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Article

- 1 **Discount Rate Specification and the Social Security Claiming Decision**
by *Brian J. Alleva*

Choosing the claiming age that maximizes the expected present value of lifetime Social Security retirement benefits requires a survival function to account for an individual's prospective longevity along with the specification of a rate by which to discount the future benefit payments for each claiming age. This article evaluates optimal claiming ages for prospective beneficiaries across a range of 81 real discount rate options (specified in increments of one-tenth of 1 percent) from 0 percent to 8 percent, considering the survival functions for men and women born in 1952. It examines the implications of choosing a given rate as well as the sensitivity of the optimal claiming age to a specific rate choice.

Note

- 17 **Married Women's Projected Retirement Benefits: An Update**
by *Howard M. Iams*

This note examines how changes in women's labor force participation and lifetime earnings will affect the Social Security benefits of future beneficiary wives. The Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (version 7) projects that at least four-fifths of wives in the late baby boom (born 1956–1965) and generation X (born 1966–1975) cohorts will receive their initial Social Security benefits based solely on their own earnings. For wives in those cohorts, most of the average benefit amount (91–92 percent) will be attributable to their own earnings histories.

DISCOUNT RATE SPECIFICATION AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMING DECISION

by Brian J. Alleva*

Choosing the claiming age that maximizes the expected present value of lifetime Social Security retirement benefits requires, among other criteria, the specification of a rate to use when discounting the future benefit payments for each claiming age. Although some experts maintain that the only appropriate rate is the current yield on long-term government bonds, a more appropriate rate choice would reflect the particular needs of a given individual. This article evaluates optimal claiming ages for prospective beneficiaries over a range of real discount rates from 0 percent to 8 percent, considering the survival functions for men and women born in 1952. Viewed prospectively, the optimal claiming age is older at lower discount rates and younger at higher rates. In addition, the risk that the optimal claiming age will ultimately fail to maximize lifetime benefits is highest at low discount rates and declines as the discount rate increases.

Introduction

Although a covered worker can claim Social Security retirement benefits when reaching age 62, the monthly benefit amount increases incrementally with every month claiming is delayed up to age 70. Once started, benefits continue essentially unchanged, in real terms, for the participant's remaining lifetime. For any given individual, the optimal claiming strategy will depend on many factors, as personal circumstances and retirement goals vary widely. If one's goal is to maximize total lifetime benefits, that individual must determine the optimal claiming age (OCA), or that which maximizes the expected present value of the lifetime benefit stream.

Beyond accounting for the myriad program rules affecting the decision to claim, choosing the optimal age requires two input criteria that can be difficult to determine. First, gauging the probability-weighted duration of the benefit stream for each possible claiming age, and thus its *expected* present value, requires a survival function or similar specification to indicate the participant's longevity prospects. Second, a discount rate is required to account for the time value of money when converting the future benefit stream for each claiming age into aggregate lifetime amounts

for comparison. This article focuses on the second requirement with a sensitivity analysis that covers a full range of plausible discount rates for single participants born in 1952. This study does not advocate the use of any particular discount rate or any criterion for choosing one, but does examine the implications of one's choice of rate and the precision of that rate specification.

Many studies of the claiming decision use a single discount rate for all computations (Sun and Webb 2011; Shoven and Slavov 2014a, 2014b; Friedman and Phillips 2008; Meyer and Reichenstein 2010, 2012). Those studies share the rationale that the single discount rate should be related to the yield on long-term inflation-indexed government bonds because Social Security benefits are also inflation-adjusted financial obligations of the U.S. government and should thus

Selected Abbreviations

EOL	expected opportunity loss
FRA	full retirement age
MCA	maximizing claiming age
OCA	optimal claiming age

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be valued similarly. More specifically, those studies suggest that the bond yield prevailing at the time of the claiming decision (instead of perhaps the long-term average) should be used as a proxy for the cost of an equivalent guaranteed annuity purchased on the private market. Shoven and Slavov (2014a, 2014b) also examine how the OCA for different cohorts has changed along with the prevailing rate over time.

In some cases, it may be entirely reasonable to value the benefit stream with a discount rate much like that for a very low-risk government bond. Using such a rate is appropriate for valuing system liabilities (aggregate future benefits to all potential recipients) from the supply-side perspective of an insurer. In fact, the average long-term government bond rate is the cost of capital to the Social Security trust funds that the program's actuaries use in their annual assessments of system health.¹ However, the insistence on discounting an individual's benefits by the yield on instruments of similar credit risk is somewhat misplaced, as it may prevent some participants from correctly valuing their potential benefit streams and, consequently, from optimizing their claiming ages. One participant may value a given potential benefit stream entirely differently from another. If Social Security benefit streams could be packaged and sold on the capital markets, then market pressure would quickly force the pricing of the credit-risk component to reflect equivalent government-bond yields. But entitled Social Security benefits are not a tradable security subject to market valuation. The claiming decision poses 97 monthly choices between ages 62 and 70, each with a different guaranteed fixed future cash stream that can be appropriately valued by the participant for whatever reason and according to how much more he or she values sooner payments rather than later ones. In addition, restricting the discount rate to interest rates current at the time of the decision, thus pricing the benefit stream against an equivalent annuity on the private market, would be relevant only to a participant who is actually seeking such an annuity. As Social Security is a compulsory program, participation alone does not indicate willingness to purchase more of a similar instrument.

Some studies do compare results for several discount rates (Coile and others 2002; Shoven and Slavov 2014b; Sun and Webb 2011; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2013; Alleva 2015). Taking an alternative approach and valuing the benefit stream as an investable asset, Spitzer (2006) and Manakyan, Ervin, and Claggett (2014) use stochastic simulations of benefit payments invested in portfolios with various allocations of stocks and bonds to explore

the likelihood that one claiming age will produce higher lifetime benefits than another. These authors apply rate-of-return probability distributions that are more realistic than single-point estimates. Nevertheless, their results for stock-heavy portfolios with higher expected rates of return generally correspond with results from the studies using higher single-point discount rates, and their results for bond-heavy portfolios similarly correspond with those using lower single-point discount rates. In general, when the claiming-age objective is maximum expected lifetime benefits, these studies clearly confirm that lower discount rates prescribe delayed claiming and that higher rates prescribe earlier claiming.

With that conclusion established, the present study examines the sensitivity of the claiming decision to the discount rate, with several interesting results. First, the OCA at lower rates (typified by the expected returns of bond- and cash-heavy asset allocations) carries an elevated risk of generating lifetime benefit amounts that fall short of the maximum amounts that could be attained by the eventual age at death. However, that risk is not particularly sensitive to rates specified within this lower range, implying that conservative discounters need not specify a precise rate to materially affect the likely outcome. On the other end of the spectrum, aggressive discounters who use higher rates (representing, for example, the expected returns of stock-heavy asset allocations) will be far more confident in their decision, as the resulting OCA poses little risk of failing to maximize lifetime benefits. In addition, the OCA has essentially no sensitivity to the discount rate in this higher range: For individuals born in 1952 and discount rates of at least 3.8 percent for men and 4.6 percent for women, 62 is always the OCA, with the risk of failing to maximize lifetime benefits decreasing as the rate increases. For those who specify more moderate discount rates (broadly representative of an equal mix of stocks and bonds), both the OCA and its non-maximization risk are very sensitive to discount rate variations, with the optimal age dropping from near 67 to 62 for both sexes in less than 100 basis points (or 1 percentage point) of discount-rate change. Extra care should thus be taken with rate specifications in this middle range.

