

percent of the jobs which were open to them.

Some of these disparities are due to a reduction in the workweek from 48 to 40 hours and a consequent loss of premium overtime pay. In itself, however, such a reduction in hours results in only a 23-percent cut in weekly earnings. *Hourly wage rates* for open jobs were, on the average, 37 to 48 percent below wage rates last received by the men, and 43 to 52 percent below last wage rates of the women.

City	Men		Women	
	Last jobs	Jobs open	Last jobs	Jobs open
Atlanta.....	\$1.10	\$0.57	\$0.95	\$0.46
Columbus.....	1.11	.72	.99	.54
Trenton.....	1.18	.75	1.05	.60

As in the case of the gross weekly earnings, the prospects for reemployment at previous wage rates were con-

siderably narrowed for many claimants. Wages of \$1 or more an hour, paid to 60 to 84 percent of the men claimants on their last jobs, were offered on only 10 to 13 percent of the jobs open to men (table 4). Although only 3 percent of the Atlanta men had last received a rate of less than 60 cents an hour, these wages were offered on 63 percent of the openings.

Less than 1 percent of the women in Atlanta could have been offered jobs paying 90 cents an hour or more, while 68 percent had last earned this much. Two-thirds of the jobs open to women in this city paid less than 50 cents an hour. The situation was almost as striking in the other cities. One percent of the jobs open to women in Columbus paid as much as 80 cents an hour; at least this rate had been paid to 77 percent of the women claimants. Thirteen percent of the jobs open to the Trenton women offered 80 cents or more; 79 percent had been employed at such rates.

and supplies during the long winter offensive against Germany. UNRRA had not been able to get really under way until early in the spring of 1945 and then had been continuously hampered by shortages of supplies, shipping, and inland transport. Repeatedly, requests for badly needed supplies had to be denied. During this period, criticism of UNRRA was frequent, largely because of public misunderstanding of UNRRA's powers and the scope of its activities. It has only been able to operate as it was invited to do so by the military authorities or the government in control over an area. Only as the United States and the other supplying nations have made supplies and shipping available, and as the receiving nations have fully cooperated in planning and administering the equitable distribution of relief, has UNRRA been able to move ahead in meeting need. Despite these obstacles, the Administration showed a substantial record of accomplishment.

By June 30, 1945, UNRRA had shipped approximately 1¼ million tons of supplies, valued at some \$295 million landed cost. (By November 1, 1945, this amount had increased to more than 2½ million tons valued at \$637 million.) These shipments were primarily food, clothing, textiles, and footwear, and also included medical supplies, such as precious sulphur and penicillin, serums and vaccines, DDT powder to combat malaria and typhus, and X-ray and other hospital equipment. These early shipments had also brought some aid in rehabilitating devastated economies. Supplies for agricultural rehabilitation had been sent in—tractors and other farm machinery, animals, seed, and fertilizer. To a lesser extent, shipments included supplies for industrial rehabilitation—machinery, repair parts, trucks, railroad cars, and raw materials such as raw cotton and wool and metals.

Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, and Italy, as countries requiring financial assistance, had received supplies. In addition, small amounts of emergency relief supplies had gone to several Northern European countries that have not asked for financial assistance from UNRRA—France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Only small items for medical training and agricultural rehabilitation had yet been sent into

UNRRA and War's Aftermath

By Ellen S. Woodward*

As Adviser on Welfare to the United States Member of the Council of UNRRA, the author has participated in the development of this "new venture in democracy in international action." In the September 1944 BULLETIN, Mrs. Woodward outlined the action taken by the Council at sessions in Atlantic City and Montreal. This article deals with the third session in London and also with the author's visit to six camps for displaced persons in Germany, which at that time were administered by the military authorities, with the aid of UNRRA personnel.

