), then the return to all stocks outstanding is that rate of growth plus the sum of dividends and net share repurchases, relative to total share value. Alternatively, one can consider ownership of a single share. The assumed rate of return minus the rate of dividend payment then implies a rate of capital gain on the single share. However, the relationship between the growth of value of a single share and the growth of the economy depends on the rate of share repurchase. As shares are being repurchased, remaining shares should grow in value relative to the growth of the economy. Either approach can be calculated in a consistent manner. What must be avoided is an inconsistent mix, considering only dividends and also assuming that the value of a single share grows at the same rate as the economy.

The implausibility refers to total stock values, not the value of single shares—thus, the relevance of net share repurchases. For example, Dudley and others (1999) view a steady equity premium in the range of 1.0 percent to 3.0 percent as consistent with current stock prices and their projections. They assume 3.0 percent GDP growth and a 3.5 percent real bond return, both higher than the assumptions used by OACT. Wadhwani (1998) finds that if the S&P 500 is correctly valued, he has to assume a negative risk premium. He considers various adjustments that lead to a higher premium, with his “best guess” estimate being 1.6 percent. That still seems too low.

Dudley and others (1999) report a current dividend yield on the Wilshire 5000 of 1.3 percent. They then make an adjustment that is equivalent to adding 80 basis points to that rate for share repurchases, for which they cite Campbell and Shiller (1998). Wadhwani (1998) finds a current expected dividend yield of 1.65 percent for the S&P 500, which he adjusts to 2.55 percent to account for share repurchases. For a discussion of share repurchases, see Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996).

Stock prices reflect investors’ assumptions about economic growth. If their assumptions differ from those used by OACT, then it becomes difficult to have a consistent projection that does not assume that investors will be surprised.

In considering these values, note the observation that a fall of 20 percent to 30 percent in advance of recessions is typical for the U.S. stock market (Wadhwani 1998). With OACT assuming a 27 percent rise in the price level over the next decade, a 21 percent decline in real stock prices would yield the same nominal prices as at present.

The importance of the assumed growth rate of GDP can be seen by redoing the calculations in Table 3 for a growth rate that is one-half of a percent larger in both the short and long runs. Compared with the original calculations, such a change would increase the ratios by 16 percent.

Both scenarios are consistent with the Gordon formula, assuming a 2.75 percent adjusted dividend yield (without a drop in share prices) and a growth of dividends of 1.5 percent per year.

With the steady-state scenario, a dollar in the market at the start of the steady state is worth $1.0425^{t}$ dollars $t$ years later, if the returns are continuously reinvested. In contrast, under the market-correction scenario, a dollar in the market at the time of the drop in prices is worth $(1/2)(1.07)^{t}$ dollars $t$ years later.

The authors assume that the Treasury rate will not change significantly, so that changes in the equity premium and in the return to stocks are similar.

One could use equations estimated on historical prices to check the plausibility of intermediate-run stock values with the intermediate-run values needed for plausibility for the long-run assumptions. Such a calculation is not considered in this article. Another approach is to consider the value of stocks relative to the replacement cost of the capital that corporations hold, referred to as Tobin’s q. That ratio has fluctuated considerably and is currently unusually high. Robertson and Wright (1998) have analyzed the ratio and concluded that a cumulative real decline in the stock market over the first decades of the 21st century has a high probability.

As Wadhwani (1998, p. 36) notes, “Surveys of individual investors in the United States regularly suggest that they expect returns above 20 percent, which is obviously unsustainable. For example, in a survey conducted by Montgomery Asset Management in 1997, the typical mutual fund investor expected annual returns from the stock market of 34 percent over the next 10 years! Most U.S. pension funds operate under actuarial assumptions of equity returns in the 8-10 percent area, which, with a dividend yield under 2 percent and nominal GNP growth unlikely to exceed 5 percent, is again, unsustainably high.”

There is no necessary connection between the rate of return on stocks and the rate of growth of the economy. There is a connection among the rate of return on stocks, the current stock prices, dividends relative to GDP, and the rate of growth of the economy.

The impact of such a change in assumptions on actuarial balance depends on the amount that is invested in stocks in the short term relative to the amount invested in the long term. The levels of holdings at different times depend on both the speed of initial investment and whether stock holdings are sold before very long (as would happen with no other policy changes) or whether, instead, additional policies are adopted that result in a longer holding period, possibly including a sustained sizable portfolio of stocks. Such an outcome would follow if Social Security switched to a sustained level of funding in excess of the historical long-run target of just a contingency reserve equal to a single year’s expenditures.

