Estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of
         the 2017 Trustees Report
        
        
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| Description of proposed provisions | Change from current law [percent of payroll] | Shortfall eliminated | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-range actuarial balance | Annual balance in 75th year | Long-range actuarial balance | Annual balance in 75th year | |||
| Category: Provisions Affecting Cost-of-Living Adjustment (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| A1 | Starting December 2018, reduce the annual COLA by 1 percentage point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.80 | 2.38 | 64% | 53% | |
| A2 | Starting December 2018, reduce the annual COLA by 0.5 percentage point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.94 | 1.25 | 33% | 28% | |
| A3 | Starting December 2018, compute the COLA using a chained version of the 
          consumer price index for wage and salary workers (CPI-W). We estimate 
          this new computation will reduce the annual COLA by about 0.3 percentage 
          point, on average. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | memo (FY 2014 Budget) | memo (Chaffetz) | memo (Becerra) | memo (Fiscal Commission) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.57 | 0.77 | 20% | 17% | |
| A4 | Starting December 2020, compute the COLA using a chained version of the 
          consumer price index for wage and salary workers (CPI-W). We estimate 
          this new computation will reduce the annual COLA by about 0.3 percentage 
          point, on average. The new COLA will not apply to DI benefits. It will 
          apply to OASI benefits, except for those of formerly disabled-workers who 
          converted to retired-worker status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.43 | 0.57 | 15% | 13% | |
| A5 | Starting December 2018, add 1 percentage point to the annual COLA for 
          beneficiaries who have lived past a "specified age". The "specified age" 
          is the sum of: (1) 65 and (2) the unisex cohort life expectancy at age 65. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Senate Special Committee on Aging) | -0.09 | -0.11 | -3% | -2% | |
| A6 | Starting December 2019, compute the COLA using the Consumer Price Index for 
          the Elderly (CPI-E). We estimate this new computation will increase the annual 
          COLA by about 0.2 percentage point, on average. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Deutch, Hirono) | memo (Lawson) | memo (Larson 2017) | memo (Sanders, DeFazio) | memo (Sanchez) | memo (Sanders 2016) | memo (Schatz) | memo (Deutch 2015) | memo (DeFazio 2015) | memo (Sanders 2015) | memo (Larson 2015) | memo (Larson 2014) | memo (Harkin 2013) | memo (Harkin 2012) | memo (Becerra) | memo (Deutch 2010) | -0.39 | -0.54 | -14% | -12% | |
| A7 | Starting December 2018, reduce the annual COLA by 1 percentage point, but not 
          to less than zero. In cases where the unreduced COLA is less than 1 percentage 
          point, do not carry over the unused reduction into future years. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Hutchison) | 1.70 | 2.25 | 60% | 50% | |
| A8 | Starting December 2018, for OASI beneficiaries only (DI beneficiaries would 
          only be affected when their benefit converts to OASI at NRA), the annual COLA 
          would be based on the chain-weighted version of the CPI-U. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.49 | 0.64 | 17% | 14% | |
| A9 | For single/head-of-household/married-filing-separate taxpayers with modified 
          adjusted gross income (MAGI) below $87,200 and for joint filers with MAGI below 
          $174,400 for December 2019 ($85,000 and $170,000 multiplied by estimated CPI-U 
          for 2019), use the chain-weighted version of the Consumer Price Index for All 
          Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) to calculate the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), 
          beginning with the December 2019 COLA. For those beneficiaries whose MAGI is 
          above these thresholds, provide no COLA.  Use prior tax year income data for 
          this determination.  Index the eligibility income threshold amounts to the CPI-U 
          after December 2019. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 1.30 | 2.42 | 46% | 54% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Level of Monthly Benefits (PIA) (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| B1.1 | Price indexing of PIA factors beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI 
         benefits in 2024: Reduce factors so that initial benefits grow by inflation 
         rather than by the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 2.65 | 7.68 | 171% | ||
| B1.2 | Progressive price indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning 
          with individuals newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024: Create a 
          new bend point at the 30th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly 
          retired workers. Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 30th 
          percentile and below. Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 30th 
          percentile such that the initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to 
          the taxable maximum grows by inflation rather than the growth in the SSA 
          average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.46 | 4.26 | 52% | 95% | |
| B1.3 | Progressive price indexing (40th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024: Create a new bend 
          point at the 40th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 40th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 40th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.23 | 3.58 | 44% | 80% | |
| B1.4 | Progressive price indexing (50th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024: Create a new bend 
          point at the 50th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 50th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 50th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.00 | 2.72 | 35% | 61% | |
| B1.5 | Progressive price indexing (60th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024: Create a new bend 
          point at the 60th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 60th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 60th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.72 | 1.76 | 26% | 39% | |
| B1.6 (2021) | Progressive price indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2021: Create a new bend 
          point at the 30th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 30th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 30th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. Young survivors (children 
          of deceased workers and surviving spouses with a child in care) are not affected. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bennett) | 1.47 | 3.96 | 52% | 88% | |
| B1.6 (2026) | Progressive price indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2026: Create a new bend 
          point at the 30th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 30th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 30th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ryan 2010) | 1.18 | 3.66 | 42% | 82% | |
| B1.7 | Progressive price indexing (40th percentile) of PIA factors for individuals 
          newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2025 through 2062: Create a new bend 
          point at the 40th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 40th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 40th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. Young survivors (children 
          of deceased workers and surviving spouses with a child in care) are not affected. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Graham, Paul, Lee) | 0.98 | 2.56 | 35% | 57% | |
| B1.8 | Progressive price indexing (50th percentile) of PIA factors for individuals 
          newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2022 through 2061: Create a new bend 
          point at the 50th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. 
          Maintain current-law benefits for earners at the 50th percentile and below. 
          Reduce the 32 and 15 percent factors above the 50th percentile such that the 
          initial benefit for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum grows by 
          inflation rather than the growth in the SSA average wage index. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Chaffetz) | 0.96 | 2.29 | 34% | 51% | |
| B2.1 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2027, multiply the 
          PIA factors by the ratio of life expectancy at 67 for 2022 to the life 
          expectancy at age 67 for the 4th year prior to the year of benefit eligibility. 
          Unisex life expectancies, based on period life tables as computed by SSA's 
          Office of the Chief Actuary, are used to determine the ratio. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | memo (Bennett) | 0.52 | 1.68 | 18% | 37% | |
| B3.1 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2018, multiply the 32 
          and 15 percent PIA factors each year by 0.987. Stop reductions after 2048, when 
          the factors reach 21 percent and 10 percent, respectively. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.54 | 2.96 | 54% | 66% | |
| B3.2 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2025, multiply the 90 
          and 32 percent PIA factors each year by 0.9925 and 0.982, respectively. Stop 
          reductions after 2062. Beginning with those newly eligible for OASI benefits in 
          2020, multiply the 15 factor by 0.982. Stop reduction of the 15 factor after 2057. 