Methods

This study builds on Alleva (2015), which defines the maximizing claiming age (MCA) as that with which a participant of a given birth year, a given age at death, and a given discount rate will have the highest aggregate lifetime benefit. Of course, without knowing one's

death age in advance, a participant must calculate lifetime benefits for each claiming age based on his or her survival function; that is, the probability of surviving to each possible age of death beyond 62.² The OCA thus maximizes the expected present value (EPV) of lifetime benefits according to the survival function. The opportunity loss for a given death age is defined as the difference between the present values of lifetime benefits under the MCA and the OCA. In other words, although the OCA maximizes *expected* lifetime benefits, it may not ultimately maximize *actual* lifetime benefits. Consequently, the expected opportunity loss (EOL), which can be thought of as the *risk* in the decision, is the survival-weighted mean opportunity loss over all possible death ages for the given OCA. EOL is expressed as the present-dollar value of potential opportunity loss per dollar of the primary insurance amount, or the benefit amount to which a worker is entitled at full retirement age (FRA). The sum of the EPV and the EOL for each possible claiming age is a constant and thus the OCA, having the maximum EPV, by definition also has the minimum EOL (or risk) of any claiming age.³ Even so, the minimum EOL itself could be substantial, and when accounting for the full retirement period from age 62 to a maximum attainable age of 120, it is also quite unlikely that a calculated OCA will ultimately turn out to have matched the MCA (Alleva 2015, Exhibit 7).

In this study, MCA, OCA, and EOL computations for men and women born in 1952 at current age 62 are performed across the range of real annual discount rates from 0 percent to 8 percent, inclusive, specified in tenths of a percent for a total of 81 rates. For every rate, the MCA is computed for each age of death from 62 to 120 according to the claiming rules that apply to the 1952 cohort. Survival functions are then applied to compute the OCA and EOL separately for men and women at each rate. The computations cover all monthly death and claiming ages. In all expositions, age is expressed in the format *years:months*, such that 67 years and 4 months is expressed as 67:04 and exact age 62 is 62:00.

According to the survival function for men born in 1952 at current age 62 with a discount rate of 2.9 percent, there is a 36 percent probability that the MCA will be 62:00 and a 20 percent probability that the MCA will be 70:00; thus, the probability that the MCA will be some age in between is 44 percent. For women, the respective probabilities are 27 percent, 30 percent, and 43 percent (Alleva 2015). Notable among these MCA probabilities is the dominance of ages 62:00 and

70:00, which together account for more than half of the entire likelihoods, versus the other 95 monthly claiming ages combined. These probability distributions change dramatically with different discount rates, yet one or both of those two exact ages dominate the probabilities for most rates. For that reason, data for MCAs in this article are aggregated into five categories: exact age 62:00, exact age 70:00, and age ranges 62:01–63:00, 63:01–66:00, and 66:01–69:11. The three age ranges correspond to break points in the formula for determining the benefit amount based on claiming age for a member of the 1952 birth cohort. The benefit amount increases by $\frac{5}{12}$ of 1 percent of the primary insurance amount for each month of delay after 62:00 through 63:00, by $\frac{5}{6}$ of 1 percent for each month after 63:00 through 66:00 (the FRA), and by $\frac{2}{3}$ of 1 percent per month after FRA up to (and including) 70:00 (see Alleva 2015).

The spectrum of real discount rates used in this study can be conveniently partitioned in terms of the expected real rates of return on portfolios of various allocations to stocks, bonds, and cash. This approach is relevant to participants who might have retirement savings invested in such portfolios, as drawing Social Security benefits for consumption would allow an equal amount to remain in the investment account, possibly continuing long-term accumulation around its expected rate of return. According to Ibbotson Associates (2011, 59–62), the historical compound real rate of return (annualized geometric average) is 6.7 percent for large-company stocks, 2.4 percent for long-term government bonds, and close to 0 percent for cash.⁴ As historical averages, these rates of return of course do not guarantee future results, but they serve as useful reference points for the long-term expected performance of commonly held asset classes. Using these historical returns as a guide, very low discount rates (below 2.4 percent) are indicative of very conservative discounters with portfolios comprising only cash and bond allocations. Relatively low discount rates (2.4 percent to about 4.6 percent) are indicative of conservative discounters with bond-heavy stock and bond portfolios. Balanced allocations near half stocks and half bonds with an average yield of about 4.6 percent indicate moderate discounters. Relatively high discount rates (about 4.6 percent to 6.7 percent) are indicative of aggressive discounters with stock-heavy portfolios. Very high discount rates (above 6.7 percent) are indicative of very aggressive discounters with portfolios of highly risky assets. Table 1 summarizes the discount rate partitions used in this analysis.

Table 1.
Discount rate (r_d) categories

Category	Range (%)	Investment strategy	Typical portfolio allocation
Very low	$r_d < 2.4$	Very conservative	Cash and bonds
Low	$2.4 \leq r_d < 4.6$	Conservative	Primarily bonds, some stocks
Moderate	$r_d \approx 4.6$	Balanced	50/50 stocks and bonds
High	$4.6 < r_d \leq 6.7$	Aggressive	Primarily stocks, some bonds
Very high	$r_d > 6.7$	Very aggressive	All stocks and other highly risky assets

SOURCE: Author's definitions based on Ibbotson Associates (2011).

Results and Analysis

This section describes the findings for three primary objectives. The first objective is to determine the MCA as identified retrospectively. The second objective is to replicate the challenge that actually faces workers nearing retirement: to determine the OCA and the EOL prospectively. The third objective is to characterize the discount rate implied by a given OCA selection.

Retrospective MCA


Chart 1 shows the death-age boundaries of the MCA categories for the entire 1952 cohort across the full spectrum of discount rates. Because the MCA computation is independent of survival probability, the figures in Chart 1 apply to both men and women. However, Charts 2 and 3 do use the separate survival functions respectively for men and women to show the actual MCA probability distributions. The plots for Charts 2 and 3 are similar, deviating only because of the difference in survival functions between the sexes. Because the MCA increases monotonically from younger death ages to older ones, the probabilities in Charts 2 and 3 for the older MCAs correspond to the probabilities of older survival ages. Expected returns for the representative investment portfolios are indicated by vertical lines. Table 2 lists details for each discount rate, including the death-age boundaries of each MCA category and the MCA probability distributions by sex.

Clearly, higher discount rates favor lower MCAs. In Charts 1–3, 70:00 is the dominant MCA category at 0.0 percent, but it gradually gives way to younger MCAs as rates progress across the lower range that signifies heavy cash and bond asset allocations. In the middle range, near the balanced-allocation rate of 4.6 percent, the probability that 62:00 is the MCA starts to increase rapidly, and comes to dominate the

other MCA categories as rates climb into the stock-heavy range. An MCA of 70:00 ceases to exist altogether at discount rates above 5.8 percent. A notable feature of these plots is the increasing sensitivity to rate. Generally, at discount rates lower than that of the balanced allocation, the slopes are more gradual and are thus less sensitive to discount rate changes than are those at rates higher than the balanced allocation. In those latter regions, the slopes—particularly for 62:00—are steeper and therefore more sensitive to the increasing rate. Also of note is that no claiming age in the second MCA category, from 62:01 to the first bend point at 63:00, is ever maximizing for any death age at any discount rate,⁵ and claiming ages in the category from 63:01 to the FRA are rarely maximizing.