THE GRIM REALITIES of the aftermath of total war in wide areas of the world confronted the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as it met in London for its third session in August, during the last days of the fighting. Millions of people in liberated Europe were living in the midst of wholesale destruction and disorganization and enduring extreme deprivation and suffering. The end of the war in the Pacific found millions in the direst need in large areas of China freed from the Japanese. Though victory was at hand, millions of people faced the prospect

of a worse winter than any they had yet experienced. In the opening session of the Council, Lord Latham, the Leader of the London County Council, said: "Whilst the valour of arms has achieved the defeat of the enemy, death and disease may yet claim the victory unless the nations united together in UNRRA can bring health and succor quickly in abundant measure." The means of providing sufficient aid was the urgent concern of this session.

Progress of Relief Operations

Since the second session of the Council in Montreal, in September, 1944, relief operations had made slow headway. Military needs had required almost all available shipping

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China, but an extensive program for that country had been planned, to go into operation as soon as China was liberated.

The Administration was carrying on a rounded program of services in Greece, assisting the Greek Government with problems of health, welfare, and displaced persons, and with agricultural and industrial rehabilitation. A program was also in operation in Yugoslavia. The limited program for mothers and children in Italy, voted at the preceding session of the Council, had progressed well. The Administration had recently assumed responsibility for relief in Albania. A mission in Czechoslovakia and a temporary delegation in Poland were working with the governments of these countries to develop programs. Small liaison missions were located in other countries to render special services requested by the governments. A limited program was being planned for Ethiopia.

Almost 4,000 UNRRA personnel were assisting the military in its operations to care for and repatriate displaced persons in Germany. The primary responsibility for these operations, so far carried by the military, was gradually being turned over to UNRRA, which was to assume full responsibility by October or November.

Present Relief Needs

Substantial as was the record of accomplishment shown by the Administration, it was dwarfed by present and future needs of staggering proportions. The representatives of the various invaded nations requesting UNRRA's assistance described the loss of life and the devastation in their countries and their urgent needs if many additional lives are not to be sacrificed.

For example, the member for Poland reported that his country had lost one-fourth of its population—7 million persons; 4 million people had lost their homes; 70 percent of the Nation's horses, 60 percent of its cattle, and 80 percent of its pigs were lost; 80 percent of the railway cars and engines and most of the bridges were demolished; and 425 of 677 hospitals and 75 percent of the health and child welfare centers were destroyed. The delegate pleaded for clothes, shoes, and food, especially for the children, who increasingly are found to have tuberculosis and to be mentally and physically impaired.

The delegate from Czechoslovakia told how UNRRA aid had arrived in time to prevent starvation and typhus and typhoid epidemics. At one time, 153 UNRRA trucks were all the transport available in the whole of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav delegate also told how UNRRA last spring had saved the lives of thousands of Yugoslavs who would otherwise have died from starvation, but he pointed out that the present allocation to Yugoslavia is far from enough to maintain bare physical existence. And so, in turn, the ravaged countries of Europe told of their urgent needs and their fear of the coming winter and pleaded for greater assistance.

Additional Requirements

UNRRA faced these needs of unprecedented magnitude with depleted funds and resources. In presenting his report and projected program of operations early in the session, the Director General set forth the hard facts. At Atlantic City it had been recommended that the uninvaded member nations contribute approximately 1 percent of their national incomes for the year ended June 30, 1943, to finance relief operations. These financial resources will be nearly exhausted by the end of 1945, and yet only part of the job which UNRRA was set up to do will be completed.

More funds.—The Administration's program called for the shipment of supplies during the 7 months June 1 to December 31 valued at a landed cost of \$1,052 million.¹ Including some necessary procurement for shipments for 1946, a total of approximately \$1,644 million,¹ of which \$550 million represented an appropriation yet to be made by the United States,² would have been spent by the end of 1945. Very little funds would be left on hand for 1946. It had been estimated that at least an additional \$1.5 billion would be required to finance assistance during the next year. After this estimate was made, other requests for assistance were received, but action on them had not been taken when the Council met. The assumption of responsibility for relief in new areas would increase the estimates of the total amount of funds required. The resources provided at Atlantic City had proved far from sufficient to provide

even a minimum of relief and rehabilitation for the countries in need of UNRRA assistance.