          Disabled workers are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) 
          subject to a proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of 
          disability, upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. Child beneficiaries 
          and spouses with a child in care under the OASI program are not affected by this proposal. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Liebman, MacGuineas, Samwick) | 2.05 | 5.26 | 72% | 117% | |
| B3.3 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2018, use a modified 
          primary insurance amount (PIA) formula. The modified formula: (1) increases the 
          first bend point to the equivalent of $800 in 2009 (about $952 in 2017); (2) 
          places a new bend point 75 percent of the way between the reset first bend point 
          and the current-law second bend point; (3) lowers the PIA factor between the new 
          bend point and the upper bend point from 32 percent to 20 percent; and (4) lowers 
          the factor above the upper bend point from 15 percent to 10 percent. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | 0.22 | 0.29 | 8% | 7% | |
| B3.4 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2021, multiply all 
          PIA factors each year by 0.991. Stop reductions after 2049. Disabled workers 
          are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement age; and (b) subject to a 
          proportional reduction in benefits, based on the worker's years of disability, 
          upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary status. Young survivors (children 
          of deceased workers and surviving spouses with a child in care) are not affected. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | 1.50 | 3.15 | 53% | 70% | |
| B3.5 | Progressive indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2020, continuing through 
          2057, and resuming in 2078: Create a new bend point at the 30th percentile 
          of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. Maintain current-law 
          benefits for earners at the 30th percentile and below. Reduce the 32 and 
          15 percent factors above the 30th percentile such that the initial benefit 
          for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum is reduced by 1.20 
          percent per year as compared to current law (for the years that progressive 
          indexing applies). Disabled workers are: (a) not affected prior to normal 
          retirement age; and (b) subject to a proportional reduction in benefits, 
          based on the worker's years of disability, upon conversion to retired-worker 
          beneficiary status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 1.33 | 3.11 | 47% | 69% | |
| B3.6 | Progressive indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2020, continuing through 
          2069: Create a new bend point at the 30th percentile of the AIME 
          distribution of newly retired workers. Maintain current-law benefits for 
          earners at the 30th percentile and below. Reduce the 32 and 15 percent 
          factors above the 30th percentile such that the initial benefit for a 
          worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum is reduced by 1.20 percent 
          per year as compared to current law (for the years that progressive indexing 
          applies). Disabled workers are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement 
          age; and (b) subject to a proportional reduction in benefits, based on the 
          worker's years of disability, upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary 
          status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 1.41 | 3.57 | 50% | 80% | |
| B3.7 | Progressive indexing (30th percentile) of PIA factors beginning with 
          individuals newly eligible for OASI benefits in 2020, continuing through 
          2029, and resuming in 2068: Create a new bend point at the 30th percentile 
          of the AIME distribution of newly retired workers. Maintain current-law 
          benefits for earners at the 30th percentile and below. Reduce the 32 and 
          15 percent factors above the 30th percentile such that the initial benefit 
          for a worker with AIME equal to the taxable maximum is reduced by 1.20 percent 
          per year as compared to current law (for the years that progressive indexing 
          applies). Disabled workers are: (a) not affected prior to normal retirement 
          age; and (b) subject to a proportional reduction in benefits, based on the 
          worker's years of disability, upon conversion to retired-worker beneficiary 
          status. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.61 | 1.60 | 22% | 36% | |
| B3.8 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024, create 
          a new bend point at the 50th percentile of the AIME distribution of newly 
          retired workers and gradually reduce all PIA factors except for the 90 
          percent factor. By 2057: a) the 32 percent PIA factor below the new bend 
          point reduces to 30 percent; b) the 32 percent PIA factor above the new 
          bend point reduces to 10 percent; and c) the 15 percent PIA factor reduces 
          to 5 percent. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Fiscal Commission) | 0.93 | 2.30 | 33% | 51% | |
| B3.9 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2030, gradually 
          reduce the 15 percent PIA factor in each year so that it reaches 10 percent 
          for those newly eligible in 2059 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | 0.08 | 0.23 | 3% | 5% | |
| B3.10 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2024, gradually 
          increase the first PIA bend point in each year so that it is 15 percent 
          higher for those newly eligible in 2038 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Sanders, DeFazio) | memo (Sanchez) | memo (Sanders 2016) | memo (Schatz) | memo (Sanders 2015) | memo (Harkin 2013) | memo (Harkin 2012) | -0.37 | -0.71 | -13% | -16% | |
| B3.11 | Increase the first PIA factor from 90 percent to 93 percent for all 
          beneficiaries eligible as of January 2019 and for those newly eligible 
          for benefits after 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2017) | memo (Larson 2015) | memo (Larson 2014) | -0.24 | -0.26 | -8% | -6% | |
| B3.12 | Use an annualized "mini-PIA" formula beginning with retired workers 
          newly eligible in 2024. For each indexed earnings year, compute an 
          individual AIME and an individual PIA. Sum these individual PIAs for 
          the 40 highest years of indexed earnings and divide that total amount 
          by 37 to get the PIA for this provision. Phase-in over five years, 
          meaning that in 2024, 80 percent of the benefit would be based on the 
          old 35-year average PIA formula and 20 percent on the new mini-PIA 
          formula, shifting by 20 percentage points each year until 100 percent 
          is based on the new mini-PIA formula for those attaining age 62 in 2028. 
          Disabled worker benefits are unchanged under this provision. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.25 | 0.40 | 9% | 9% | |
| B3.13 | For retired worker beneficiaries newly eligible in 2024 (excluding disabled 
          workers), add a new bend point at the wage-indexed equivalent of the 50th 
          percentile of the AIME distribution minus $100 (for 2015 eligibility) and 
          change the PIA factors to 95/32/15/5. Also move the current-law first bend 
          point from the wage-indexed equivalent of $885 in 2017 to $1,125 in 2017. 
          Phase this provision in over 10 years (2024-2033). The phase-in would work 
          on a weighted-average basis: 90% of CL formula + 10% of proposal formula for 
          2024, 80% of CL formula + 20% of proposal formula for 2025, and so on. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.07 | 0.14 | 2% | 3% | |
| B3.14 | Beginning with those newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2019, reduce 
          the 15 percent PIA factor by 2 percentage points per year so that it 
          reaches 5 percent for those newly eligible in 2023 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | 0.32 | 0.47 | 11% | 10% | |
| B3.15 | Increase the 90 percent PIA formula factor to 91 percent for beneficiaries 
          newly eligible in 2022, 92 percent for those newly eligible in 2023, ..., 
          reaching 95 percent for those newly eligible in 2026 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Sanchez) | -0.28 | -0.44 | -10% | -10% | |
| B3.16 | For retired worker and disabled worker beneficiaries becoming initially 
          eligible in January 2024 or later, phase in a new benefit formula (from 
          2024 to 2033). Replace the existing two primary insurance amount (PIA) 
          bend points with three new bend points as follows:  (1) 25% AWI/12 from 
          2 years prior to initial eligibility; (2) 100% AWI/12 from 2 years prior 
          to initial eligibility; and (3) 125% AWI/12 from 2 years prior to initial 
          eligibility.  The new PIA factors are 95%, 27.5%, 5% and 2%. During the 
          phase in, those becoming newly eligible for benefits will receive an 
          increasing portion of their benefits based on the new formula, reaching 
          100% of the new formula in 2033. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.89 | 1.60 | 31% | 36% | |
| B4.1 | Increase the number of years used to calculate benefits for retirees and 
          survivors (but not for disabled workers) from 35 to 38, phased in over 
          the years 2018-2022. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.27 | 0.38 | 10% | 8% | |
| B4.2 | Increase the number of years used to calculate benefits for retirees and 
          survivors (but not for disabled workers) from 35 to 40, phased in over 
          the years 2018-2026. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Chaffetz) | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.44 | 0.64 | 15% | 14% | |
| B4.3 | For the OASI and DI computation of the PIA, gradually reduce the maximum 
          number of drop-out years from 5 to 0, phased in over the years 2019-2027. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | 0.60 | 0.92 | 21% | 21% | |
| B4.4 | Reduce the number of computation years (increase dropout years) for parents
          having a child in care under the age of 6. The parent must have no earnings 
          (covered or non-covered) for the year to be eligible for the credit. Only 
          one parent can claim the childcare added dropout year for a given earnings 
          year. Each parent can earn at most 2 dropout years per child, and a maximum 
          of 5 dropout years in total. The years designated as childcare years do not 
          have to be the years that could otherwise be included in the computation of 
          the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The provision would be effective 
          for all benefits payable for entitlement in January 2019 and later (without 
          regard for when the beneficiary became initially eligible). graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Murphy) | -0.05 | -0.05 | -2% | -1% | |
| B4.5 | For retired and disabled workers, reduce the maximum number of dropout 
          years to 4 for workers newly eligible in 2019, to 3 for workers newly 
          eligible in 2020, and to 2 for workers newly eligible in 2021 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | 0.36 | 0.52 | 13% | 12% | |
| B5.1 | Increase the PIA to a level such that a worker with 30 years of earnings 
          at the minimum wage level receives an adjusted PIA equal to 120 percent 
          of the Federal poverty level for an aged individual. This provision takes 
          full effect for all newly eligible OASDI workers in 2035, and is phased 
          in for new eligibles in 2026 through 2034. The percentage increase in PIA 
          is lowered proportionately for those with fewer than 30 years of earnings, 
          down to no enhancement for workers with 20 or fewer years of earnings. 