Perhaps the most salient feature of these MCA plots for the 1952 cohort is that with a 7.5 percent or higher real rate of return, no claiming age can ever produce more lifetime benefit than 62:00, *even if the participant lives to age 120*. Therefore, a consideration of alternative claiming ages, at least for this cohort, is limited to discount rates of less than 7.5 percent. Although one could argue that discounting potential benefits at a real rate of 7.5 percent is somewhat reckless, it is certainly not unrealistic. If one intends to service debt with the benefit stream, various long-term obligations such as home equity loans or credit cards financed at 7.5 percent or more are not uncommon. If one intends to invest the benefit stream, the historical annual average real return on small-company stocks is substantially higher, though hardly guaranteed to continue, at 8.8 percent (Ibbotson Associates 2011, 54). In any case, it is not the retrospective MCA but the prospective EOL-minimizing OCA that is central to the claiming decision because the age of death is unknown. In that light, even much lower discount rates can strongly favor early claiming.


Chart 1.
Death-age boundaries for MCA categories, by discount rate: 1952 birth cohort (either sex)



SOURCE: Author's calculations.

NOTE: Claiming ages from 62:01 through 63:00 do not maximize lifetime benefits for individuals of the 1952 birth cohort, regardless of age at death or discount rate.

Chart 2.
Relative probabilities that the MCA falls within specified ranges for men born in 1952, by discount rate




SOURCE: Author's calculations.

NOTES: Probabilities are based on the survival function of men currently aged 62.

Claiming ages from 62:01 through 63:00 do not maximize lifetime benefits for individuals of the 1952 birth cohort, regardless of age at death or discount rate.

Chart 3.
Relative probabilities that the MCA falls within specified ranges for women born in 1952, by discount rate



SOURCE: Author's calculations.

NOTES: Probabilities are based on the survival function of women currently aged 62.

Claiming ages from 62:01 through 63:00 do not maximize lifetime benefits for individuals of the 1952 birth cohort, regardless of age at death or discount rate.

Table 2.
Detailed discount rate specifications: Probability distributions (in percent) by MCA category and sex, with applicable age-at-death range, prospective OCA, and prospective EOL, for subjects born in 1952 at age 62

Dis- count rate (%)	Probability (in percent) that the MCA is—												Prospective—			
	62:00			63:01–66:00			66:01–69:11			70:00			OCA		EOL (\$)	
	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
0.0	62:00–76:10	25.25	18.54	76:11–79:08	7.81	6.51	79:09–86:05	23.48	21.13	86:06–120:00	43.46	53.82	69:07	70:00	12.95	9.90
0.1	62:00–76:11	25.46	18.71	77:00–79:09	7.85	6.54	79:10–86:06	23.57	21.26	86:07–120:00	43.13	53.49	69:06	70:00	12.92	9.93
0.2	62:00–77:00	25.68	18.89	77:01–79:10	7.87	6.56	79:11–86:08	23.99	21.70	86:09–120:00	42.46	52.84	69:05	70:00	12.88	9.96
0.3	62:00–77:01	25.90	19.07	77:02–79:11	7.89	6.59	80:00–86:10	24.42	22.15	86:11–120:00	41.79	52.19	69:04	70:00	12.83	9.98
0.4	62:00–77:03	26.34	19.44	77:04–80:00	7.70	6.44	80:01–86:11	24.50	22.26	87:00–120:00	41.46	51.87	69:03	70:00	12.77	10.01
0.5	62:00–77:04	26.56	19.62	77:05–80:02	7.99	6.69	80:03–87:01	24.68	22.51	87:02–120:00	40.77	51.19	69:02	70:00	12.70	10.04
0.6	62:00–77:05	26.78	19.80	77:06–80:03	8.02	6.72	80:04–87:03	25.11	22.97	87:04–120:00	40.09	50.50	69:01	70:00	12.63	10.07
0.7	62:00–77:06	27.00	19.99	77:07–80:04	8.06	6.75	80:05–87:05	25.54	23.44	87:06–120:00	39.41	49.82	68:11	70:00	12.54	10.11
0.8	62:00–77:08	27.44	20.35	77:09–80:06	8.12	6.82	80:07–87:07	25.71	23.69	87:08–120:00	38.72	49.14	68:10	69:11	12.45	10.13
0.9	62:00–77:09	27.66	20.53	77:10–80:07	8.16	6.85	80:08–87:09	26.14	24.16	87:10–120:00	38.04	48.46	68:09	69:10	12.36	10.15
1.0	62:00–77:10	27.88	20.71	77:11–80:08	8.19	6.89	80:09–87:11	26.57	24.62	88:00–120:00	37.36	47.78	68:08	69:08	12.26	10.15
1.1	62:00–78:00	28.33	21.09	78:01–80:10	8.25	6.94	80:11–88:01	26.75	24.90	88:02–120:00	36.67	47.07	68:07	69:07	12.15	10.14
1.2	62:00–78:01	28.56	21.28	78:02–80:11	8.27	6.96	81:00–88:03	27.19	25.39	88:04–120:00	35.98	46.37	68:06	69:06	12.04	10.12
1.3	62:00–78:03	29.03	21.67	78:04–81:00	8.07	6.81	81:01–88:05	27.61	25.86	88:06–120:00	35.29	45.66	68:05	69:05	11.92	10.09
1.4	62:00–78:04	29.26	21.86	78:05–81:02	8.37	7.07	81:03–88:07	27.76	26.11	88:08–120:00	34.60	44.96	68:04	69:03	11.80	10.05
1.5	62:00–78:06	29.72	22.25	78:07–81:03	8.18	6.92	81:04–88:10	28.53	26.94	88:11–120:00	33.57	43.90	68:03	69:02	11.68	10.00
1.6	62:00–78:07	29.95	22.44	78:08–81:05	8.48	7.18	81:06–89:00	28.68	27.19	89:01–120:00	32.89	43.19	68:01	69:01	11.55	9.94
1.7	62:00–78:09	30.42	22.83	78:10–81:06	8.28	7.03	81:07–89:02	29.09	27.68	89:03–120:00	32.21	42.47	68:00	69:00	11.42	9.87
1.8	62:00–78:10	30.65	23.02	78:11–81:08	8.58	7.29	81:09–89:05	29.58	28.30	89:06–120:00	31.19	41.39	67:11	68:11	11.28	9.80
1.9	62:00–79:00	31.12	23.42	79:01–81:10	8.64	7.35	81:11–89:07	29.73	28.56	89:08–120:00	30.51	40.67	67:10	68:09	11.15	9.72
2.0	62:00–79:02	31.61	23.83	79:03–81:11	8.42	7.18	82:00–89:10	30.48	29.41	89:11–120:00	29.48	39.59	67:09	68:08	11.01	9.64
2.1	62:00–79:03	31.85	24.03	79:04–82:01	8.74	7.47	82:02–90:01	30.93	29.99	90:02–120:00	28.48	38.51	67:08	68:07	10.87	9.55
2.2	62:00–79:05	32.33	24.44	79:06–82:03	8.82	7.55	82:04–90:04	31.36	30.58	90:05–120:00	27.49	37.43	67:07	68:06	10.72	9.45
2.3	62:00–79:07	32.82	24.84	79:08–82:04	8.61	7.39	82:05–90:06	31.74	31.06	90:07–120:00	26.82	36.71	67:06	68:05	10.58	9.35
2.4	62:00–79:09	33.30	25.25	79:10–82:06	8.69	7.47	82:07–90:09	32.18	31.65	90:10–120:00	25.83	35.62	67:05	68:03	10.44	9.25
2.5	62:00–79:11	33.79	25.66	80:00–82:08	8.77	7.56	82:09–91:00	32.60	32.24	91:01–120:00	24.85	34.55	67:04	68:02	10.29	9.14
2.6	62:00–80:01	34.30	26.09	80:02–82:10	8.82	7.62	82:11–91:04	33.30	33.17	91:05–120:00	23.58	33.12	67:02	68:01	10.15	9.03
2.7	62:00–80:03	34.80	26.52	80:04–83:00	8.89	7.70	83:01–91:07	33.68	33.73	91:08–120:00	22.63	32.05	67:01	68:00	10.00	8.91
2.8	62:00–80:05	35.31	26.95	80:06–83:02	8.97	7.80	83:03–91:10	34.04	34.27	91:11–120:00	21.68	30.98	67:00	67:11	9.86	8.80
2.9	62:00–80:07	35.82	27.38	80:08–83:04	9.05	7.90	83:05–92:02	34.65	35.14	92:03–120:00	20.48	29.58	66:11	67:10	9.71	8.68