The Director General put the problem before the Council in compelling terms. Additional funds about as large as those originally contributed must be provided if the peoples of Europe were to be brought through possibly the grimmest winter in history to the next harvest.

Larger amounts of supplies.—The Director General called on the contributing countries not only for necessary funds but also for shipping and supplies in increasing amounts. Even though they were extremely scarce, fats, dairy products, meats, trucks, clothing, and coal had to be provided by the supplying governments. The Director General recognized that meeting UNRRA's minimum requirements would mean sacrifice for the peoples of the supplying nations. Without such sacrifice, the promises made to the invaded countries during Axis occupation could not be made good. With a reminder that "UNRRA represents the pledged word of the United Nations," the Director General declared: "If the contributing countries fail to implement their promise rapidly, efficiently, and generously, aid will not be forthcoming and the name of the United Nations will be a mockery in Europe this winter."

The Director General also pleaded the cause of the countries that have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for supplies and so do not require UNRRA assistance. These countries have also experienced serious difficulties in getting supplies. Destruction and economic disorganization had exceeded expectations, and these countries also must have much greater supplies of food, raw materials, transport, and coal before the winter.

The Director General called on the receiving nations to assist in the equitable distribution of relief supplies, to utilize fully indigenous supplies, to eliminate black markets, and to control prices. Only with the full mobilization of all the resources of the United Nations can the needs of the liberated nations be met during the coming winter.

Action To Finance Operations

Because of their urgency, financial measures, although a source of less debate than some policy questions, overshadowed in importance all

¹ These figures have been increased substantially since the Japanese surrender.

² Pending in Congress as of December 1.

other action taken by the Council in its third session.

Payment of Pledged Contributions

As a first step in supplying funds and supplies for operations, the contributing governments which had not yet made their contributions in full were asked to complete their payments at once. Of the total amount of contributions for operations anticipated by June 30, 1945, only about two-thirds had yet been made available in cash, commodities, or services. The unpaid share of the United States commitments represented the largest part of the pledged contributions that had not yet been made. The United States had authorized a total contribution to UNRRA of \$1,350 million, representing approximately 1 percent of the national income for the year ending June 30, 1943, but \$550 million of this amount had not yet been appropriated by the Congress. In addition, contributions from several other governments, amounting to \$30 million, would either not become available for expenditure until after this year or had only received preliminary approval by the executive branch of the government.

Additional Financial Contributions

Major action to finance the program of operations required to meet the minimum needs during the coming year was the adoption of a resolution proposed by the United States recommending that the uninvaded member nations make an additional contribution of approximately 1 percent of their national incomes for the year ended June 30, 1943. This action is intended to provide funds to finance UNRRA until the end of its operations, which, according to instructions given the Director General by the Council, must be terminated in Europe by the end of 1946 and in China by April 1947. Carrying out this recommendation on financing will mean doubling the amounts of the original commitments by the contributing governments. Nevertheless, the Director General questioned whether even these additional contributions would be sufficient. The provision of these additional funds will depend on action by the United States Congress³ and by the governments of other contributing nations. Whether the Administration

³ On November 27 the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved authorization of an additional \$1,350 million.

receives the funds to carry out the projected program of operations will depend on the measure of public support that the peoples of the contributing nations give to UNRRA.

In regard to support by the United States, the Honorable William L. Clayton, Member for the United States, reported in an early session of the Council that soon after VE-day President Truman had requested the supply agencies of the Government "to grant priority necessary to meet the minimum civilian requirements of those of our allies who have been ravaged by the enemy, to the fullest extent that the successful prosecution of military operations and the maintenance of our essential domestic economy permit." "If I know the people of the United States," Mr. Clayton went on to say, "I think I can also assure you that they are prepared to continue to make whatever sacrifices may be necessary to go forward with the job of relief and rehabilitation of the liberated areas so long as they are convinced that the job is being well done and that the people of the liberated countries themselves are doing everything in their power to get on a self-sustaining basis as quickly as possible."