          (Year-of-work requirements are "scaled" for disabled workers based on 
          their years of potential work from age 22 to benefit eligibility). The 
          benefit enhancement percentage is reduced proportionately for workers 
          with higher average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), down to no enhancement 
          for those with AIME at least twice that of a 35-year steady minimum wage 
          earner. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ryan 2010) | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0% | -0% | |
| B5.2 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2018, reconfigure the special 
          minimum benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined as a year in which 
          4 quarters of coverage are earned. (b) At implementation, set the PIA 
          for 30 years of coverage equal to 125 percent of the monthly poverty 
          level (about $1,238 in 2016). For those with under 30 years of coverage, 
          the PIA per year of coverage over 10 years is $1,238/20 = $61.90. 
          (c) Index the initial PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for 
          successive cohorts. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Lawson) | memo (Larson 2017) | memo (Sanders, DeFazio) | memo (Sanders 2016) | memo (Sanders 2015) | memo (Larson 2015) | memo (Larson 2014) | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.15 | -0.22 | -5% | -5% | |
| B5.3 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2018, reconfigure the special 
          minimum benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined to be either a 
          year in which 4 quarters of coverage are earned or a child is in care. 
          Childcare years are granted to parents who have a child under 5, with 
          a limit of 8 such years. (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 30 
          years of coverage equal to 125 percent of the monthly poverty level 
          (about $1,238 in 2016). For those with under 30 years of coverage, 
          the PIA per year of coverage over 10 years is $1,238/20 = $61.90. 
          (c) Index the initial PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for 
          successive cohorts. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.22 | -0.32 | -8% | -7% | |
| B5.4 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2024, reconfigure the special minimum 
          benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined as a year in which 4 quarters of 
          coverage are earned. (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 30 years of 
          coverage equal to 125 percent of the monthly poverty level (about $1,238 in 
          2016). For those with under 30 years of coverage, the PIA per year of coverage 
          over 10 years is $1,238/20 = $61.90. (c) From 2016 to the year of implementation, 
          2024, index the PIA per year of coverage using the chain-CPI index. Then, for 
          later years, index the PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for successive 
          cohorts. (d) Scale work requirements for disabled workers, based on the number 
          of years of non-disabled potential work. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Fiscal Commission) | -0.12 | -0.20 | -4% | -4% | |
| B5.5 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2019, reconfigure the special minimum 
          benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined as a year in which either 20 percent 
          of the "old law maximum" is earned or a child is in care. Childcare years 
          are granted to parents who have a child under 6, with a limit of 8 such years. 
          (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 30 years of coverage equal to 133 percent 
          of the Census monthly poverty level (about $1,276 in 2016). For those with 
          under 30 years of coverage, the PIA per year of coverage over 19 years is 
          $1,276/11 = $116.00. (c) Index the initial PIA per year of coverage by wage 
          growth for successive cohorts. (d) Scale work requirements for disabled workers, 
          based on the number of years of non-disabled potential work. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | -0.05 | -0.08 | -2% | -2% | |
| B5.6 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2018, reconfigure the special minimum 
          benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined to be either a year in which 4 
          quarters of coverage are earned or a child is in care. Childcare years are 
          granted to parents who have a child under 6, with a limit of 5 such years. 
          (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 30 years of coverage equal to 100 
          percent of the monthly poverty level (about $1,005 in 2017). For those with 
          under 30 years of coverage, the PIA per year of coverage over 10 years is 
          $1,005/20 = $50.25. (c) From 2017 to the year of implementation, 2018, index 
          the PIA per year of coverage using the CPI index. Then, for later years, 
          index the PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for successive cohorts. 
          (d) Scale work requirements for disabled workers, based on the number of 
          years of non-disabled potential work. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Chaffetz) | -0.10 | -0.16 | -4% | -3% | |
| B5.7 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2020, reconfigure the special minimum 
          benefit: (a) The number of years of work (YOWs) is determined as total quarters 
          of coverage divided by 4, ignoring any fraction. Childcare years are granted 
          to parents who have a child under 6, with a limit of 5 such years. (b) At 
          implementation, set the PIA for 30+ YOWs equal to 100 percent of the monthly 
          HHS poverty level for the year prior to eligibility. For workers between 11 
          and 29 YOWs, reduce the special minimum by 3 1/3 percentage points per YOW 
          so that at 29 YOWs the minimum would be 96 2/3% of poverty, ..., down to 11 
          YOWs at 36 2/3% of poverty. No minimum for 10 or fewer YOWs. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Moore) | -0.02 | -0.00 | -1% | -0% | |
| B5.8 | Beginning in 2022, create a Basic Minimum Benefit (BMB) within Social Security 
          (i.e., the cost of the BMB would be charged as a cost to the OASI Trust Fund), 
          with the following specifications: (1) Eligibility for the BMB would be limited 
          to OASI beneficiaries who have attained normal retirement age (NRA) or above. 
          OASI beneficiaries under NRA would not be eligible for the BMB. (2) The BMB would 
          be calculated on a household basis and split equally between members of the household. 
          In the case of a married couple, both spouses would need to claim any Social Security 
          benefits for which they are eligible before they could receive the BMB. If both 
          spouses have claimed and one is NRA or above and the other has not yet attained 
          NRA, only the half of the BMB for the spouse over NRA would be payable. (3) The 
          BMB amount for single beneficiaries would be equal to either: 1) the BMB base 
          ($604 in 2015) - 0.70 * current monthly OASI benefit (not including any BMB), if 
          positive; or 2) zero. (4) The BMB amount for married beneficiaries would be equal 
          to either: 1) the BMB base ($906 in 2015) - 0.70 * total household monthly OASI 
          benefits (not including any BMB), if positive; or 2) zero. (5) The BMB bases for 
          singles and couples would be updated annually for changes in the average wage index 
          (AWI). (6) Single filers with Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) over $30,000 and joint 
          filers with AGI (including taxable SS benefits) over $45,000 would be subject to 
          clawback of the BMB through the income tax system. Any BMB would be reduced by one 
          dollar for every dollar of income above the thresholds. (Thresholds, in 2015 dollars, 
          would be indexed to chained CPI-U.) Clawbacks would be credited back to the OASI Trust 
          Fund. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | -0.20 | -0.24 | -7% | -5% | |
| B5.9 | Beginning for those newly eligible in 2019, reconfigure the special minimum 
          benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined as a year in which 4 quarters of 
          coverage are earned. (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 40 years of coverage 
          equal to 125 percent of the monthly Aged Federal poverty level (about $1,200 
          in 2016). For those with 20 or fewer years of coverage, phase up linearly from 
          0 percent of the poverty level for 10 years of coverage to 100 percent of the 
          poverty level. For those having between 20 and 40 years of coverage, phase up 
          linearly from 100 percent of the poverty level at 20 years of coverage to 125% 
          of the poverty level for 40 or more years of coverage. (c) For newly eligible 
          workers in 2019 and 2020, index the applicable poverty level using the CPI 
          index, to the year prior to eligibility. Then, for newly eligible workers in 
          2021 and later, index the PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for successive 
          cohorts. (d) Disabled workers have a somewhat similar minimum benefit, with 
          work requirements scaled based on the number of years of non-disabled potential 
          work. Disabled workers have a somewhat similar minimum benefit amount. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | -0.14 | -0.24 | -5% | -5% | |
| B5.10 | Reconfigure the special minimum benefit, phased in for retired and disabled 
          workers newly eligible from 2024 through 2033: (a) A year of work (YOW) coverage 
          is equal to earnings at or above $10,875 in 2017 (reflecting a full-time worker 
          earning the federal minimum wage), adjusted thereafter for wage growth.  