(Continued)

Table 2.
Detailed discount rate specifications: Probability distributions (in percent) by MCA category and sex, with applicable age-at-death range, prospective OCA, and prospective EOL, for subjects born in 1952 at age 62—Continued

Dis- count rate (%)	Probability (in percent) that the MCA is—												Prospective—			
	62:00			63:01–66:00			66:01–69:11			70:00			OCA		EOL (\$)	
	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
3.0	62:00–80:09	36.33	27.82	80:10–83:06	9.13	7.99	83:07–92:06	35.25	36.00	92:07–120:00	19.29	28.19	65:01	67:08	9.56	8.56
3.1	62:00–80:11	36.83	28.25	81:00–83:08	9.22	8.09	83:09–92:09	35.55	36.51	92:10–120:00	18.40	27.15	65:00	67:07	9.24	8.43
3.2	62:00–81:01	37.37	28.71	81:02–83:11	9.57	8.43	84:00–93:01	35.80	37.07	93:02–120:00	17.27	25.80	64:10	67:06	8.93	8.31
3.3	62:00–81:04	38.17	29.40	81:05–84:01	9.39	8.31	84:02–93:06	36.54	38.15	93:07–120:00	15.91	24.14	64:09	67:05	8.63	8.19
3.4	62:00–81:06	38.70	29.85	81:07–84:03	9.47	8.42	84:04–93:10	37.01	38.91	93:11–120:00	14.82	22.82	64:08	67:04	8.33	8.07
3.5	62:00–81:09	39.50	30.54	81:10–84:06	9.60	8.59	84:07–94:02	37.08	39.31	94:03–120:00	13.82	21.55	64:07	67:03	8.04	7.94
3.6	62:00–81:11	40.03	31.00	82:00–84:08	9.69	8.70	84:09–94:07	37.68	40.30	94:08–120:00	12.60	20.00	64:06	67:02	7.75	7.82
3.7	62:00–82:02	40.87	31.74	82:03–84:11	9.78	8.82	85:00–95:00	37.94	40.96	95:01–120:00	11.41	18.47	64:05	67:00	7.46	7.70
3.8	62:00–82:05	41.71	32.48	82:06–85:02	9.91	9.00	85:03–95:05	38.03	41.46	95:06–120:00	10.35	17.06	62:00	66:11	7.07	7.58
3.9	62:00–82:07	42.27	32.97	82:08–85:04	9.99	9.12	85:05–95:11	38.65	42.55	96:00–120:00	9.08	15.36	62:00	65:00	6.60	7.40
4.0	62:00–82:10	43.12	33.71	82:11–85:07	10.12	9.30	85:08–96:04	38.57	42.89	96:05–120:00	8.19	14.10	62:00	64:11	6.15	7.11
4.1	62:00–83:01	43.99	34.49	83:02–85:10	10.22	9.44	85:11–96:10	38.67	43.48	96:11–120:00	7.12	12.59	62:00	64:10	5.71	6.83
4.2	62:00–83:05	45.16	35.54	83:06–86:01	10.03	9.34	86:02–97:05	38.73	44.08	97:06–120:00	6.07	11.04	62:00	64:08	5.29	6.55
4.3	62:00–83:08	46.05	36.34	83:09–86:05	10.49	9.84	86:06–98:00	38.38	44.26	98:01–120:00	5.09	9.55	62:00	64:07	4.89	6.27
4.4	62:00–83:11	46.93	37.13	84:00–86:08	10.61	10.02	86:09–98:07	38.18	44.57	98:08–120:00	4.28	8.28	62:00	64:06	4.50	6.01
4.5	62:00–84:03	48.17	38.28	84:04–86:11	10.37	9.86	87:00–99:02	37.90	44.77	99:03–120:00	3.56	7.10	62:00	64:05	4.13	5.75
4.6	62:00–84:06	49.10	39.13	84:07–87:03	10.81	10.36	87:04–99:11	37.32	44.75	100:00–120:00	2.77	5.76	62:00	62:00	3.78	5.32
4.7	62:00–84:10	50.34	40.27	84:11–87:07	10.94	10.59	87:08–100:07	36.49	44.34	100:08–120:00	2.23	4.80	62:00	62:00	3.44	4.88
4.8	62:00–85:02	51.62	41.48	85:03–87:11	11.02	10.75	88:00–101:05	35.69	44.03	101:06–120:00	1.67	3.75	62:00	62:00	3.12	4.45
4.9	62:00–85:06	52.91	42.70	85:07–88:03	11.11	10.93	88:04–102:03	34.75	43.48	102:04–120:00	1.23	2.88	62:00	62:00	2.82	4.05
5.0	62:00–85:10	54.21	43.93	85:11–88:07	11.19	11.12	88:08–103:03	33.77	42.89	103:04–120:00	0.84	2.07	62:00	62:00	2.53	3.66
5.1	62:00–86:03	55.87	45.53	86:04–89:00	11.24	11.28	89:01–104:03	32.33	41.73	104:04–120:00	0.56	1.45	62:00	62:00	2.26	3.30
5.2	62:00–86:08	57.54	47.16	86:09–89:04	10.93	11.09	89:05–105:05	31.19	40.81	105:06–120:00	0.34	0.94	62:00	62:00	2.01	2.95
5.3	62:00–87:01	59.23	48.81	87:02–89:09	10.95	11.23	89:10–106:08	29.63	39.39	106:09–120:00	0.19	0.56	62:00	62:00	1.77	2.63
5.4	62:00–87:06	60.94	50.52	87:07–90:03	11.25	11.69	90:04–108:01	27.72	37.49	108:02–120:00	0.09	0.29	62:00	62:00	1.55	2.32
5.5	62:00–88:00	62.99	52.58	88:01–90:08	10.85	11.44	90:09–109:08	26.12	35.85	109:09–120:00	0.04	0.13	62:00	62:00	1.34	2.03
5.6	62:00–88:05	64.71	54.34	88:06–91:02	11.08	11.83	91:03–111:07	24.20	33.79	111:08–120:00	0.01	0.05	62:00	62:00	1.15	1.77
5.7	62:00–89:00	67.11	56.81	89:01–91:08	10.57	11.49	91:09–113:10	22.32	31.68	113:11–120:00	a	0.01	62:00	62:00	0.97	1.52
5.8	62:00–89:06	69.15	58.97	89:07–92:03	10.66	11.79	92:04–116:07	20.18	29.23	116:08–120:00	a	a	62:00	62:00	0.81	1.29
5.9	62:00–90:02	71.85	61.85	90:03–92:10	10.04	11.34	92:11–120:00	18.11	26.81	62:00	62:00	0.67	1.08