“The annual rate of growth in total labor force decreased from an average of about 2.0 percent per year during the 1970s and 1980s to about 1.1 percent from 1990 to 1998. After 1998 the labor force is projected to increase about 0.9 percent per year, on average, through 2008, and to increase much more slowly after that, ultimately reaching 0.1 percent toward the end of the 75-year projection period” (Social Security Trustees Report, p. 55). “The Trustees assume an intermediate trend growth rate of labor productivity of 1.3 percent per year, roughly in line with the average rate of growth of productivity over the last 30 years” (Social Security Trustees Report, p. 55).

Two approaches are available to answer this question. Since the Gordon formula, given above, shows that the return to stocks equals the adjusted dividend yield plus the growth of stock prices, one needs to consider how the dividend yield is affected by slower growth. In turn, that relationship will depend on investment levels relative to corporate earnings. Baker (1999b) makes such a calculation, which is not examined here. Another approach is to consider the return on physical capital directly, which is the one examined in this article.

Using the Granger test of causation (Granger 1969), Carroll and Weil (1994) find that growth causes saving but saving does not cause growth. That is, changes in growth rates tend to precede changes in savings rates but not vice versa. For a recent discussion of savings and growth, see Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000).

One can also ask how a change in policy designed to build and maintain a larger trust fund in a way that significantly increases national saving might affect future returns. Such a change would plausibly tend to lower rates of return. The size of that effect depends on the size of investment increases relative to available investment opportunities, both in the United States and worldwide. Moreover, it depends on the response of private saving to the policy, including the effect that would come through any change in the rate of return. There is plausibly an effect here, although this article does not explore it. Again, the argument speaks to the level of rates of return generally, not to the equity premium.

One can also ask how changed policies might affect future returns. A change in portfolio policy that included stocks (whether in the trust fund or in individual accounts) would plausibly lower the equity premium somewhat. That effect could come about through a combination of a rise in the Treasury rate (thereby requiring a change
in tax and/or expenditure policy) and a fall in expected returns on stocks. The latter depends on both the underlying technology of available returns to real investments and the effect of portfolio policy on national saving. At this time, research on this issue has been limited, although it is plausible that the effect is not large (Bohn 1998; Abel 1999; Diamond and Gennaiopulos 1999).

For stochastic projections, see Copeland, VanDerhei, and Salisbury (1999); and Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998). OCACT generally provides sensitivity analysis by doing projections with several different rates of return on stocks.

Cochrane (1997, p. 32) reaches a similar conclusion relative to individual investment: “We could interpret the recent run-up in the market as the result of people finally figuring out how good an investment stocks have been for the last century, and building institutions that allow wise participation in the stock market. If so, future returns are likely to be much lower, but there is not much one can do about it but sigh and join the parade.”

References


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Appendix A: Alternative Method for Determining the Ratio of Stock Value to GDP

Variables

\( r \) …… rate of return on stocks
\( g \) …… rate of growth of both GDP and dividends
\( a \) …… adjusted dividend yield at time 0
\( P(t) \) … aggregate stock value at time \( t \)
\( Y(t) \) … GDP at time \( t \)
\( D(t) \) … dividends at time \( t \)

Equations

\[ Y(t) = Y(0)e^{rt} \]
\[ D(t) = D(0)e^{rt} = aP(0)e^{rt} \]
\[ dP(t)/dt = rP - D(t) = rP - aP(0)e^{rt} \]

Solving the differential equation, we have:

\[ P(t) = P(0)\left\{ (r - g - a)e^{(r-g)t} + a \right\} / (r - g) \]
\[ = P(0)\left\{ e^{rt} - (a/(r-g))(e^{rt} - e^{rt}) \right\} \]

Taking the ratio of prices to GDP, we have:

\[ P(t)/Y(t) = \frac{P(0)/Y(0)}{\left\{ (r - g - a)e^{(r-g)t} + a \right\} / (r - g)} \]
\[ = \frac{P(0)/Y(0)}{\left\{ (e^{rt} - (a/(r-g))(e^{rt} - e^{rt}) \right\}} \]