          (b) At implementation, set the minimum PIA at zero percent of AWI for those 
          with 10 or fewer YOWs to 15 percent of AWI for those with 15 YOWs, increasing 
          linearly so that it reaches 19 percent for 19 YOWs.  Then the minimum PIA would 
          jump up to 25 percent of AWI for those with 20 YOWs, increasing linearly so 
          that it equals 35 percent of AWI for those with 35 or more YOWs. (c) Use the 
          AWI for two years prior to the year of initial eligibility in the minimum PIA 
          calculation with COLA increase after the year of initial eligibility. (d) Scale 
          the YOW requirements for disabled workers, based on the number of years of 
          non-disabled potential work. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | -0.22 | -0.40 | -8% | -9% | |
| B6.1 | Provide a 5 percent increase to the monthly benefit amount (MBA) of any 
          beneficiary who is 85 or older at the beginning of 2018 or who reaches 
          their 85th birthday after the beginning of 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Chaffetz) | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.11 | -0.16 | -4% | -4% | |
| B6.2 | Provide the same dollar amount increase to the monthly benefit amount (MBA) 
          of any beneficiary who is 85 or older at the beginning of 2018 or who reaches 
          their 85th birthday after the beginning of 2018. The dollar amount of increase 
          equals 5 percent of the average retired-worker MBA in the prior year. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.11 | -0.16 | -4% | -3% | |
| B6.3 | Provide an increase in the benefit level of any beneficiary who is 85 or 
          older at the beginning of 2019 or who reaches their 85th birthday after 
          the beginning of 2019. Increase the beneficiary's PIA based on an amount 
          equal to the average retired-worker PIA at the end of 2018, or at the end 
          of the year age 80 if later. Increase the beneficiary's PIA by 5 percent 
          of this amount for those older than 85 at the beginning of 2019 and by 5 
          percent of this amount at age 85 for others, phased in at 1 percent per 
          year for ages 81-85. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | -0.14 | -0.19 | -5% | -4% | |
| B6.4 | Starting in 2018, provide a 5 percent uniform benefit increase 24 years 
          after initial benefit eligibility. Phase in the benefit increase at 1 
          percent per year from the 20th through 24th years after eligibility. For 
          disabled workers, the eligibility age is the initial entitlement year to 
          the benefit. The benefit increase is equal to 5 percent of the PIA of a 
          worker assumed to have career-average earnings equal to SSA's average wage 
          index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | memo (Fiscal Commission) | -0.16 | -0.21 | -5% | -5% | |
| B6.5 | Starting in 2020, provide a 5 percent uniform PIA increase 20 years after 
          benefit eligibility. Phase in the PIA increase at 1 percent per year from 
          the 16th through 20th years after eligibility. The full PIA increase is 
          equal to 5 percent of the PIA of a worker assumed to have career-average 
          earnings equal to the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Moore) | -0.24 | -0.31 | -8% | -7% | |
| B6.6 | Starting in 2024, provide a uniform PIA increase 23 years after benefit 
          eligibility. Phase in the PIA increase at 0.5 percent per year from the 
          14th through the 23rd years after eligibility. The full PIA increase is 
          equal to 5 percent of the average retired worker PIA in December of the 
          12th year after benefit eligibility. A similar additional PIA increase 
          applies 42 years after benefit eligibility (age 104), phased in from the 
          33rd through the 42nd years after eligibility. For those past the 14th 
          year of eligibility in 2024 (over age 76 for retirees), phase in the PIA 
          enhancement over 10 years starting in 2024. Auxiliary beneficiaries receive 
          benefit enhancement based on the PIA of the governing worker. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (FY 2014 Budget) | -0.21 | -0.30 | -8% | -7% | |
| B6.7 | Starting in January 2024, provide an addition to monthly benefits for all 
          beneficiaries who have been eligible for at least 20 years, with the following 
          specifications:  (1) Augment benefits (not the PIA) for those of qualifying 
          age and eligibility duration with a MAGI below about $25,600 if single and 
          $51,200 if married. MAGI is set to equal the IRMAA definition (AGI plus 
          tax-exempt interest income). Index these thresholds after 2024 by the increase 
          in the C-CPI-U; (2) The full additional amount is applicable for those born 
          1958 and later, once 24 years elapse from initial eligibility. The basic 
          additional amount is calculated as 5 percent of the PIA for a hypothetical 
          worker with earnings equal to the AWI each year; (3) For those born prior 
          to 1958, the full additional amount is multiplied by the number of years 
          they have been affected by the C-CPI-U, divided by 24; (4) Beneficiaries 
          will receive 20 percent of their additional amount in their 20th year after 
          initial eligibility, 40 percent in their 21st year after initial eligibility,..., 
          and 100 percent of their additional amount in their 24th and later years after 
          benefit eligibility; (5) Retired and disabled worker beneficiaries, dually entitled 
          spouse beneficiaries, and all survivor beneficiaries received their addition 
          as described above. Spousal beneficiaries (aged or with child in care) and 
          child beneficiaries of a living retired or disabled worker receive 50 percent 
          of the additional amount described above. Other beneficiary types (such as 
          parents of deceased workers) will receive the percentage of the flat benefit 
          that equals the percentage of the insured worker's PIA that they receive; 
          (6) The AWI used is for the second year prior to the beneficiary's initial 
          eligibility year, with applicable COLAs applied up to the age when the addition 
          is received; and (7) The additional amount is added to the monthly benefit 
          after reductions for early claiming or increases for delayed claiming have 
          been applied. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | -0.07 | -0.08 | -2% | -2% | |
| B7.1 | Reduce benefits by 3 percent for those newly eligible for benefits in 2018 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.37 | 0.51 | 13% | 11% | |
| B7.2 | Reduce benefits by 5 percent for those newly eligible for benefits in 2018 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.61 | 0.84 | 22% | 19% | |
| B7.3 | Give credit to parents with a child under 6 for earnings for up to 
          five years. The earnings credited for a childcare year equal one half 
          of the SSA average wage index (about $24,682 in 2016). The credits 
          are available for all past years to newly eligible retired-worker 
          and disabled-worker beneficiaries starting in 2018. The 5 years are 
          chosen to yield the largest increase in AIME. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.22 | -0.32 | -8% | -7% | |
| B7.4 | Increase benefits by 2 percent for all beneficiaries as of the beginning of 
          2018 and for those newly eligible for benefits after the beginning of 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.31 | -0.34 | -11% | -7% | |
| B7.5 | Increase benefits by 5 percent for all beneficiaries as of the beginning of 
          2018 and for those newly eligible for benefits after the beginning of 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.78 | -0.84 | -27% | -19% | |
| B7.6 | Increase benefits by 20 percent for all beneficiaries as of the beginning of 
          2018 and for those newly eligible for benefits after the beginning of 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -3.10 | -3.36 | -110% | -75% | |
| B7.7 | Reduce individual Social Security benefits if modified adjusted gross 
          income, or MAGI (AGI less taxable Social Security benefits plus nontaxable 
          interest income) is above $60,000 for single taxpayers or $120,000 for 
          taxpayers filing jointly. This provision is effective for individuals 
          newly eligible for benefits in 2022 or later. The percentage reduction 
          increases linearly up to 50 percent for single/joint filers with MAGI 
          of $180,000/$360,000 or above. Index the MAGI thresholds for years after 
          2022, based on changes in the SSA average wage index. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Chaffetz) | 0.34 | 0.47 | 12% | 10% | |
| B7.8 | Replace the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and Government Pension 
          Offset (GPO) with a revised reduction for most OASI benefits based on all 
          earnings, beginning with beneficiaries newly eligible in 2024. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.06 | 0.09 | 2% | 2% | |
| B7.9 | Beginning for newly eligible retired workers and spouses in 2024, all 
          claimants who are married would receive a specified joint-and-survivor 
          annuity benefit (i.e., surviving spouses would receive 75 percent of 
          the decedents' benefits, in addition to their own) that would be payable 
          if both were still alive. Initial benefits would be actuarially adjusted 
          to keep the expected value of benefits equivalent to what would otherwise 
          be current law. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.02 | -0.21 | 1% | -5% | |
| B7.10 | Replace the current-law WEP with a new calculation for most OASI and DI 
          benefits based on covered and non-covered earnings, phased in for beneficiaries 
          becoming newly eligible in 2024 through 2033. For this new approach, compute 
          a PIA based on all past earnings (covered and non-covered), and multiply 
          by the "non-covered earnings ratio." This ratio is equal to the current-law 
          concept of the average indexed monthly earnings computed without non-covered 
          earnings divided by a modified average indexed monthly earnings that includes 
          both covered and non-covered earnings in our records. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.03 | 0.06 | 1% | 1% | |
| B7.11 | Beginning in January 2020, eliminate the retirement earnings test for all 
          beneficiaries under normal retirement age, including retired workers, aged 