(Continued)

Table 2.
Detailed discount rate specifications: Probability distributions (in percent) by MCA category and sex, with applicable age-at-death range, prospective OCA, and prospective EOL, for subjects born in 1952 at age 62—Continued

Dis- count rate (%)	Probability (in percent) that the MCA is—												Prospective—			
	62:00			63:01–66:00			66:01–69:11			70:00			OCA		EOL (\$)	
	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Age at death	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
6.0	62:00–90:09	74.17	64.38	90:10–93:06	9.92	11.48	93:07–120:00	15.91	24.14	62:00	62:00	0.54	0.89
6.1	62:00–91:05	76.73	67.24	91:06–94:02	9.45	11.21	94:03–120:00	13.82	21.55	62:00	62:00	0.43	0.72
6.2	62:00–92:02	79.52	70.42	92:03–94:11	8.86	10.82	95:00–120:00	11.62	18.76	62:00	62:00	0.33	0.57
6.3	62:00–93:00	82.46	73.87	93:01–95:08	7.82	9.92	95:09–120:00	9.72	16.21	62:00	62:00	0.24	0.44
6.4	62:00–93:11	85.45	77.51	94:00–96:07	6.89	9.14	96:08–120:00	7.66	13.35	62:00	62:00	0.18	0.32
6.5	62:00–94:10	88.14	80.93	94:11–97:07	6.08	8.47	97:08–120:00	5.78	10.60	62:00	62:00	0.12	0.23
6.6	62:00–95:11	90.92	84.64	96:00–98:08	4.91	7.26	98:09–120:00	4.17	8.09	62:00	62:00	0.08	0.16
6.7	62:00–97:02	93.49	88.31	97:03–99:10	3.65	5.78	99:11–120:00	2.85	5.91	62:00	62:00	0.05	0.10
6.8	62:00–98:06	95.60	91.54	98:07–101:03	2.63	4.52	101:04–120:00	1.77	3.94	62:00	62:00	0.02	0.06
6.9	62:00–100:02	97.43	94.60	100:03–102:10	1.59	3.03	102:11–120:00	0.98	2.37	62:00	62:00	0.01	0.03
7.0	62:00–102:00	98.66	96.89	102:01–104:09	0.89	1.90	104:10–120:00	0.45	1.20	62:00	62:00	b	0.01
7.1	62:00–104:04	99.46	98.59	104:05–107:01	0.39	0.95	107:02–120:00	0.15	0.46	62:00	62:00	b	b
7.2	62:00–107:03	99.86	99.57	107:04–110:00	0.11	0.32	110:01–120:00	0.03	0.11	62:00	62:00	b	b
7.3	62:00–111:01	99.98	99.94	111:02–114:00	0.01	0.05	114:01–120:00	a	0.01	62:00	62:00	b	b
7.4	62:00–117:00	100.00	100.00	117:01–120:00	a	a	62:00	62:00	b	b
7.5	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00
7.6	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00
7.7	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00
7.8	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00
7.9	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00
8.0	62:00–120:00	100.00	100.00	62:00	62:00	0.00	0.00

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

NOTES: Claiming ages from 62:01 through 63:00 do not maximize lifetime benefits for individuals of the 1952 birth cohort, regardless of age at death or discount rate.

Rounded components of percentage distributions (the sum of the columns for men or the sum of the columns for women at a given discount rate) do not necessarily sum to 100.00.

... = not applicable.

a. Less than 0.005 percent.

b. Less than \$0.005.

Prospective OCA and EOL

Charts 4 and 5 show, for men and women respectively, the OCA and its associated EOL across the discount-rate spectrum. The lower rates indicate the oldest OCAs,⁶ as expected; however, they also indicate the highest EOLs. This result reflects the wider distribution of likely MCAs at lower rates (as shown in Charts 2 and 3), making the OCA decision risky at rates within this range. Also notable is that 70:00 is never the OCA for men and is the OCA for women only at rates of 0.7 percent or lower. Both the OCA and EOL decrease as the discount rate increases (with the exception of a slight uptick in EOL for women between 0.0 percent and 1.0 percent).⁷ Yet as rates increase from 2.9 percent to 3.8 percent for men and from 3.8 percent to 4.6 percent for women, the OCA and the EOL both descend rapidly, indicating high sensitivity to the specific rate. Individuals contemplating discount rates in these narrow ranges should take extra care with rate specification, as the OCA drops from 66:11 to 62:00 with a change of less than 100 basis points for both sexes. For example, using a 2.9 percent discount rate yields an OCA of 66:11 for men born in 1952 (Alleva 2015). Yet as the current analysis suggests, that OCA is surprisingly sensitive to the chosen discount rate. At 2.8 percent, 10 basis points lower, the OCA is virtually the same at 67:00; but at 3.0 percent, only 10 basis points higher, it is 65:01, almost 2 years younger.

Above the discount-rate thresholds at which the OCA reaches 62:00, EOLs continue to fall sharply, indicating increasing likelihoods that the OCA will in fact equal the MCA. At 7.5 percent and higher, the EOL is \$0.00, as 62:00 will always be maximizing, not just optimal, for both sexes. The OCA is 62:00 at 3.8 percent and higher for men and 4.6 percent and higher for women (Table 2). This result corroborates the work of Spitzer (2006), who finds that at rates of about 4 percent and higher, delayed claiming is generally not advisable. With the expected capital-market returns summarized in Table 1, 3.8 percent indicates a fairly conservative portfolio of roughly one-third stocks and two-thirds bonds, and 4.6 percent indicates a balanced portfolio. Using stochastic simulations of the investment of Social Security benefits into various stock and bond allocations, Manakyan, Ervin, and Claggett (2014) also find that such allocations strongly favor immediate claiming, even if the beneficiary survives to age 96.

Charts 4 and 5 show that at lower discount rates, the OCA is less likely to equal the MCA, and thus will likely turn out to have been the “wrong” choice. That situation suggests that adjusting one’s discount rate

upwards is one way to lower decision risk. Basing the claiming decision on an arbitrarily higher rate simply to feel more confident in the outcome would seem to be imprudent. However, this study finds that such a rate need never rise above 3.8 percent for men and 4.6 percent for women.



Implied Discount Rates

In selecting a discount rate for the Social Security claiming decision, one might come to consider the inverse of the decision metric; that is, instead of asking what claiming age is prescribed by a given discount rate, one could ask what discount rate is implied by a given claiming age. If a chosen discount rate measures only the extent to which the participant prefers the benefit payments sooner rather than later, then early claiming itself implies a higher discount rate and delayed claiming implies a lower discount rate. For those who would claim early because they need the money for current expenditures, the discount rate is very high, as they would value immediate receipt of benefits much more than the alternative—say, inadequate food or shelter while awaiting later ages to which survival is uncertain. Higher discount rates and immediate claiming could also imply intent to invest the cash flows at equivalently high expected rates of return for use later in retirement. Either way, early claimers inherently place high value on receiving the cash flow sooner.