Action on Major Policy Questions

In addition to financial problems, the Council at the London meeting was concerned chiefly with two policy questions of major importance—the care of displaced persons who cannot or do not wish to be returned to their homes and the undertaking of relief operations in Italy and Austria.

Care of Displaced Persons

As at preceding sessions, consideration of difficult questions concerning the care of displaced persons required a major share of the Council's time.

Representatives of the military authorities reported that in the 3 months since VE-day they had repatriated more than 4 million displaced persons found in Germany. Some 2 million persons remained, of whom 23,000 were stateless. (By the end of September another million persons had been repatriated, leaving only 1.3 million.) About one-fifth of the camp population were children. Some 1,200 children who were found unaccompanied by any adults had been removed to Sweden,

Switzerland, and France, and about 2,000 more remained in camps in Germany.

Observation of camps in Germany.—Following the Council Session, I had an opportunity to observe at first hand the care provided these persons in six camps in Germany, in each of which from 5,500 to 8,000 displaced persons were living. The military authorities were responsible for the displaced persons operations and for the administration of the camps. UNRRA teams, working under the direction of the military, provided the operating staff for the camps. These teams usually consisted of a director, sometimes an assistant director, supply officer, welfare officer, medical officer, nurse, and secretary. The displaced persons themselves performed most of the work of maintaining the camps.

Housing in the camps was far from satisfactory. Bombed and damaged buildings that had formerly been barracks, warehouses, or even stables were used. Repairs were badly needed to give protection from rain and cold. The buildings had few partitions and so provided little privacy. An effort was made to house members of each national group together. There was little furniture. For the most part, the beds were worn-out army cots with grimy, ragged bedding. In only one camp, where bolts of blanket material had been obtained from German supplies and cut into blanket lengths, did I see fresh whole blankets. Although the camps had insufficient equipment for proper maintenance and appeared dirty, the use of DDT kept them free from flies and insects.

The military authorities had been providing rations of 2,000 calories a day. Food was prepared and distributed from a central camp kitchen. One member from each family lined up to get servings for all members of the family in whatever containers could be found. The scarcity of available milk supplies meant that milk—distributed at the camp hospital—could be given only to infants, very young children, and the aged, and must be limited to one-half pint a day.

The clothes of the persons living in the camps were terribly dingy and worn. Two camps had new materials to use for clothing but had too few sewing machines to make clothes in sufficient quantity.

Each camp had its own hospital and

medical and dental clinics, staffed usually by physicians and dentists from among the displaced persons. So-called "liberated" equipment and instruments had been taken from German institutions in the community. Seriously ill patients were taken to local German hospitals.

An effort was made to provide schooling for the children, but the classes lacked books and other school supplies. The absence of planning for the constructive use of time and the lack of recreational equipment presented a serious problem. Old and young wandered about with practically nothing to do. The brightest spot in each camp was the chapel where religious services were held. Even though bombed buildings frequently were used for the chapels, the residents of the camps had taken a great deal of care to make the chapel interiors as attractive as possible. In the midst of deprivation, the spiritual life of these people had survived.

Clarification of UNRRA responsibility.—The displaced persons still in Germany are, in many instances, more difficult to repatriate than those who left shortly after Germany's collapse. Some cannot or do not wish to return to their former homes. A question had arisen as to the authority of the Administration to care for such persons without prior approval of their own governments. The Administration requested the Council to clarify existing policies so as to give clear direction on this point. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution, seconded by the United States, authorizing the Administration to assist in giving care on a temporary basis to displaced persons who cannot or do not care to return home, without the necessity of agreement with their governments. This resolution was vigorously opposed by a minority of the member nations on the grounds that such action would interfere with the sovereign rights of nations and would involve UNRRA in political activities in opposition to some member governments. The proponents of the measure, on the other hand, took the position that a requirement for consultation with the government concerned on each relief applicant would give individual governments a veto on UNRRA operations that would prevent UNRRA from performing its basic relief job. They argued further that such a procedure would involve

UNRRA in making distinctions on political grounds in administering relief.