          spouses, aged widow(er)s, young spouses with a child in care, young surviving 
          spouses with a child in care, and children. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Walorski) | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.02 | 0.13 | 1% | 3% | |
| B7.12 | Provide an option to split the 8-percent delayed retirement credit (DRC) 
          to offer a lump sum benefit at initial entitlement equal to 2 percent of 
          the 8 percent DRC earned, and a 6 percent DRC on subsequent monthly benefits, 
          effective for workers newly entitled to retired worker benefits in 2020 and 
          later.  Widows are held harmless from the lump-sum decision. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Smith) | memo (Johnson 2016) | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0% | 0% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Retirement Age (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| C1.1 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, increase 
          the NRA 1 month every 2 years until the NRA reaches 68. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.37 | 0.70 | 13% | 16% | |
| C1.2 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, increase 
          the NRA 2 months per year until the NRA reaches 68. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Liebman, MacGuineas, Samwick) | 0.46 | 0.70 | 16% | 16% | |
| C1.3 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          index the NRA to maintain a constant ratio of expected retirement years 
          (life expectancy at NRA) to potential work years (NRA minus 20). We assume 
          the NRA will increase 1 month every 2 years. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ryan 2010) | memo (AARP) | memo (Ryan 2008) | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.54 | 1.58 | 19% | 35% | |
| C1.4 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          increase the NRA 2 months per year until it reaches 69 for individuals 
          attaining age 62 in 2034. Thereafter, increase the NRA 1 month every 2 years. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | memo (Chaffetz) | 1.10 | 2.23 | 39% | 50% | |
| C1.5 | Starting in 2018, allow workers to choose whether to have their payroll 
          tax rate reduced by 2 percentage points. For each calendar year that a 
          worker chooses to have their payroll tax reduced, their normal retirement 
          age (NRA) increases 1 month. We assume 2/3 of workers each year will choose 
          this payroll reduction. The General Fund of the Treasury reimburses the OASI 
          and DI Trust Funds for the reduction in payroll tax revenue. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Landry) | 0.67 | 1.26 | 24% | 28% | |
| C1.6 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          increase the NRA by 1 month every 2 years until the NRA reaches 69. Also 
          increase the age up to which the delayed retirement credit may be earned 
          at the same rate (from 70 to 72). No change to earliest eligibility age. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.52 | 1.37 | 19% | 30% | |
| C1.7 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those attaining age 
          62 in 2022, increase the NRA by 3 months per year starting for attaining 
          age 62 in 2023 until it reaches 69 for those attaining age 62 in 2030. 
          Increase the age up to which delayed retirement credits may be earned from 
          70 to 72 on the same schedule. Increase the widow(er) NRA in the same manner. 
          The earliest eligibility age (EEA) for worker's and widow(er)'s benefit is 
          unchanged. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.87 | 1.37 | 31% | 30% | |
| C2.1 | Increase the earliest eligibility age (EEA) by two months per year for those 
          age 62 starting in 2019 and ending in 2036 (EEA reaches 65 for those age 62 
          in 2036). graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | -0.07 | -0.42 | -2% | -9% | |
| C2.2 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          index the NRA to maintain a constant ratio of expected retirement years 
          (life expectancy at NRA) to potential work years (NRA minus 20). We assume 
          the NRA will increase 1 month every 2 years. Also, raise the earliest 
          eligibility age (EEA) for retired-workers, aged widow(er)s, and disabled 
          widow(er)s by the same amount as the NRA starting for those attaining EEA 
          in 2018. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | memo (Warshawsky) | 0.51 | 1.28 | 18% | 29% | |
| C2.3 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          index the NRA to maintain a constant ratio of expected retirement years (life 
          expectancy at NRA) to potential work years (NRA minus 20). We assume the NRA 
          will increase 1 month every 2 years. Also, increase the earliest eligibility 
          age (EEA) by the same amount as the NRA starting for those age 62 in 2022 
          so as to maintain a 5 year difference between the two ages. Include a 
          "hardship exemption" with no EEA/NRA change for a worker with 25 years of 
          earnings (with 4 quarters of coverage each), and average indexed monthly 
          earnings (AIME) less than 250 percent of the poverty level (wage-indexed 
          from 2013). The hardship exemption is phased out for those with AIME above 
          400 percent of the poverty level. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Fiscal Commission) | 0.40 | 1.11 | 14% | 25% | |
| C2.4 | After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for those age 62 in 2022, 
          increase both the NRA and the earliest eligibility age (EEA) by 36/47 of a 
          month per year until the NRA and EEA reach 70 and 65 respectively. For each 
          year, the computed NRA and EEA round down to the next lower full month. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Lummis) | 0.75 | 1.84 | 27% | 41% | |
| C2.5 | Increase the normal retirement age (NRA) 3 months per year starting for those 
          age 62 in 2018 until the NRA reaches 70 in 2033. Thereafter, index the NRA to 
          maintain a constant ratio of expected retirement years (life expectancy at NRA) 
          to potential work years (NRA minus 20). We assume the NRA will increase 1 month 
          every 2 years. Also, increase the earliest eligibility age (EEA) from 62 to 64 
          at the same time the NRA increases from 67 to 69; that is, for those attaining 
          age 62 in 2021 through 2028. Keep EEA at 64 thereafter. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Graham, Paul, Lee) | 1.35 | 2.73 | 48% | 61% | |
| C2.6 | Increase the normal retirement age (NRA) and the earliest eligibility 
          age (EEA) for those age 62 in 2020-2021 to 68 and 63, respectively, and 
          then by 3 months per year in 2022-2025 to 69 and 64, respectively. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Hutchison) | 0.91 | 1.15 | 32% | 26% | |
| C2.7 | Increase the normal retirement age (NRA) and the earliest eligibility age 
          (EEA) for those age 62 starting in 2018 by 3 months per year until EEA 
          reaches 64 in 2025 and NRA reaches 69 in 2029. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Hutchison) | 0.83 | 1.15 | 29% | 26% | |
| C2.8 | Starting in 2020, convert all disabled-worker beneficiaries to retired-worker 
          status upon attainment of their earliest eligibility age (EEA) rather than 
          their normal retirement age (NRA). After conversion, apply the early retirement 
          reduction for retirement at EEA (currently about 28.3 percent for those age 62 
          in 2020) phased in over 40 years. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | 0.44 | 0.81 | 16% | 18% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Family Member Benefits (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| D1 | Beginning in 2018, continue benefits for children of disabled or deceased 
          workers until age 22 if the child is in high school, college or vocational 
          school. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Lawson) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | memo (Begich, Murray) | memo (Moore) | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | -0.06 | -0.06 | -2% | -1% | |
| D2 | The current spouse benefit is based on 50 percent of the PIA of the other 
          spouse. Reduce this percent each year by 1 percentage point beginning with 
          newly eligible spouses in 2018, until the percent reaches 33 in 2034. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | 0.11 | 0.16 | 4% | 4% | |
| D3 | Allow divorced aged spouses and divorced surviving spouses married 5 to 9 
          years to get benefits based on the former spouse's account. Divorced aged 
          and surviving spouses would receive 50% of the applicable current-law PIA 
          percentage if married 5 years, 60% of the applicable PIA percentage if 
          married 6 years, ..., 90% of the applicable PIA percentage if married 9 
          years. This benefit would be available to divorced spouses on the rolls
          at the beginning of 2019 and those becoming eligible after 2019. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Begich, Murray) | -0.02 | -0.01 | -1% | -0% | |
| D4 | Establish an alternative benefit for a surviving spouse. For the surviving 
          spouse, the alternative benefit would equal 75 percent of the sum of the 
          survivor's own worker benefit and the deceased worker's PIA (including any 
          actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits). If the deceased worker 
          died before becoming entitled, use the age 62 actuarial reduction if deceased 
          before age 62, or the applicable actuarial reduction/DRC for entitlement at 
          the age of death if deceased after 62. The alternative benefit would not exceed 
          the PIA of a hypothetical earner who earns the SSA average wage index (AWI) 
          every year, and who becomes eligible for retired-worker benefits in the same 
          year in which the deceased worker became entitled to worker benefits or died 
          (if before entitlement). The alternative benefit would be paid only if more 
          than the current-law benefit. This benefit would be available to surviving 
          spouses on the rolls at the beginning of 2019 and those becoming eligible 
          after 2019. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Lawson) | memo (Begich, Murray) | -0.12 | -0.13 | -4% | -3% | |
| D5 | Limit the spousal benefit to that received by the spouse of the 75th percentile 
          career-average worker, beginning with retired workers newly eligible in 2024. 