Consistent with the Gordon formula, a constant ratio of \( P/Y \) (that is, a steady state) follows from \( r = g + a \). As a non-steady-state example—with values of .07 for \( r \), .015 for \( g \), and .03 for \( a = P(75)/Y(75) = 28.7P(0)/Y(0) \).
Appendix B: Calculation Using the Gordon Equation

In discrete time, once we are in a steady state, the Gordon growth model relates a stock price \( P \) at time \( t \) to the expected dividend \( D \) in the following period, the rate of growth of dividends \( G \), and the rate of return on the stock \( R \). Therefore, we have:

\[
P_t = D_{t+1} (1+G) = P_t (1+G)
\]

We denote values after a decade (when we are assumed to be in a steady state) by \( P' \) and \( D' \) and use an “adjusted” initial dividend that starts at a ratio \( G' \), \( G' = .07, \ G = .02, \ G' = .015. \) In this case, we have:

\[
P' / P = (1 + G') D'/((1 + G') P)
\]

\[
= (1 + G') D' (1 + G') P / ((1 + G') P)
\]

\[
= X (1 + G') (1 + G') P / ((1 + G') P)
\]

For the basic calculation, we assume that \( R \) is .07, \( G \) is .02, \( G' \) is .015. In this case, we have:

\[
P' / P = 22.5 X
\]

Thus, for initial ratios of adjusted dividends to stock prices of .02, .025, .03, and .035, \( P' / P \) equals .45, .56, .67 and .79, respectively. Subtracting those numbers from 1 yields the required decline in the real value of stock prices as shown in the first column of Table 3. Converting them into nominal values by multiplying by 1.27, we have values of .57, .71, and .86. If the long-run stock return is assumed to be 6.5 percent instead of 7.0 percent, the ratio \( P' / P \) is higher and the required decline is smaller. Increasing GDP growth also reduces the required decline. Note that the required declines in stock values in Table 3 are the decline in real values; the decline in nominal terms would be less.

Appendix C: A Cobb-Douglas Solow Growth Model in Steady State

Variables

- \( Y \) … output
- \( K \) … capital
- \( L \) … labor
- \( a \) … growth rate of Solow residual
- \( g \) … growth rate of both \( K \) and \( Y \)
- \( n \) … growth rate of labor
- \( b \) … share of labor
- \( s \) … savings rate
- \( e \) … depreciation rate
- \( MP(K) \) … marginal product of capital

Equations

\[
\log[Y] = at + b \log[L] + (1 – b) \log[K]
\]

\[
(dL/dt)/L = n
\]

\[
dY/dt)/Y = (dK/dt)/K = g
\]

\[
dK/dt = sY – cK
\]

\[
(dK/dt)/K = sY/K – c
\]

\[
Y/K = (g + c)/s
\]

\[
MP(K) = (1 – b)Y/K = (1 – b)(g + c)/s
\]

\[
g = a + bn + (1 – b)g
\]

\[
g = (a + bn)/b
\]

\[
MP(K) = (1 – b)\{(a + bn)(bs) + c/s\}
\]

\[
dMP(K)/da = (1 – b)(bs)
\]

\[
dg/da = 1/b
\]

Assume that the share of labor is .75 and the gross savings rate is .2. Then the change in the marginal product of capital from a change in the growth rate is:

\[
dMP(K)/dg = (dMP(K)/da)(dg/da) = (1 – b)s = .25/2
\]

(Note that these are gross savings, not net savings. But the corporate income tax reduces the return to savers relative to the return to corporate capital, so the derivative should be multiplied by roughly 2/3.)

Similarly, we can consider the effect of a slowdown in labor force growth on the marginal product of capital:

\[
dMP(K)/dn = (1 – b)/s
\]

\[
dg/dn = 1
\]

\[
dMP(K)/dg = (dMP(K)/dn)/(dg/dn) = (1 – b)/s = .25/2
\]

(This is the same expression as when the slowdown in economic growth comes from a drop in technical progress.)

Turning to the effects of changes in the savings rate, we have:

\[
dMP(K)/ds = –MP(K)/s = .5
\]

Thus, the savings rate has a large impact on the marginal product of capital as well.

Both of these effects are attenuated to the extent that the economy is open and rates of return in the United States change less because some of the effect occurs abroad.