A substitute resolution was finally adopted, with four council members voting against it. This action authorized the Administration to give purely temporary care to displaced persons pending their repatriation. Assistance may not be given to persons who have been taken into custody "on charges of having collaborated with the enemy or having committed other crimes against the interests of nationals of the United Nations." The Administration is to make every effort, in full consultation with the occupying authorities and the governments concerned, "to encourage the repatriation or return to their homes of the displaced persons concerned at the earliest possible moment." The authority of the Administration provided by this resolution in any geographic area is to be reviewed at the end of 6 months.

Another significant provision of the resolution prohibited charging UNRRA resources with the cost of basic supplies, equipment, and transportation necessary for displaced persons in Germany. It authorized the Administration "to make agreements with the governments or occupying authorities in control of areas of Germany for the care or transportation of displaced persons."

Relief Operations in Former Enemy Areas

Italy and Austria.—Another controversial question which was debated extensively by the Council was the question of full aid to Italy and to Austria, both former enemy nations. A limited program of \$50 million for aid in Italy, especially for children and expectant mothers, had been voted at the Montreal Council Session. Less than \$12 million had been spent on this program up to May 31, 1945. In connection with the occupation of Italy, the United States, the British, and the Canadian Governments will have provided some \$500 million in relief to the Italian people by the end of 1945, when the military will discontinue these relief operations.

The United States proposed that the responsibility for relief in Italy in 1946 be assumed by UNRRA. The United States Member estimated that about \$450 million in additional funds would be required to provide necessary relief until after the next harvest; he

proposed that the Administration modify its program of operations by providing funds for the Italian program on the same basis as for other liberated areas.

The United States resolution was strongly opposed by several nations, especially those which had been invaded by Italy. The opponents considered it premature to treat Italy as if she were one of the United Nations. It was suggested that the decision would be considered a precedent for nonpayment of reparations. Some of the receiving nations objected to sharing with Italy the limited resources of UNRRA, which were already insufficient to provide for countries that had been United Nations from the beginning and now badly needed assistance.

On the proposal of the member from Ethiopia, who pointed out that UNRRA had not yet begun operations in Ethiopia although it was the first country to be liberated from occupation by one of the Axis powers, the United States resolution was revised. The chief amendment provided for a program of relief "adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population" instead of "on the same standards and basis of priority as apply to liberated areas of the United Nations and their nationals." In this form the resolution was adopted with one dissenting vote, while one member abstained from voting.

The Council adopted a similar resolution, introduced by the United States, for relief in Austria. The military occupying authorities have been importing civilian supplies in Austria. This procedure will probably be terminated by the end of the year, and responsibility for relief will then be assumed by UNRRA.

Formosa and Korea.—The question also arose of providing relief to two former enemy areas in the Far East—Korea and Formosa. The Administration was authorized to operate in these areas in the same way as in other liberated areas. It was estimated that operations in these two areas and in Austria would add \$100 million to UNRRA's requirements, in addition to the \$450 million needed for Italy.

Other Action

Three additional governments were admitted to membership in UNRRA—Denmark, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian

Soviet Socialist Republic—bringing the total membership to 47 nations.

The Central Committee of the Council, which carries responsibility for policy decisions between sessions of the Council, was enlarged to include Canada and France. Heretofore, the membership of this Committee had been limited to the four big nations—the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and China.

The Regional Committee of the Council for Europe was enlarged by the inclusion of the three newly admitted member governments. The Soviet Union was added to the membership of the Regional Committee of the Council for the Far East.