          For future cohorts, this limit would be indexed for inflation annually using 
          chain weighted CPI-U. The provision affects divorced spouses and young spouses 
          (retired workers) but not spouses of disabled workers. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.09 | 0.19 | 3% | 4% | |
| D6 | For spouses and children of retired and disabled workers becoming newly 
          eligible beginning in 2024 and phased in for 2024 through 2033, limit 
          their auxiliary benefit to one-half of the PIA for a hypothetical worker 
          with earnings equal to the national average wage index (AWI) each year. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.07 | 0.11 | 2% | 2% | |
| D7 | Beginning in January 2020, require full time school enrollment as a 
          condition of eligibility for child benefits at age 15 up to 18. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0% | 0% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Payroll Taxes (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| E1.1 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 15.4 percent in 
          2018 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 2.85 | 2.97 | 101% | 66% | |
| E1.2 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 15.5 percent in 
          2030-2059, and to 18.6 percent in years 2060 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 3.33 | 5.99 | 118% | 134% | |
| E1.3 | Reduce the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 11.4 percent in 
          2018 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | -0.97 | -1.01 | -34% | -23% | |
| E1.4 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) by 0.1 percentage point 
          each year from 2023-2042, until the rate reaches 14.4 percent in 2042 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2014) | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | 1.45 | 1.99 | 51% | 44% | |
| E1.5 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 12.6 percent in 2020, 
          12.9 percent in 2028, 13.1 in percent in 2038, 13.9 percent in 2048, 13.5 percent 
          in 2058, and 13.3 percent in 2068 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.76 | 0.91 | 27% | 20% | |
| E1.6 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 12.6 percent in 2020, 
          12.9 percent in 2028, 13.3 in percent in 2038, 13.8 percent in 2048, 14.4 percent 
          in 2068, and 14.5 percent in 2083 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 1.07 | 2.07 | 38% | 46% | |
| E1.7 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) to 12.7 percent in 2020, 
          13.0 percent in 2033, 13.3 in percent in 2048, 14.0 percent in 2068, 14.5 percent 
          in 2078, and 14.7 percent in 2088 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.88 | 2.25 | 31% | 50% | |
| E1.8 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) by 0.1 percentage point 
          each year from 2020-2025, until the rate reaches 13.0 percent for 2025 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Moore) | 0.54 | 0.60 | 19% | 13% | |
| E1.9 | Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4 percent) by 0.1 percentage point 
          each year from 2021-2044, until the rate reaches 14.8 percent in 2044. Then 
          increase the payroll tax rate an additional 0.1 percentage point in each year 
          from 2083-2087, until the rate reaches 15.3 percent for 2087 and later. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2017) | memo (Larson 2015) | 1.76 | 2.85 | 62% | 64% | |
| E1.10 | Increase the payroll tax rate by 0.1 percentage point per year for 2019 through 
          2028 so that it equals 13.4 percent for 2028 and later. The increase would be 
          split evenly between the employer and employee share, and would be split between 
          OASI and DI in proportion to currently scheduled payroll tax rates. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.88 | 1.00 | 31% | 22% | |
| E2.1 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2018 and later, and apply full 12.4 percent 
          payroll tax rate to all earnings. Do not provide benefit credit for earnings above 
          the current-law taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (DeFazio 2015) | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 2.35 | 2.46 | 83% | 55% | |
| E2.2 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2018 and later, and apply full 12.4 percent 
          payroll tax rate to all earnings. Provide benefit credit for earnings above the 
          current-law taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 1.89 | 1.60 | 67% | 36% | |
| E2.3 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2018 and later, and apply full 12.4 percent 
          payroll tax rate to all earnings. Provide benefit credit for earnings above the 
          current-law taxable maximum.  Create a new bend point at the current-law taxable 
          maximum with a 3 percent formula factor applying above the new bend point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | 2.15 | 2.15 | 76% | 48% | |
| E2.4 | Eliminate the taxable maximum for years 2024 and later (phased in 2018-2024), 
          and apply full 12.4 percent payroll tax rate to all earnings. Provide benefit 
          credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum that are subject to 
          the payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula 
          involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings from each year after 
          2017 that were in excess of that year's current-law taxable maximum; (2) a 
          new bend point equal to 134 percent of the monthly current-law taxable maximum; 
          and (3) formula factors of 3 percent and 0.25 percent below and above the new 
          bend point, respectively. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Deutch, Hirono) | memo (Deutch 2015) | memo (Deutch 2010) | 2.18 | 2.35 | 77% | 52% | |
| E2.5 | Apply 12.4 percent payroll tax rate on earnings above $250,000 starting in 2018, 
          and tax all earnings once the current-law taxable maximum exceeds $250,000. Do 
          not provide benefit credit for additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Sanders, DeFazio) | memo (Sanders 2016) | memo (Sanders 2015) | memo (Sanders 2013) | memo (DeFazio 2011) | 2.19 | 2.46 | 77% | 55% | |
| E2.6 | Apply a 3 percent payroll tax on earnings above the current-law taxable maximum 
          starting in 2018. Do not provide benefit credit for earnings above the current-law 
          taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | 0.61 | 0.64 | 21% | 14% | |
| E2.7 | Apply a 6 percent payroll tax on earnings above the current-law taxable maximum 
          starting in 2018. Do not provide benefit credit for earnings above the current-law 
          taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Wexler) | 1.19 | 1.25 | 42% | 28% | |
| E2.8 | Apply a 2 percent payroll tax on earnings above the current-law taxable 
          maximum for years 2020-2067, and a 3 percent rate for years 2068 and later. 