Conversely, those who delay claiming do so at least in part because they can afford to, and thus their need for immediate benefit payments is less than that of early claimers, which implies lower discount rates. Delayed claimers could also have a strong anticipation of, and a desire to maximize lifetime benefits for, survival to advanced ages (at the expense of maximizing for an earlier death), which in itself implies less need for immediate payments. Chart 1 confirms that delayed claiming is effective mostly at advanced ages and lower discount rates, as later MCAs give way to earlier MCAs as rates increase (implying as before that earlier claiming is more effective at higher rates, even if maximization at advanced ages is one’s goal). Thus it could be inferred that delayed claimers desire to maximize lifetime benefits for advanced ages, which is mostly effective at lower rates. Either way, delayed claimers place less value on receiving the cash flow sooner.



Both of the above situations are congruous with the results of this and previous studies. Early claiming is found to be associated with higher rates, and delayed claiming is associated with lower rates.

Chart 4.
OCA and EOL for men born in 1952, by discount rate



SOURCE: Author's calculations.

Chart 5.
OCA and EOL for women born in 1952, by discount rate



SOURCE: Author's calculations.

Conclusion

Alleva (2015) analyzes the Social Security claiming decision using a fixed real rate of 2.9 percent to discount benefits at the long-term average inflation-adjusted government bond rate. Extending that analysis over a broad range of rates, the present study finds that optimizing the decision with lower rates prescribes later claiming ages but with higher associated risk, whereas optimization with higher rates prescribes earlier claiming ages and lower associated risk.

Several other results of this study are noteworthy. First, for both men and women born in 1952 with a real discount rate of 7.5 percent or higher, claiming at age 62 will always maximize lifetime benefits even if death occurs as late as age 120. For these cohorts, this finding effectively caps the range of rates to consider at 7.5 percent.

Secondly, at discount rates above 5.8 percent, claiming at age 70 will not maximize lifetime benefits for either sex at any death age. More importantly, a delay to age 70 is never the optimal choice for men at any discount rate and is optimal for women only at 0.7 percent or lower.

Finally, claiming at age 62 is optimal at discount rates of 3.8 percent or higher for men and 4.6 percent or higher for women. In other words, based on their respective survival functions, claiming at age 62 generates the highest expected lifetime benefits over the full retirement horizon at those rates or higher. Furthermore, those two rates reflect the expected returns on fairly conservative-to-moderate portfolio allocations of no more than one-half stocks. In addition, claiming at age 62 at those rates carries less risk than that associated with the OCA of 66:11 at 2.9 percent, as determined in Alleva (2015). These results indicate that rates higher than 3.8 percent (for men) and 4.6 percent (for women) need not be considered, even to justify immediate claiming with lowered risk.

Notes

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¹ Specifically, the Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary uses a 2.9 percent real interest rate for the Alternative II (intermediate) projections of the Social Security trust funds (Board of Trustees 2013, 105).

² The survival functions used in this study are derived from cohort life tables prepared by the Social Security

Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary for the Alternative II (intermediate) projections of the Social Security trust funds (Board of Trustees 2013, 79). For documentation of those survival functions, see Alleva (2016).

³ For the full computational methodology for calculating the MCA, the OCA, and the EOL, see Alleva (2015).

⁴ Because Social Security benefits are cost-of-living adjusted, all rates in this article are specified in real terms.

⁵ Meyer and Reichenstein (2012) find similar results.

⁶ Shoven and Slavov (2012, Figure 2) find similar results.

⁷ The EOL for women rises from \$9.90 at 0.0 percent to \$10.15 at 1.0 percent before declining monotonically as rates increase thereafter. The OCA is 70:00 at 0.0 percent and it begins edging younger at 0.8 percent. As rates increase through these lower ranges, the MCA for women shifts younger more quickly than the OCA does, which increases the EOL. Beyond 0.8 percent, however, the dominant MCA tracks increasingly closer to the OCA (as it does for men), thereby reducing the EOL until it reaches \$0.00 at the point where MCA and OCA converge (7.5 percent).

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MARRIED WOMEN'S PROJECTED RETIREMENT BENEFITS: AN UPDATE

by Howard M. Iams*

This note uses the latest version of the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term microsimulation model to update earlier projections of Social Security retirement benefits for married women. Changes in women's earnings in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries will sharply change the predominant type of Social Security benefits received by current and future beneficiary wives. Benefit levels will be determined more by wives' own lifetime earnings than by the lifetime earnings of their husbands. At least four-fifths of wives in the late baby boom (born 1956–1965) and generation X (born 1966–1975) cohorts will receive their initial Social Security benefits based solely on their own earnings. For wives in those cohorts, benefits based on their own earnings record will account for most (91–92 percent) of their total Social Security benefit amount.

Introduction

The Social Security Act of 1935 provided for the general welfare of workers by establishing a system of federal old-age benefits. The 1939 amendments to the act added auxiliary benefits for women based on what was viewed as the traditional American family—men were “breadwinners”; women were wives (or widows); and husbands and wives remained married for a lifetime (Berkowitz 2002). Subsequent amendments extended benefits to divorced wives and survivors of insured workers.¹ Today, Social Security provides monthly retirement-age benefits to qualified workers and auxiliary benefits to their wives, ex-wives, and widows based on their marital histories and lifetime earnings (Social Security Administration [SSA], n.d.).²

Increasing numbers of women now receive Social Security retirement benefits based on their own earnings. Many women, however, continue to receive benefits based partly or entirely on the earnings records of their current or former husbands because their marriage-based benefits are higher than they would be if they were based solely on their own earnings records. Because benefit amounts are higher than they otherwise would be for a substantial

number of beneficiaries, marriage-based auxiliary benefits have an important effect on program costs. In December 2014, Social Security paid retirement-age benefits to 26.3 million women aged 62 or older (SSA 2016, Table 5A.14). Slightly more than half of those beneficiaries (51.1 percent, or 13.4 million women) received benefits based on their own earnings, while the remainder (48.9 percent, or 12.9 million women) received benefits based at least in part on marriage.³

In December 2014, about 2.3 million women aged 62 or older received auxiliary benefits based solely on their spouses' earnings and another 3.1 million were dually entitled to both their own retired-worker benefits and auxiliary benefits. In addition,

Selected Abbreviations

FRA	full retirement age
GenX	Generation X
MINT	Modeling Income in the Near Term
PIA	primary insurance amount
SIPP	Survey of Income and Program Participation
SSA	Social Security Administration

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3.7 million widows received higher monthly Social Security benefits based on their deceased spouses' earnings records and 3.8 million dually entitled widows received a survivor benefit that was higher than their own retired-worker benefit would have been. Thus, about 23 percent of female beneficiaries aged 62 or older received only wife/widow benefits and another 26 percent received dual-entitlement benefits in December 2014. That is a marked shift from earlier years, such as 1960, when 57 percent of female beneficiaries aged 62 or older received only auxiliary benefits and 5 percent received dual-entitlement benefits.