In accordance with a proposal made by the United Kingdom, action was taken to dissolve the central standing technical committees on agriculture and on welfare and all the subcommittees of the Regional Committees for Europe and the Far East. In the place of the other standing committees, the Council, the Central Committee, and the Regional Committees will appoint, as needed, special technical subcommittees to advise them and the Administration on specific technical problems. In discussing this action, the Member for the United States said: “. . . there is great need for special services for children, for youths, for the aged, for women, for the handicapped; and . . . in some fashion the types of problems which were dealt with by the Welfare Committee must continue to receive attention in the future.” Such an ad hoc subcommittee was later set up to consider welfare problems in the Far East.

Effect of War's End on Program

The sudden surrender of Japan, which occurred during the Council session, had far-reaching implications for UNRRA's program. With military necessity no longer the governing consideration, the needs of the liberated countries could at last have priority over all other claims. For the first time, tools, equipment, and raw materials would be available to rebuild devastated economies. Emphasis could now be put on rehabilitation as well as on emergency relief.

At the same time, it was recognized that the transition from war to peace had its own special dangers for the

program. Tremendous pressures would soon be brought to bear in the supplying nations to relax the wartime system of controls and restrictions on supplies. The inevitable desire to return to normalcy might interfere with the flow of supplies to UNRRA. Recognizing the difficulties involved in the transition to a peace economy, the Council quickly adopted a resolution emphasizing that the end of the war would release great productive capacity and recommending that the member governments of the supplying countries take immediate steps to ensure the movement of supplies without interruption and in increasing volume and to instruct their military and civilian supply agencies to make war supplies immediately

available for relief purposes.

The session ended as it had begun, with emphasis on the tremendous responsibility placed on the contributing nations to meet the needs of the liberated nations. Not only sympathy for our suffering allies but also our own self-interest in a stable world order demands that we not fail in accomplishing this objective. In transmitting his report for the last quarter, the Director General reminded the Council of the words of President Roosevelt on the occasion of the founding of UNRRA: “The sufferings of the little men and women who have been ground under the Axis heel can be relieved only if we utilize the production of ALL the world to balance the want of ALL the world.”

Resources of Widow and Child Beneficiaries in Seven Cities

By Marie Correll Malitsky*

UNDER THE Social Security Act, millions of wives and minor children or workers in employment covered by old-age and survivors insurance are assured a monthly income in the event of the worker's death. During 1940, an estimated 136,600¹ mothers with children under age 18 were widowed in the United States. In that year, the first in which monthly benefits were paid under the act, approximately 32,000 such families became entitled to monthly survivor benefits. By June 1945 survivor benefits were in force on the wage records of about 180,000 deceased workers who were survived by a widow and children under age 18. Surveys of widows and children receiving these benefits in 1940 in seven cities show that they afforded many families some protection from want and were a considerable factor in helping the widows maintain homes for their children.

The great majority of the widows²

*Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Analysis Division. Articles describing the resources of primary beneficiary families studied in the same cities, and also containing summary data on widow and child beneficiaries, were published in the *Bulletin* for July 1943, pp. 3-20, and September 1943, pp. 3-17.

¹ Estimated by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. *Best's Insurance News*, Life Edition, Vol. 45, No. 5 (September 1944), p. 24.

² The only widow beneficiaries discussed in this article are those who have in their care a child of a deceased wage earner.

interviewed were housewives who were suddenly confronted with the double responsibility of securing an income and keeping a home for their families. Few of them were employed when their husbands were alive, and not many had the experience, skill, or training required for earning a satisfactory family wage. Furthermore, in six of the cities only about 10 percent, and in one city 24 percent, had as much as \$25 a month in income from assets accumulated by the family before the husband died or from private insurance payments. From 45 to 62 percent of the widows had no income whatever from such resources.³ Most of the relatives on whom they might rely for aid were sons and daughters between the ages of 18 and 24, who were handicapped as wage earners by youth and inexperience, or parents whose earning power was restricted because of advanced age.

Scope and Method

These findings are based on information obtained from beneficiaries interviewed in their homes by representatives of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance in 1941-42. The families whose resources were studied had been awarded survivor benefits in

³ In computing these percentages, old-age and survivors insurance benefits and the rental value of owner-occupied homes were not included.