          Do not provide benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable 
          maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.44 | 0.63 | 16% | 14% | |
| E2.9 | Apply the following payroll tax rates above the current-law taxable maximum: 
          2.0 percent in 2020, 3.0 percent in 2033, 3.5 percent in 2048, 4.5 percent 
          in 2058, and 5.5 percent in 2068 and later. Do not provide benefit credit 
          for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.71 | 1.14 | 25% | 25% | |
| E2.10 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2028 and later. Phase in elimination by 
          taxing all earnings above the current-law taxable maximum at: 1.24 percent in 2019, 
          2.48 percent in 2020, and so on, up to 12.40 percent in 2028. Provide benefit credit 
          for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum.  Create a new bend point at the 
          current-law taxable maximum with a 5 percent formula factor applying above the new 
          bend point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Harkin 2012) | 1.92 | 2.05 | 68% | 46% | |
| E2.11 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2023 and later. Phase in elimination by 
          taxing all earnings above the current-law taxable maximum at: 2.48 percent in 
          2019, 4.96 percent in 2020, and so on, up to 12.40 percent in 2023. Provide benefit 
          credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum that are subject to the 
          payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula involves: 
          (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings from each year after 2017 that were 
          in excess of that year's current-law taxable maximum; and (2) a formula factor 
          of 5 percent on this newly computed "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Sanchez) | memo (Schatz) | memo (Harkin 2013) | 2.09 | 2.16 | 74% | 48% | |
| E2.12 | Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2029 and later. Phase in elimination 
          by taxing all earnings above the current-law taxable maximum at: 1.24 percent 
          in 2020, 2.48 percent in 2021, and so on, up to 12.40 percent in 2029. Provide 
          benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum. Create a 
          new bend point at the current-law taxable maximum with a 3 percent formula 
          factor applying above the new bend point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Moore) | 1.92 | 2.15 | 68% | 48% | |
| E2.13 | Apply OASDI payroll tax rate on earnings above $400,000 starting in 2019, and 
          tax all earnings once the current-law taxable maximum exceeds $400,000. Provide 
          benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum that are subject 
          to the payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula 
          involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings from each year after 2018 
          that were in excess of that year's current-law taxable maximum; and (2) a formula 
          factor of 2 percent on this newly computed "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2015) | memo (Larson 2014) | 1.88 | 2.34 | 66% | 52% | |
| E2.14 | Apply OASDI payroll tax rate on earnings above $250,000 starting in 2019, and 
          tax all earnings once the current-law taxable maximum exceeds $250,000. Provide 
          benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum that are subject 
          to the payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula 
          involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings from each year after 2018 
          that were in excess of that year's current-law taxable maximum; and (2) a formula 
          factor of 2 percent on this newly computed "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Lawson) | 2.11 | 2.34 | 75% | 52% | |
| E2.15 | Apply OASDI payroll tax rate on earnings above $300,000 starting in 2019, 
          and tax all earnings once the current-law taxable maximum exceeds $300,000. 
          Provide benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum 
          that are subject to the payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This 
          secondary PIA formula involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings 
          from each year after 2018 that were in excess of that year's current-law 
          taxable maximum; and (2) a formula factor of 3 percent on this newly computed 
          "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Crist) | 2.00 | 2.28 | 71% | 51% | |
| E3.1 | Increase the taxable maximum such that 90 percent of earnings would be subject 
          to the payroll tax (phased in 2018-2027). Provide benefit credit for earnings 
          up to the revised taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.77 | 0.64 | 27% | 14% | |
| E3.2 | Increase the taxable maximum such that 90 percent of earnings would be subject 
          to the payroll tax (phased in 2018-2027). Do not provide benefit credit for 
          additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Liebman, MacGuineas, Samwick) | 0.98 | 1.10 | 35% | 25% | |
| E3.3 | Increase the taxable maximum such that 90 percent of earnings would be subject 
          to the payroll tax (phased in 2019-2024). Provide benefit credit for earnings 
          up to the revised taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | 0.77 | 0.64 | 27% | 14% | |
| E3.4 | Increase the taxable maximum from $106,800 to $115,200 (in 2009 AWI-indexed dollars), 
          or from $142,200 to $153,300 in 2020, phased in 2018-2020. Provide benefit credit for 
          earnings up to the revised taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | 0.11 | 0.08 | 4% | 2% | |
| E3.5 | Increase the taxable maximum each year by an additional 2 percent beginning in 2018 
          until taxable earnings equal 90 percent of covered earnings. Provide benefit credit 
          for earnings up to the revised taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | 0.63 | 0.66 | 22% | 15% | |
| E3.6 | Increase the taxable maximum each year by an additional 2 percent beginning 
          in 2020 until taxable earnings equal 90 percent of covered earnings. Do not 
          provide benefit credit for additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (NRC/NAPA) | 0.75 | 1.10 | 26% | 25% | |
| E3.7 | Increase the taxable maximum by an additional 2 percent per year beginning in 
          2019 until taxable earnings equal 90 percent of covered earnings. Provide benefit 
          credit for earnings up to the revised taxable maximum. Create a new bend point 
          equal to the current-law taxable maximum with a 5 percent formula factor applying 
          above the new bend point. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Fiscal Commission) | 0.64 | 0.77 | 23% | 17% | |
| E3.8 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $200,000 in 2017 (about $274,500 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Provide proportional benefit credit 
          for additional earnings taxed, based on the payroll tax rate applied to the 
          additional earnings divided by the full 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.20 | 0.16 | 7% | 4% | |
| E3.9 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $200,000 in 2017 (about $274,500 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Do not provide benefit credit for 
          additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.25 | 0.30 | 9% | 7% | |
| E3.10 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $300,000 in 2017 (about $411,600 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Provide proportional benefit credit 
          for additional earnings taxed, based on the payroll tax rate applied to the 
          additional earnings divided by the full 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.14 | 0.12 | 5% | 3% | |
| E3.11 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $300,000 in 2017 (about $411,600 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Do not provide benefit credit for 
          additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.19 | 0.22 | 7% | 5% | |
| E3.12 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $400,000 in 2017 (about $548,700 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Provide proportional benefit credit 
          for additional earnings taxed, based on the payroll tax rate applied to the 
          additional earnings divided by the full 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.12 | 0.09 | 4% | 2% | |
| E3.13 | Beginning in 2025, apply 2 percent payroll tax rate on earnings over the 
          wage-indexed equivalent of $400,000 in 2017 (about $548,700 in 2025), with 
          the threshold wage-indexed after 2025. Do not provide benefit credit for 
          additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson, Brady, Ryan) (includes similar provisions with 3 percent and 4 percent payroll tax rates) | 0.15 | 0.18 | 5% | 4% | |
| E3.14 | Eliminate the taxable maximum for the employer payroll tax (6.2 percent) 
          beginning in 2018. For the employee payroll tax (6.2 percent) and for benefit 
          credit purposes, beginning in 2018, increase the taxable maximum by an additional 
          2 percent per year until taxable earnings equal 90 percent of covered earnings. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (National Academy of Social Insurance) | 1.43 | 1.38 | 51% | 31% | |
| E3.15 | Increase the taxable maximum such that 90 percent of earnings are subject to 
          the payroll tax (phased in 2018-2027). In addition, apply a tax rate of 6.2 percent 
          for earnings above the revised taxable maximum (phased in from 2018-2027). Provide 
          benefit credit for earnings taxed up to the revised taxable maximum. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Senate Special Committee on Aging) | 1.39 | 1.35 | 49% | 30% | |
| E3.16 | Beginning in 2019, apply 4 percent payroll tax rate on earnings above the wage-indexed 
          equivalent of $400,000 in 2015 (about $457,200 in 2019), with the threshold wage-indexed 
          after 2019. Provide benefit credit for additional earnings taxed, using a secondary PIA 
          formula. This secondary PIA formula involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings 
          taxed only between 2015 wage-indexed equivalents of $400,000 and $500,000, or about 
          $457,200 and $571,500 in 2019 (with thresholds wage-indexed after 2019); and (2) a formula 
          factor of 2 percent on this newly computed "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2017) | memo (Begich, Murray) | 0.30 | 0.33 | 11% | 7% | |
| E3.17 | Beginning in 2019, increase the taxable maximum by twice the rate of increase in the 
          national Average Wage Index, but never by less than 3 percent. Provide benefit credit 
          for earnings up to the revised taxable maximum levels. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Murphy) | 1.06 | 1.47 | 37% | 33% | |
| E3.18 | Increase the taxable maximum linearly over 4 years to $212,700 for 2022. After 2022, 
          index the taxable maximum to AWI plus 0.5 percentage point. Apply benefit credit on 
          additional earnings taxed. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.57 | 0.64 | 20% | 14% | |
| E3.19 | Increase the taxable maximum such that 90 percent of earnings would be subject to the 
          payroll tax (phased in linearly from 2019-2024). Provide benefit credit for additional 
          earnings taxed, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula involves: (1) 
          an "AIME+" derived from additional annual earnings taxed over the current-law taxable 
          maximum; and (2) a formula factor of 2.5 percent on this newly computed "AIME+". graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Ribble) | 0.97 | 1.06 | 34% | 24% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Coverage of Employment (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| F1 | Starting in 2018, cover newly hired State and local government employees. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Fiscal Commission) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | memo (Warshawsky) | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.17 | -0.18 | 6% | -4% | |
| F2 | Starting in 2018, exempt individuals with more than 180 quarters of coverage from 
          the OASDI payroll tax. Earnings exempted from OASDI payroll tax would not be used 
          in computing benefits. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | -0.52 | -0.71 | -18% | -16% | |
| F3 | Expand covered earnings to include employer and employee premiums for 
          employer-sponsored group health insurance (ESI). Starting in 2021, phase 
          out the OASDI payroll tax exclusion for ESI premiums. Set an exclusion 
          level at the 75th percentile of premium distribution in 2021, with amounts 
          above that subject to the payroll tax. Reduce the exclusion level each year 
          by 10 percent of the 2021 exclusion level until fully eliminated in 2031. 