Two major trends have contributed to the shift from auxiliary to retired-worker benefits for women at retirement. First, women's participation in the labor force increased dramatically after 1960 (Goldin 2006; Blau and Kahn 2007). This was particularly true for married women (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), including mothers of young children (Cohany and Sok 2007, Chart 1). The majority of this increase occurred by the 1990s, resulting in more women in post-World War II birth cohorts earning eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits based on their own lifetime earnings. Second, marriage trends began to change in ways that resulted in lower percentages of women born after 1945 becoming eligible for benefits as wives or widows of eligible workers (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007; Kennedy and Ruggles 2014; Tamborini and Whitman 2007; Iams and Tamborini 2012; Butrica and Smith 2012).

Social Security Program Rules

This section provides a brief overview of the Social Security program rules applicable to women aged 62 or older who are eligible for marriage-based retirement benefits as the wife, divorced ex-wife, or widow of an insured worker. The wife of a retired worker is eligible for a spousal benefit of up to 50 percent of her husband's primary insurance amount (PIA), if claimed at her full retirement age (FRA).⁴ A wife generally must be married to the insured worker for at least 1 continuous year before she can receive benefits based on her husband's record. A divorcee may be eligible for a divorced-spouse benefit of up to 50 percent of her ex-spouse's PIA if the marriage lasted 10 years (120 months) and the ex-spouse is alive.⁵ A dually entitled woman—who is eligible for benefits based on her own and on her spouse's lifetime earnings—receives her retired-worker benefit supplemented by the difference between that amount and the spousal

benefit amount. If the wife's own retired-worker benefit is higher than her spousal benefit, she receives only her retired-worker benefit (Iams and Tamborini 2012; SSA, n.d.).

Social Security also provides auxiliary benefits to widows of insured workers. If a widow collects benefits at her FRA, her widow's benefit can equal up to 100 percent of her deceased husband's PIA. A reduced benefit (71–99 percent of the deceased worker's PIA) is available as early as age 60 (age 50 if the survivor is disabled).⁶ A divorcee with a 10-year marriage may qualify for a survivor's benefit if her ex-husband dies. (In this note, "widow" includes qualifying surviving divorced ex-wives.) If the widow benefit exceeds her own retired-worker benefit, then she is dually entitled and receives her own retired-worker benefit supplemented by the difference between it and her surviving-spouse benefit. If her own retired-worker benefit is larger than the widow benefit, then she is only eligible for her own retired-worker benefit.

Methodology

This analysis uses version 7 of SSA's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT7) microsimulation model⁷ to update Butrica and Smith (2012), which used MINT6 to project married women's retirement benefits. The sample population is separated into four birth cohorts: war babies (born 1937–1945), leading boomers (born 1946–1955), trailing boomers (born 1956–1965), and generation X (GenX, born 1966–1975). All Social Security benefit projections are in 2013 wage-adjusted dollars. A more detailed methodology for MINT7's projections is described in Smith and Favreault (2013b), in Butrica, Smith, and Iams (2012), and in the previous version of the estimates in Butrica and Smith (2012).

MINT7

SSA uses MINT to estimate the income, assets, and demographic characteristics of future retirees. Version 7 uses data from the 2004 and 2008 panels of the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security administrative earnings and benefit records through 2010 as the basis for its projections. For individuals born from 1926 through 1979, MINT7 projects the major sources and levels of retirement income by year (through 2099), from age 55 until death. Because Social Security benefits are tied closely to beneficiaries' marital events, MINT7 independently

projects each person's marital changes, mortality, entry to and exit from the Social Security Disability Insurance program, and age of first receipt of Social Security benefits.⁸

MINT7 directly measures the experiences of respondents included in the SIPP interviews (2004–2010), representing the first half of the lives of leading boomers and first third of the lives of trailing boomers. MINT7 measures the changes in earnings and benefits through 2010 then statistically projects respondents' income and characteristics into the future, accounting for major changes in the growth of economy-wide real earnings, the distribution of earnings both between and within birth cohorts, and the composition of the retiree population. Those factors will all affect the retirement income of future boomer and GenX retirees. The Urban Institute performed the MINT7 calculations for this analysis under contract to SSA (Smith and Favreault [2013a, Chapter 3]) to match the procedures used for MINT6 in Butrica and Smith (2012).

Changes from MINT6

This section outlines the most important changes in MINT between versions 6 and 7. For example, in MINT7, the war babies cohort includes individuals born 1937–1945, rather than 1936–1945 as in MINT6. More importantly, MINT7 uses more recent data than MINT6, with combined 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels matched to Social Security administrative earnings and benefits data through 2010.

MINT inputs include projections of net immigration, disability prevalence through age 65, mortality rates, and the growth in average economy-wide wages and the consumer price index (CPI). MINT7 uses projections from *The 2012 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds* (Board of Trustees 2012).⁹ By comparison, MINT6 used projections from the *2009 Trustees Report*, which did not account for the Great Recession of 2007–2009.

MINT7 accounts for the economic effects of the Great Recession, including the decline in employment and earnings from 2007 through 2010 and subsequent slower earnings growth for the more recent cohorts. The wage-growth assumptions in MINT7 result in lower projected Social Security benefits for the more recent birth cohorts than those projected with MINT6.¹⁰

MINT7 projects that the trend observed from 2007 through 2010—an increase in the share of workers postponing retirement and a decline in the share of

eligible workers claiming Social Security benefits at their earliest retirement age—will continue. MINT7 projects a smaller share of workers who will claim their benefits at age 62 (one-third) than MINT6 projected (two-fifths), as well as a smaller share claiming benefits by age 65 (80 percent versus 90 percent).

Using recent data indicating racial differences in marital histories, MINT7 estimated separate models for blacks and nonblacks to project marriage and divorce patterns overall. MINT7 projects a decrease in the share of persons who are married in future cohorts and an increasing share of women who are single at age 67.


Findings

Across cohorts, the rise in women's labor force participation and earnings has increased the share of wives who are expected to be eligible for Social Security retired-worker benefits based on their own earnings (Chart 1). MINT7 projects that the percentage of wives who will be eligible for retired-worker benefits based on their own earnings records will increase from 79 percent for war babies to 92 percent for GenXers. Because most husbands earn their own retired-worker benefits, the percentage of married couples with both spouses entitled to retired-worker benefits is also projected to rise, from 75 percent for war babies to 84 percent for leading boomers and 88 percent for GenXers.

Similar to the earlier findings, MINT7 projects a positive correlation between husbands' and wives' lifetime earnings—one that will become increasingly positive across the more recent cohorts (Chart 2). The correlation between the lifetime average indexed monthly earnings of married couples increased from about 0.17 for war babies to 0.18 for leading boomers, 0.24 for trailing boomers, and 0.28 for GenXers, indicating that the lifetime earnings of spouses have become more similar over time.

As noted earlier, auxiliary benefits provide retirement income for wives with either no earnings history or with lower earnings than those of their husbands. MINT7 projects that the growth in women's lifetime earnings will result in increasing percentages of married women receiving retired-worker-only benefits (that is, benefits based solely on their own earnings record, with no auxiliary benefit) at their take-up age (Chart 3). Those percentages climb from 62 percent for war babies to 73 percent for leading boomers to 82 percent and 81 percent for trailing boomers and


Chart 1.
Percentage of married women and married couples projected to be eligible for retired-worker benefits at Social Security take-up age, by birth cohort



SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations using MINT7 data.

NOTE: Sample includes married women in the year they claim Social Security benefits, but excludes those projected to ever receive Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.


Chart 2.
Correlation between husbands' and wives' projected average indexed monthly earnings, by birth cohort



SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations using MINT7 data.