          Eliminate the excise tax on ESI premiums starting in 2021. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | 0.94 | 0.66 | 33% | 15% | |
| F4 | Expand covered earnings to include contributions to voluntary salary 
          reduction plans (such as Cafeteria 125 plans and Flexible Spending 
          Accounts). Starting in 2018, subject these contributions to the OASDI 
          payroll tax, making the payroll tax treatment of these contributions 
          like 401(k) contributions. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | 0.28 | 0.17 | 10% | 4% | |
| F5 | Tax Reform for Business: Establish a value added tax of 3.0 percent for 
          2019 and 6.5 percent for 2020 and later. Starting in 2019, reduce the corporate 
          income tax rate from 35 to 27 percent. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | -0.02 | 0.17 | -1% | 4% | |
| F6 | Apply a 6.2 percent tax on investment income as defined in the Affordable Care 
          Act (ACA), with unindexed thresholds as in the ACA ($200,000 for single filer, 
          $250,000 for married filing jointly), starting in 2019. Proceeds go to the OASDI 
          Trust Fund. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Sanders, DeFazio) | memo (Sanders 2016) | memo (Sanders 2015) | 0.94 | 1.16 | 33% | 26% | |
| Category: Provisions Affecting Trust Fund Investment in Equities (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| G1 | Invest 40 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2018-2032), assuming an ultimate 6.2 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.53* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G2 | Invest 40 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2018-2032), assuming an ultimate 5.2 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.39* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G3 | Invest 40 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2018-2032), assuming an ultimate 2.7 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. Thus, the ultimate rate of return on equities is the same as that 
          assumed for Trust Fund bonds. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.00* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G4 | Invest 15 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2018-2027), assuming an ultimate 6.2 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | 0.22* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G5 | Invest 15 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2018-2027), assuming an ultimate 2.7 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. Thus, the ultimate rate of return on equities is the same as that 
          assumed for Trust Fund bonds. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (AARP) | 0.00* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G6 | Invest 25 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2020-2029), assuming an ultimate 6.2 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2014) | 0.34* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| G7 | Invest 25 percent of the OASDI Trust Fund reserves in equities (phased in 
          2020-2029), assuming an ultimate 2.7 percent annual real rate of return on 
          equities. Thus, the ultimate rate of return on equities is the same as that 
          assumed for Trust Fund bonds. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2014) | 0.00* | 0.00 | * | 0% | |
| * A change in the investment of trust fund reserves to include some equities affects the size of all summarized measures because increased "present-value" discounting reduces the weight on values for more distant future years. As a result, the magnitude of the current-law actuarial balance and the summarized effects of most proposals is reduced. Therefore, the size of the change in the long-range actuarial balance indicated here cannot be interpreted directly as a reduction in the shortfall. The actual reduction in the shortfall from equity investment depends on the amount of reserves that are available for investment throughout the period. For example, if provisions to change revenue or scheduled benefits resulted in a purely pay-as-you-go system (reserves just above zero throughout the period), then investment in equities would have no effect on the actuarial balance. | ||||||
| Category: Provisions Affecting Taxation of Benefits (2017 Trustees Report intermediate assumptions) | ||||||
| Current law shortfall in long-range actuarial balance is 2.83 percent of payroll and in annual balance for the 75th year is 4.48 percent of payroll. | ||||||
| H1 | Starting in 2018, tax Social Security benefits in a manner similar to 
          private pension income. Phase out the lower-income thresholds during 
          2018-2027. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Social Security Advisory Board) | 0.20 | 0.15 | 7% | 3% | |
| H2 | Starting in 2018, tax Social Security benefits in a manner similar to 
          private pension income. Phase out the lower-income thresholds during 
          2018-2037. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Warshawsky) | 0.19 | 0.15 | 7% | 3% | |
| H3 | Starting in 2019, modify personal income tax by: (a) establishing two-brackets 
          with marginal rates of 15 and 27 percent separated at $51,000 (CPI indexed); (b) 
          creating a non-refundable credit for low-income tax filers age 65 and older; and 
          (c) treating capital gains as regular income. Tax all Social Security benefits 
          at the applicable marginal rate (15 or 27 percent) less 7.5 percent, with 60 
          percent of this revenue going to OASDI and 40 percent going to HI. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center 2010) | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0% | -1% | |
| H4 | Increase the threshold for taxation of OASDI benefits to $50,000 for single 
          filers and $100,000 for joint filers starting in 2019. Taxation of benefits 
          revenues transferred to the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund would be the 
          same as if the current-law computation applied. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2015) | memo (Larson 2014) | -0.11 | -0.01 | -4% | -0% | |
| H5 | Beginning in 2024, for single/head-of-household/married-filing-separate taxpayers 
          with MAGI of $250,000 or more and joint filers with MAGI of $500,000 or more, include 
          up to the remaining 15 percent of Social Security benefits in taxable income (increased 
          from up to 85 percent of benefits taxable under current law). In subsequent years, 
          update these thresholds for growth in wages (AWI). Revenue from this provision would 
          be credited to the Social Security trust funds. Current law taxation of up to 85 percent 
          of Social Security benefits would remain unchanged. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center October 2016) | memo (Bipartisan Policy Center June 2016) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0% | 0% | |
| H6 | Eliminate federal income taxation of OASDI benefits that is credited to the OASI and DI 
          Trust Funds for 2054 and later. Phase out OASDI taxation of benefits by increasing 
          relevant "income" thresholds from 2045 through 2053 as follows, for single/joint tax 
          filers:  (a) 2045 = $32,500/$65,000; (b) 2046 = $40,000/$80,000; (c) 2047 = $47,500/$95,000; 
          (d) 2048 = $55,000/$110,000; (e) 2049 = $62,500/$125,000; (f) 2050 = $70,000/$140,000; 
          (g) 2051 = $77,500/$155,000; (h) 2052 = $85,000/$170,000; and (i) 2053 = $92,500/$185,000.  
          Taxation of benefits revenues for the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund would be maintained 
          at the same level as if the current-law computation applied. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Johnson 2016) | -0.41 | -0.94 | -14% | -21% | |
| H7 | Replace the current-law thresholds for federal income taxation of OASDI benefits 
          with a single set of thresholds at $50,000 for single filers and $100,000 for joint 
          filers for taxation of up to 85 percent of OASDI benefits, effective for tax year 
          2019.  These thresholds would be fixed and not indexed to price inflation or average 
          wage increase. Reallocate a portion of revenue from taxation of OASDI benefits 
          to the HI Trust Fund such that the HI Trust Fund would be in the same position 
          as if the current-law computation (in the absence of this provision) applied.  
          The net amount of revenue from taxing OASDI benefits, after the allocation to HI, 
          would be allocated to the combined Social Security Trust Fund. graph | table | pdf-graph | pdf-table | memo (Larson 2017) | -0.18 | -0.01 | -6% | -0% | |