NOTE: Sample includes married women in the year they claim Social Security benefits, but excludes those projected to ever receive Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

Chart 3.
Projected Social Security benefit status of married women at Social Security take-up age,
by birth cohort



SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations using MINT7 data.

NOTES: Sample includes married women in the year they claim Social Security benefits, but excludes those projected to ever receive Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

Rounded components of percentage distributions do not necessarily sum to 100.

GenXers, respectively. MINT7 also projects cross-cohort declines in the percentages of women eligible for auxiliary benefits based solely on their husbands' earnings, from 16 percent for war babies to 6 percent and 7 percent for trailing boomers and GenXers, respectively. As women's lifetime earnings continue to become more similar to their spouses' earnings over time, MINT7 projects that the percentage of wives who are dually entitled to Social Security benefits will decrease from 21 percent among war babies to 13 percent for GenXers.¹¹


MINT7 projects that many wives' or ex-wives' Social Security benefits will change—from retired-worker-only to auxiliary—when they survive their husbands or ex-husbands. A widow is eligible for a survivor benefit if her own retired-worker benefit is less than 100 percent of her spouse's retired-worker benefit (before any adjustments for early or delayed retirement) (SSA, n.d.). A substantial percentage of wives are expected to receive survivor benefits that are higher than their own earned benefits,

although that percentage decreases across the cohorts (Chart 4). Although almost four-fifths of married women in the war baby cohort (79 percent) would receive higher Social Security benefits as widows, only about two-thirds of wives in the GenX cohort (68 percent) would do so. By comparison, 76 percent of wives in the leading boomer and 70 percent in the trailing boomer cohorts are expected to receive higher Social Security retirement benefits as widows than as spouses.

An alternative way of illustrating the relative impact of auxiliary benefits is to compare a married woman's projected actual benefits based on both her husband's and her own earnings with the projected benefit levels if they were computed on the basis of only her husband's or her own earnings (Table 1). Among the GenX cohort, for example, the actual projected benefit that a wife would receive at take-up would be about \$1,683 per month, on average. This benefit melds a wife's own retired-worker benefit and any auxiliary benefit. The average amount of a GenX

Chart 4.

Projected mean monthly Social Security benefit of married women at Social Security take-up age before and after their husbands die and percent who will receive higher benefits as a survivor, by birth cohort



SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations using MINT7 data.

NOTE: Sample includes married women in the year they claim Social Security benefits, but excludes those projected to ever receive Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

Table 1.

Projected mean monthly Social Security benefit of married women at Social Security take-up age and share of actual benefit, by computation method and birth cohort (in 2013 dollars)

Computation method	War babies (1937-1945)	Leading boomers (1946-1955)	Trailing boomers (1956-1965)	GenXers (1966-1975)
Actual benefit ^a	1,103	1,250	1,517	1,683
Using only husband's earnings ^b				
Simulated benefit	787	844	943	1,021
Share of actual benefit (%)	71	68	62	61
Using only wife's earnings ^c				
Simulated benefit	883	1,079	1,388	1,556
Share of actual benefit (%)	80	86	91	92

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations using MINT7 data.

NOTE: Sample includes married women in the year they claim Social Security benefits, but excludes those projected to ever receive Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

- a. Defined as the wife's Social Security benefit, which is based on both the husband's and wife's earnings. This amount is derived by comparing the wife's PIA with her husband's PIA. If the wife's PIA is less than one-half of her husband's PIA, then the amount of Social Security benefit she receives is effectively equal to one-half of her husband's PIA. This is the Social Security benefit the wife would receive before any actuarial reductions for early retirement or increases for delayed retirement.
- b. Computed as one-half the husband's PIA, which is based on the husband's earnings.
- c. Defined as the wife's PIA, which is based on the wife's earnings.

wife's spousal benefit (based on only her husband's earnings) would be about \$1,021 per month, or about 61 percent of the actual benefit. The average amount based on a GenX wife's retired-worker-only benefit would be about \$1,556 per month, or 92 percent of the actual benefit. All of the average benefit amounts increased substantially across cohorts, especially those based on only the wife's earnings. The percentage of the actual benefit accounted for by the wife's own earnings increases from 80 percent for war babies to 91 percent for trailing boomers and 92 percent for GenXers.

Conclusions

This note uses MINT7 to update projections of currently and formerly married women's Social Security retirement benefits. MINT7 projects that the dramatic changes in the labor force attachment and earnings of women in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries will sharply change the predominant type of Social Security benefits received by wives entering retirement. Those benefits will be determined more by wives' own lifetime earnings and less by their husbands' lifetime earnings. In contrast with the currently or formerly married women in the war baby cohort (born 1937–1945), at least four-fifths of those in the trailing boomer (born 1956–1965) and GenX (born 1966–1975) cohorts will receive their initial retirement benefits based only on their own earnings. Benefits based on wives' own lifetime earnings will account for most (91 percent to 92 percent) of their average total benefits. Among women who outlive their husbands, a majority will receive survivor benefits based on their husbands' earnings, although many will be dually entitled as retired workers and widows. The proportion of widows receiving retired-worker-only benefits is projected to increase from about one-fifth in the war babies cohort to about one-third in the GenX cohort.

Notes

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¹ An ex-wife must have been married at least 10 years to qualify for auxiliary benefits based on her ex-husband's earnings.

² Although husbands, ex-husbands, and widowers are likewise eligible for auxiliary benefits, this note focuses on women.

³ This number and the subtotals discussed below include women receiving parent's benefits.

⁴ The PIA—the monthly benefit a person receives when he or she retires at the FRA—is based on the highest 35 years of earnings in covered employment, indexed for wage changes. The retirement benefit amount also depends on the person's age when he or she begins receiving benefits. A person who claims benefits before reaching the FRA receives reduced monthly benefits. One who chooses to delay taking benefits until after reaching the FRA receives increased monthly benefits (SSA, n.d.).

⁵ The length-of-marriage requirement was reduced from 20 years to 10 years in 1977.

⁶ A widow benefit may be reduced if the deceased husband claimed early retirement benefits. Widows whose husbands delayed taking Social Security retirement benefits until after reaching their FRA, thereby earning delayed-retirement credits, receive increased benefits.

⁷ SSA's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics developed MINT, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, and the Urban Institute.

⁸ MINT7 also projects socioeconomic characteristics such as race/ethnicity, educational attainment, immigration status, sex, labor force participation in years, lifetime earnings of persons and shared earnings with spouses, assets, assets in retirement accounts, and poverty status. In addition to Social Security benefits, it projects pension income, asset income, earnings, Supplemental Security Income, income from coresident household members, and imputed rental income. Those socioeconomic characteristics and income sources, however, are not analyzed in this note.

⁹ SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary prepares the long-term projections of the financial status of the Social Security program published in the *Trustees Report*.

¹⁰ Because of the conversion from 2011 dollars in Butrica and Smith (2012) to 2013 dollars in this analysis, all benefits increase in nominal dollars.

¹¹ MINT7 projects more wives with retired-worker-only benefits and fewer with auxiliary benefits or dual entitlement than MINT6. The reasons are unclear. The changes could partially reflect delayed claiming of wives leading to higher retired-worker benefits based on their own earnings records. They could also partially reflect reduced projected lifetime earnings for their husbands, perhaps because of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. A wife does not receive auxiliary benefits if her basic benefit is higher than half of her husband's benefit, which occurs when her lifetime earnings are greater than about one-third of her husband's lifetime earnings.

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